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Abstract 
 
This dissertation analyzes how indigenous populations are politically 
included by or excluded from different forms of market-based 
conservation practices being implemented by state agencies, NGOs and 
international financial institutions (IFIs), in two adjacent Costa Rican 
indigenous territories: the Talamanca-Bribri and the Talamanca-Cabécar 
Indigenous Reserves (TBIR and TCIR, respectively). More precisely, this 
thesis explores the interaction between these indigenous peoples and 
three green economy interventions oriented at conserving forest cover 
and biodiversity through: 1) the promotion of organic cacao production in 
agroforestry systems (AFS), 2) the financialization of forest carbon 
through payments of environmental services (PES) and 3) the design of 
new indigenous-minded forms of PES through REDD+.  
While this thesis explores if the various economic, environmental 
and social promises of these interventions become materialized, attention 
is focused on explaining their political impact with regards to historical 
indigenous demands for autonomy, control over natural resource 
management and right to self-determination. In this sense, this thesis will 
conceptualize these interventions as ‘inclusive’ forms of neoliberal 
conservation oriented towards addressing the historical forms of social 
exclusion of the Bribri and Cabécar indigenous peoples from Costa Rican 
society. This thesis will show how the green economy has been embraced 
by conservation state agencies and NGOs in Costa Rica from an 
ambivalent stance, coming not from a stable consensus over the need of 
configuring forest governance under market logics, but due to neoliberal 
pressures to make protected areas financially self-supporting and capable 
of contributing to the wider national economy vis-à-vis other productive 
and social land uses. It will also explain how have the Bribri and the 
Cabécar managed to retain a strong territorial claim over their lands, 
leading state and NGO actors to introduce market-based conservation in 
the TBIR and TCIR as an effort towards modifying existing indigenous 
livelihoods, behavior and perspectives in favor of conservation, instead of 
forcefully imposing it.  
Afterwards, this dissertation will characterize the manner in which 
the proponents of these forms of the green economy have attempted to 
gain legitimacy and promote “buy-in” for these interventions at a local 
level, while also highlighting how local participation is being shaped by 
discursive and material powers of the green economy. It will explain how 
these interventions simultaneously appropriate indigenous demands for 
political autonomy and self-determination and transform local 
institutions handling natural resource governance. Drawing on literature 
 xix 
about the relationship between indigenous politics and state formation, 
this thesis explains how this appropriation and transformation of 
indigenous demands lead to new forms of social exclusion.  
Overall, this thesis is based on the concept of neoliberal 
multiculturalism, understood as a political project engrained within 
neoliberal forms of governance that seeks to selectively recognize 
indigenous rights with the objective of rendering these compatible to the 
wider ideas, interests and logics of capital. Using this concept as a key part 
of the analytical framework, this thesis demonstrates that the market-
based interventions in the TBIR and TCIR entail the disciplining of 
indigenous peoples and politics to livelihoods considered more 
compatible with the economic and political practices and ideas of the 
green economy, while still recognizing and supporting the traditions, 
rights and ideas of the Bribri and Cabécar inhabitants that are compatible 
to neoliberal conservation. So, viewed in a historical perspective, the gap 
between recognition and implementation of indigenous rights in Costa 
Rica is not being reduced through neoliberal conservation. While 
conservation state agencies and NGOs have begun to diversify 
environmental governance to accommodate to some indigenous ideas and 
culture, the overriding neoliberal mindsets of individualistic rationality, 
marginal optimization and environmental efficiency remain the 
unyielding project planning imperatives. Consequently, this thesis argues 
that while there is some effort to achieve inclusivity through these 
interventions, political exclusion remains an integral feature of the 
relationship between modern conservation and indigenous peoples in 
Costa Rica. 
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Resumen 
 
Esta disertación analiza cómo poblaciones indígenas resultan 
políticamente incluidas o excluidas de diferentes prácticas de 
conservación basadas en el mercado, implementadas por agencias 
estatales, ONGs e instituciones financieras internacionales (IFI), en dos 
territorios indígenas costarricenses: las Reservas Indígenas Talamanca-
Bribri y Talamanca Cabécar (TBIR y TCIR, respectivamente). Más 
precisamente, esta tesis explora la interacción entre pueblos indígenas y 
tres intervenciones inspiradas en la economía verde y orientadas a la 
conservación de la cobertura forestal y la biodiversidad, a través de: 1) la 
promoción de producción de cacao orgánico en sistemas agroforestales 
(SAF), 2) la financialización del carbono producido por bosques a través 
de pagos por servicios ambientales (PES) y 3) el diseño de nuevas formas 
de PES amigables a los derechos indígenas por medio de REDD+.  
Si bien la tesis explora si las promesas económicas, ambientales y 
sociales terminan materializándose, la atención se centra en explicar el 
impacto político de estas intervenciones al respecto de demandas 
históricas de los indígenas por una mayor autonomía, control sobre los 
recursos naturales y el derecho a la autodeterminación. En este sentido, 
esta tesis conceptualizará estas intervenciones como formas ‘inclusivas’ 
de conservación neoliberal orientadas a abordar formas históricas de 
exclusión política de los Bribri y Cabécar en la sociedad costarricense. Esta 
tesis demostrará cómo la economía verde ha sido acogida por las ONG y 
las agencias costarricenses de conservación estatal desde una posición 
ambivalente, definida no por un consenso estable sobre la necesidad de 
configurar la gobernanza forestal bajo lógicas de mercado, sino que como 
resultado de presiones neoliberales destinadas a hacer a las áreas 
protegidas financieramente autosostenibles y capaces de contribuir a la 
economía nacional. Se explicará cómo es que los Bribri y Cabécar han 
logrado retener un fuerte control de su territorio, obligando al estado y las 
ONG a introducir la conservación basada en el mercado no mediante la 
imposición forzosa, sino que como un esfuerzo de reformar los modos de 
vivencia indígena para ser más coherentes con la conservación.  
Posteriormente, esta disertación caracterizará la forma en que los 
proponentes de esta economía verde han intentado obtener legitimidad y 
promover la aceptación indígena de estas intervenciones a nivel local, al 
tiempo que se señala cómo la participación local es moldeada por el 
discurso de la economía verde. Se explicará cómo estas intervenciones se 
apropian simultáneamente de las demandas indígenas de mayor 
autonomía política y la autodeterminación, para transformar instituciones 
locales encargadas de la administración de recursos naturales. Con base 
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en literatura recientes sobre la relación entre política indígena y formación 
de Estado, esta tesis explica cómo la apropiación y transformación de las 
demandas indígenas lleva a nuevas formas de exclusión social.  
En general, esta tesis está basada en el concepto de 
multiculturalismo neoliberal, entendido como un proyecto político 
enraizado dentro de formas neoliberales de gobernanza que busca 
reconocer selectivamente los derechos indígenas con el objetivo de 
hacerlos compatibles a las ideas, intereses y lógicas más amplias del 
capitalismo. Usando este concepto como una parte clave del marco 
analítico, esta tesis demuestra que las intervenciones de mercado en el 
TBIR y el TCIR, implican el disciplinamiento de los pueblos indígenas y 
su política a favor de modos de vivencia considerados más compatibles 
con las prácticas económicas y políticas, así como las ideas de la economía 
verde, mientras se reconocen las tradiciones, derechos e ideas de los Bribri 
y Cabécar que pueden ser compatibles con la conservación neoliberal. De 
este modo, vistas en una perspectiva histórica, la brecha entre el 
reconocimiento y la implementación de derechos indígenas en Costa Rica 
no está siendo reducida por medio de esta conservación neoliberal 
‘inclusiva’. Si bien, agencias estatales y ONG han venido diversificando la 
gobernanza ambiental para admitir algunas ideas indígenas, las 
mentalidades neoliberales de racionalidad individualista, optimización 
marginal y eficiencia ambiental siguen siendo los imperativos de la 
planificación de proyectos. Consecuentemente, esta tesis argumenta que, 
si bien hay esfuerzos para garantizar la inclusividad a través de estas 
intervenciones, la exclusión política continúa siendo la faceta integral de 
la relación entre la conservación moderna y los pueblos indígenas de 
Costa Rica.    
 xxii 
 
 
 
Samenvatting 
 
In dit proefschrift wordt beschreven hoe inheemse bevolkingsgroepen in 
de samenleving opgenomen of ervan uitgesloten worden als gevolg van 
de implementatie van verschillende methoden van op de markt gebaseerd 
natuurbehoud in twee aangrenzende leefgebieden van de inheemse 
bevolking: de Talamanca-Bribri en Talamanca-Cabécar Indigenous 
Reserves (respectievelijk TBIR en TCIR) in Zuidoost-Costa Rica. In dit 
onderzoek is specifiek gekeken naar drie verschillende interventies op het 
gebied van beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Deze waren gericht op 
behoud van bosbedekking en biodiversiteit in de bufferzones van het 
nabijgelegen internationale park La Amistad (PILA) door middel van: 1) 
het bevorderen van biologische cacaoproductie in boslandbouwsystemen; 
2) financialisering van de koolstofvoorraad in bossen door middel van 
PES en 3) het ontwerpen van nieuwe, op de inheemse bevolking gerichte 
vormen van PES door middel van REDD+. 
In dit proefschrift wordt ingegaan op de diverse economische, 
milieu- en sociale beloften van deze voorbeelden van de groene economie, 
maar de focus ligt op wat deze initiatieven betekenen voor de roep om 
politieke autonomie van de inheemse bevolking, voor hun controle over 
beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en hun recht op zelfbeschikking. In 
dit opzicht worden de eerdergenoemde interventies in dit proefschrift 
opgevat als op sociale integratie gerichte vormen van neoliberaal 
natuurbehoud die bedoeld zijn als reactie op de lange geschiedenis van 
sociale uitsluiting uit de Costa Ricaanse maatschappij van de inheemse 
Bribri- en Cabécarstammen.  
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat de ‘groene economie’ door 
overheidsinstellingen voor natuurbehoud en ngo’s in Costa Rica met 
ambivalentie is omarmd, waarbij er geen stabiele consensus was over de 
noodzaak bosbeheer conform de wetten van de markt te organiseren, 
maar sprake was van neoliberale druk om beschermde gebieden 
financieel onafhankelijk te maken en een bijdrage te laten leveren aan de 
bredere nationale economie in vergelijking met andere productieve en 
sociale manieren van grondgebruik. Het beschrijft dat de Bribri- en 
Cabécarstammen sterke territoriale aanspraken op hun grondgebied zijn 
blijven maken, en dat de overheid en ngo’s op de markt gebaseerd 
natuurbehoud in de TBIR en TCIR hebben geïntroduceerd in een poging 
om de inheemse bevolking te bewegen om hun bestaande manier om in 
hun levensonderhoud te voorzien, hun gedrag en hun zienswijze te 
veranderen ten gunste van natuurbehoud, zodat dit niet dwingend 
opgelegd hoefde te worden. 
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Hierna volgt een uiteenzetting van de wijze waarop de 
voorstanders van de ‘groene economie’ hebben geprobeerd om 
legitimiteit te verwerven en deze interventies op lokaal niveau te 
‘verkopen’, waarbij ook aandacht wordt besteed aan hoe lokale 
participatie wordt vormgegeven door discursieve en materiële machten 
van de groene economie. Het onderzoek verklaart hoe de voorstanders 
van de groene economie zich met deze interventies tegelijkertijd de 
inheemse aanspraak op politieke autonomie en zelfbeschikking toe-
eigenen, en lokale instituties voor het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
transformeren. Daarmee verklaart het onderzoek, op basis van literatuur 
over de relatie tussen inheemse politiek en staatsvorming, hoe deze toe-
eigening en transformaties tot nieuwe vormen van sociale uitsluiting 
leiden.  
Het begrip neoliberaal multiculturalisme staat centraal in dit 
proefschrift en wordt opgevat als een politiek project geworteld in 
neoliberale vormen van governance met als oogmerk inheemse rechten 
selectief te erkennen om deze in overeenstemming te brengen met de 
algemene ideeën, belangen en logica van het kapitaal. Met dit begrip als 
essentieel onderdeel van het analytisch kader toont dit onderzoek aan dat 
de op de markt gebaseerde interventies in de TBIR en TCIR de inheemse 
bevolkingsgroepen en politiek vormen van levensonderhoud opleggen 
die geacht worden beter aan te sluiten bij de economische en politieke 
praktijken en ideeën van de ‘groene economie’, terwijl de tradities, rechten 
en ideeën van de Bribri -en Cabécar-inwoners die aansluiten bij 
neoliberaal natuurbehoud erkend en ondersteund worden.  
Vanuit historisch perspectief bezien wordt de kloof tussen 
erkenning en implementatie van inheemse rechten in Costa Rica dus niet 
kleiner door neoliberaal natuurbehoud en blijft de paradox van 
natuurbehoud bestaan. Hoewel overheidsinstellingen voor 
natuurbehoud en ngo’s begonnen zijn met het diversifiëren van 
milieubeheer om enigszins tegemoet te komen aan inheemse ideeën en 
cultuur, blijft de neoliberale denkrichting van individualistische 
rationaliteit, marginale optimalisatie en milieuefficiëntie de 
projectplanning onverminderd bepalen. Daarom is de conclusie van dit 
proefschrift dat er met deze interventies weliswaar pogingen tot sociale 
integratie worden gedaan, maar dat sociale uitsluiting een wezenlijk 
kenmerk blijft van de relatie tussen modern natuurbehoud en inheemse 
bevolkingsgroepen in Costa Rica. 
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Map	1.	Location	of	the	Talamanca-Bribri	and	Talamanca-Cabécar	Indigenous	
Reserves	within	the	Costa	Rican	national	territory	
	
Source:	 Elaboration	 of	 the	 author	 based	 on	maps	 provided	 by	 the	 Development	
Observatory	of	the	University	of	Costa	Rica.		
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Map	2.	The	Talamanca-Bribri	and	Talamanca-Cabécar	Indigenous	Reserves	
	
Source:	 Elaboration	 of	 the	 author	 based	 on	maps	 provided	 by	 the	 Development	
Observatory	of	the	University	of	Costa	Rica.	
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Introduction 
 
Over the course of the past decade, the green economy has been heralded 
as the answer to the economic, social and environmental crises ailing the 
world today. Building on the ideological precepts of sustainable 
development, the green economy offers the chance to merge development 
and conservation through the usage of market-led forms of natural 
resource governance devoted to green growth (see Hayden, 2014; Sandor, 
2012). Though popular in various spheres of development policy, green 
growth has become a central approach for environmental conservation, 
attracting the attention of big international NGOs, international financial 
organisms (IFO), state agencies and donors whom are currently 
converging the usage of market logics for planning and carrying out new 
conservation projects and interventions (Büscher and Fletcher, 2015; Arsel 
and Büscher, 2012; Igoe and Brockington, 2007). In a context defined by 
growing degradation of globally-valued natural resources worldwide, 
natural rural landscapes are being re-organized and new legal, political 
and economic infrastructure that could allow environmental services to 
be traded is being put in place (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010), through 
considerable efforts to promote ecotourism, integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDP) and schemes for the financialization of 
nature through payments of environmental services (PES) and REDD+. 
Behind this fundamental shift in our understanding of nature and our 
relationship with it, advocates of the green economy claim that these 
forms of conservation will not only result in the protection of natural 
resources, but also the promotion of local development, the reduction of 
rural poverty (Muradian et al., 2013; Arsel and Büscher, 2012), and more 
importantly to this dissertation, in considerable advances for indigenous 
agendas regarding the materialization of long-standing claims for 
territorial autonomy and self-determination (see Yashar, 2005; Van Cott, 
2010; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992).  
The significance of this latter promise must not be understated, 
especially considering the complex and paradoxical relationship between 
modern conservation and indigenous peoples over the past two centuries. 
While alliances between these groups are frequent today (see Chapin, 
2004; Catton, 1997; WWF, 1997; Stepp et al., 2004), initial encounters were 
often violent and grossly disadvantageous for indigenous peoples. 
Whether in underdeveloped Africa and Asia or in the developed regions 
of North America, the first protected areas and game reserves were 
designed following preservationist approaches – dubbed today as 
“fortress conservation” – which quickly interpreted indigenous 
populations as a threat to the conservation of natural landscapes 
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(Brockington et al., 2008; Jacoby, 2001; Neumann, 2005; Spence, 1999). 
Indigenous dispossession of ancestral lands and resource uses soon 
followed, as colonial elites carved out protected areas in order to foster 
new capitalist economic practices or to consolidate state power over 
territorial frontiers (see examples in Grandia, 2012; Agrawal and Redford, 
2009; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1996). In the rare instances that modern 
conservation allowed the presence of indigenous peoples, the decision 
came from a position of perceived cultural superiority of white elites, for 
which indigenous life was to be evaluated according to their contribution 
to the enhancement of Western ideas of pristine natural landscapes 
(Brockington et al., 2008).  
The gradual shift from fortress conservation to community-based 
conservation (CBC) since the 1980s may have allowed for renewed 
collaboration between indigenous peoples and conservationists, but that 
did not mean that various forms of social exclusion of indigenous 
populations by conservation suddenly stopped. Various studies offer 
evidence of growing failure of conservation projects aimed at indigenous 
peoples, due to contradictions between how these groups and 
conservationists value natural resources differently, leading to opposed 
resource management imperatives and practices (see Holt, 2005; Hutton 
et al., 2005; Chapin, 2004). One consistent reason behind these types of 
failings was the inability of conservation to account for the dynamic 
character of indigenous culture in contexts of socioeconomic 
transformation (see Dove, 2006; Niezen, 2003). Often, the introduction of 
indigenous groups within conservation planning tended to reify the 
former as “ecologically noble savages” and their natural resource 
management practices as timeless and immutable vis-à-vis historical 
change (see Niezen, 2003; Colchester, 1997; Conklin and Graham, 1995; 
Redford, 1990).  
Indeed, various authors have explained how previously successful 
efforts to protect landscapes eventually led to conflicts with local 
indigenous communities, due to the failure to acknowledge new or 
existing demands for economic development and welfare, especially in a 
context of gradual articulation of these peoples into an ever-expanding 
capitalist system (see Holt, 2005; Chapin, 2004; Agrawal and Redford, 
2006). Moreover, failure to account them as more than just another 
“stakeholder” within the implementation of equilibrium-based models of 
biodiversity conservation, led to limitations to engage with the central 
concerns that has historically led them to enter in alliances with 
conservation, such as attaining their collective right to self-determination 
and political autonomy through the exercise of control over natural 
resources in their ancestral territories (see Isla, 2015; Holt, 2005; Castillo, 
2004) In this context, it is no wonder that some indigenous populations 
ended up perceiving conservation as no different than other “mega-
projects” (i.e.: oil and mineral extraction industries and massive 
agricultural plantations), given how these interventions provoked 
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significant changes in rural lives, failed to fulfill promises of improved 
welfare and discarded any type of effort to protect their land-based rights 
(see Dove, 2006; Dowie, 2005). As Holt (2005) argues, whether in the case 
of top-down or bottom-up approaches, conservation seems to place 
indigenous people in a ‘catch-22’, where local culture is considered as both 
a support and a threat to conservation. Yet, the green economy is currently 
promising a solution to this dilemma, that could resolve the historical 
problems of the relationship between indigenous peoples and modern 
conservation namely by offering a win-win solution based on the 
possibility of harmonizing conservationists’ objectives of nature 
protection with indigenous demands for “cultural” conservation. 
Conservation and development specialists have found the promises 
of these win-win solutions through market logics enormously appealing. 
Indeed, organizations like the Bank Information Center (BIC), one of the 
non-profit NGOs that worked in the context of the Costa Rican REDD+ 
Program studied here, concluded that this initiative constituted a “viable 
commercial mechanism to support conservation and the maintenance of carbon 
sinks in forests, whilst simultaneously engaging with the preoccupations of 
indigenous peoples” (Baker and Donaldson, 2015). Despite garnering the 
support of all of the other big international NGOs and state agencies 
involved in the Costa Rican REDD+ Program, this conclusion was written 
and published well before: 1) negotiations between indigenous peoples, 
conservation NGOs and state authorities in the REDD+ dialogue ended, 
2) indigenous consultation regarding this ‘indigenous alternative’ began 
and 3) the recently-established National REDD+ Program yielded any 
tangible policy result. From this very brief example alone, it is quite clear 
that there is a positive outlook for these win-win solutions, despite the fact 
that not enough evidence exists providing support of their actual 
effectiveness in promoting social and political inclusion. Accordingly, 
numerous scholars have offered warnings and called for studies 
regarding the contrasts between the discourse behind the green economy 
and its actual realities (see Muradian et al., 2013; Sullivan, 2013; Büscher 
et al., 2012; Dressler and Roth, 2012; Robertson, 2004). Instead of going 
along with the ‘market hype’, they view the on-the-ground realities of the 
green economy as a contested political process whereby attempts to 
commoditize nature may result in the social exclusion of poor rural 
communities from the natural resources they require to survive (Fairhead 
et al., 2012; Leach et al., 2012; Kelly, 2011; Corson, 2010). Indeed, numerous 
studies have already began showing the effects of the contradictions of 
market-based conservation (MBC) and explored the incomplete and 
competing logics that end up provoking a combination of positive and 
negative results (Büscher and Fletcher, 2015; Arsel and Büscher, 2012; 
Corson, 2011).  Yet, more studies are needed to better understand the 
social impact of neoliberal conservation, especially regarding the role that 
indigenous peoples play in the context of these neoliberal interventions.  
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This dissertation analyzes how indigenous populations are 
politically included by or excluded from different forms of market-based 
conservation practices being implemented by state agencies, NGOs and 
international financial institutions (IFIs), in two adjacent Costa Rican 
indigenous territories: the Talamanca-Bribri and the Talamanca-Cabécar 
Indigenous Reserves (TBIR and TCIR, respectively). More precisely, this 
thesis explores the interaction between these indigenous peoples and 
three green economy interventions oriented at conserving forest cover 
and biodiversity through: 1) the promotion of organic cacao production in 
agroforestry systems (AFS), 2) the financialization of forest carbon 
through payments of environmental services (PES) and 3) the design of 
new indigenous-minded forms of PES through REDD+.  
While this thesis explores if the various economic, environmental 
and social promises of these interventions become materialized, attention 
is focused on explaining their political impact with regards to historical 
indigenous demands for autonomy, control over natural resource 
management and right to self-determination. In this sense, this thesis will 
conceptualize these interventions as ‘inclusive’ forms of neoliberal 
conservation oriented towards addressing the historical forms of social 
exclusion of the Bribri and Cabécar indigenous peoples from Costa Rican 
society. This thesis will show how the green economy has been embraced 
by conservation state agencies and NGOs in Costa Rica from an 
ambivalent stance, coming not from a stable consensus over the need of 
configuring forest governance under market logics, but due to neoliberal 
pressures to make protected areas financially self-supporting and capable 
of contributing to the wider national economy vis-à-vis other productive 
and social land uses. It will also explain how have the Bribri and the 
Cabécar managed to retain a strong territorial claim over their lands, 
leading state and NGO actors to introduce market-based conservation in 
the TBIR and TCIR as an effort towards modifying existing indigenous 
livelihoods, behavior and perspectives in favor of conservation, instead of 
forcefully imposing it.  
Afterwards, this dissertation will characterize the manner in which 
the proponents of these forms of the green economy have attempted to 
gain legitimacy and promote “buy-in” for these interventions at a local 
level, while also highlighting how local participation is being shaped by 
discursive and material powers of the green economy. It will explain how 
these interventions simultaneously appropriate indigenous demands for 
political autonomy and self-determination and transform local 
institutions handling natural resource governance. Drawing on literature 
about the relationship between indigenous politics and state formation, 
this thesis explains how this appropriation and transformation of 
indigenous demands lead to new forms of social exclusion.  
Overall, this thesis is based on the concept of neoliberal 
multiculturalism, understood as a political project engrained within 
neoliberal forms of governance that seeks to selectively recognize 
 5 
indigenous rights with the objective of rendering these compatible to the 
wider ideas, interests and logics of capital. Using this concept as a key part 
of the analytical framework, this thesis demonstrates that the market-
based interventions in the TBIR and TCIR entail the disciplining of 
indigenous peoples and politics to livelihoods considered more 
compatible with the economic and political practices and ideas of the 
green economy, while still recognizing and supporting the traditions, 
rights and ideas of the Bribri and Cabécar inhabitants that are compatible 
to neoliberal conservation. So, viewed in a historical perspective, the gap 
between recognition and implementation of indigenous rights in Costa 
Rica is not being reduced through neoliberal conservation. While 
conservation state agencies and NGOs have begun to diversify 
environmental governance to accommodate to some indigenous ideas and 
culture, the overriding neoliberal mindsets of individualistic rationality, 
marginal optimization and environmental efficiency remain the 
unyielding project planning imperatives. Consequently, this thesis argues 
that while there is some effort to achieve inclusivity through these 
interventions, political exclusion remains an integral feature of the 
relationship between modern conservation and indigenous peoples in 
Costa Rica. 
1.1. Research questions 
This is the main question that has guided this dissertation: how is neoliberal 
multiculturalism established in the context of the market-based interventions and 
strategies implemented in TBIR and TCIR and how does this impinge on the 
possibility of the green economy to reach its objectives of environmental 
conservation and social inclusion for the Bribri and Cabécar people? This 
question is accompanied by three other sub-research questions:  
1. What are the main features of the wider conservation discourse in 
Costa Rica, how it is being transformed by ideas about the green 
economy and how has this affected the governance and 
intervention strategies of the market-based conservation projects 
being implemented in the TBIR and TCIR? 
2. How do these key features relate to local Bribri and Cabécar 
territorialities at the level of regional and local governance levels?  
3. How does neoliberal multiculturalism impact the possibilities of 
the market-based conservation projects implemented in the TBIR 
and TCIR of producing inclusive forms of development and 
conservation for the Bribri and the Cabécar people? 
1.2. The case: the relationship between Bribri and 
Cabécar peoples with modern conservation 
The current interactions between the Bribri and the Cabécar indigenous 
peoples and the state agencies and international NGOs promoting 
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conservation in their territories offer an excellent case study of how the 
relationship between indigenous people and modern conservation has 
been moving forward vis-à-vis the shift from fortress conservation to 
neoliberal initiatives, like PES or REDD+; and how these interactions are 
affected by neoliberal multiculturalism. While historically protective of 
their traditional customs and of the integrity of their state-mandated 
territories, these two indigenous peoples are nationally well-known for 
their political activism against attempts to promote oil and mineral 
extraction, hydroelectric power endeavors and banana plantations 
(Borges and Villalobos, 1997). In 1982, converging around the need of 
countering these types of “mega-projects”, state conservation agencies 
and national and international NGOs began considering the Bribri and 
Cabécar peoples as allies for the establishment of La Amistad 
International Park – a transfrontier protected area spanning between 
Costa Rica and Panama, but which is operated as two separate national 
parks in each country (see map 3).  
Demographic studies made around this time estimated that the two 
indigenous territories (created in 1978) had a population of 2.383 
inhabitants, occupying an area of 664,2 km2, leading to a population 
density of 3,58 inhabitants per kilometer squared (Bozzoli de Wille, 1986). 
This density was perceived by conservation NGOs and state agencies as 
conducive for the protection of natural resources (Castillo and Borge, 
1995). While there was some for-profit cultivation (e.g.: cacao, banana and 
rice) in the Bribri townships most accessible to mestizo-owned lands, large 
extensions of forests predominated the landscape, intermeshed with 
patches devoted to indigenous traditional agroforestry. Sharing shelter in 
dispersed traditional houses made from local materials, most of the Bribri 
and the Cabécar living beyond the Telire River fished the local rivers, 
gathered forest resources for food and medicine, hunted the local fauna 
and cultivated traditional crops for their own subsistence with limited 
technology. The agreement amongst conservation NGOs and state 
officials was that indigenous resource use patterns were mostly 
sustainable, supporting the idea of an alliance.   
However, like most indigenous populations in Costa Rica, the way 
of life of the Talamancans is being pressured to change by inward and 
outward forces. A local population surge, the introduction of previously 
non-existent forms of technology in the lowlands of the Talamanca Valley, 
a slow, but unrelenting plunge into the national and international 
capitalist markets and the expansion of new state services in the area have 
been the causes behind changes in resource use patterns of the Bribri and 
the Cabécar, and consequently, in the integrity of their cultural forms of 
land use (Castillo and Borge, 1995). Through state intervention, the 
Talamancans have seen the introduction of mestizo educational practices 
and Westernized healthcare systems. Today, only 7,8% of the local 
indigenous population remain uninsured by the Costa Rican Social 
Security Board (CCSS), and 87,7% of them know how to read and write in 
 7 
Spanish, due to schools created by the Ministry of Public Education 
(MEP). Recently built roads have integrated the main indigenous 
townships of Suretka and Shiroles to the local, provincial and national 
capitals. Many of the inhabitants in these places now work for wages in 
the banana plantations of Dole and Chiquita, the hotels and commerce of 
the mestizo towns in the adjacent Sixaola Valley. 
Map	3.	La	Amistad	Biosphere	Reserve	and	its	different	forms	of	territorial	
management	
	
Source:	Elaboration	by	the	author	based	on	maps	provided	the	Costa	Rican	Ministry	
of	 Environment	 and	 Energy	 and	 the	 Panamanian	 National	 Authority	 of	 the	
Environment.	
Meanwhile, others have begun producing cacao, plantains and 
bananas for sale to intermediaries whom commercialize these produces in 
San José (the national capital), Europe and the United States. Alongside 
all of these changes, local population grew yearly by an average of 10,4% 
in the past 30 years, leading to a total population of 9,821 inhabitants and 
a population density of 14,8 inhabitants per kilometer squared, more than 
four times the one reported in 1982 (INEC, 2012). The usage of new tools 
for agriculture, hunting and fishing, growing demand for state services, 
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the gradual transformation of household livelihoods from subsistence to 
market production, the introduction of monocultures and the selling of 
handicrafts to nearby hotels are all visible change of the transformations 
brought to the TBIR and TCIR by capitalist development; many of which 
are perceived by conservation NGOs and state agencies to be having 
deleterious consequences for the previously well-conserved landscape of 
the Talamanca Valley (MIDEPLAN, 2011; MINAET-SINAC, 2011). 
Table	1.	Main	conservation	projects	under	implementation	between	2012-2017	
in	the	TBIR	and	TCIR	
Project	and	
duration	
Scale	and	
location	of	
intervention	
Proposing	
actors	
Financial	
sources	
Project	
description	
Sustainable	
Development	
Project	of	the	
Sixaola	River	
Basin	(BID-
MAG)	(2009-
2016)	
Local,	mainly	
in	the	
Talamanca	
and	Sixaola	
Valley	
BID	
MAG	
Ministry	of	
Planning	and	
Economic	Policy	
(MIDEPLAN)	
11,9	million	
USD	(9,2	
million	from	
BID	loan;	
2,7	million	
from	
government	
sources)	
Promotion	of	
sustainable	
development	
through	financing	
of	productive	
activities	(mainly	
organic	cacao,	
plantain	and	
banana	
production)	
Integrated	
Management	
of	Ecosystems	
at	the	Sixaola	
Binational	River	
Basin	(BID-
FEM)	(2009-
2012)	
Transfrontier,	
alongside	the	
Sixaola	River	
Basin	
BID	
Costa	Rican	
Ministry	of	
Environment	
and	Energy	
(MINAE)	
Panamanian	
National	
Authority	of	the	
Environment	
(ANAM)		
17,9	million	
USD	from	a	
BID	loan	
Creation	of	
Binational	
Commission	for	
Sustainable	
Management	of	
the	Sixaola	River	
Basin	and	support	
for	an	
environmental	
diagnostic	of	
natural	resources	
in	the	river	basin	
Payments	of	
Environmental	
Services	
Program	(PSA)	
(1998-now)	
National,	
though	
mainly	in	the	
forested	
areas	of	the	
TBIR	and	TCIR	
adjacent	to	
PILA	
World	Bank	
(WB)	
FONAFIFO	
47,0	million	
USD	from	
WB	loans	
and	
government	
sources	
Payment	of	
environmental	
services	in	
exchange	of	
conserving	forests	
in	the	territories	
Source:	Elaboration	by	the	author	based	on	information	collected	from	MIDEPLAN,	
2011;	Nessim	et	al.,	2004;	and	data	obtained	from	FONAFIFO.	
The conservation projects that will be studied in this dissertation 
constitute the main interventions designed by conservationists to address 
this situation. These have come as a result of a combination of state and 
NGO interests at national and international level and operate through 
different forms and scales of conservation governance, thereby providing 
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a very rich case for analyzing the historical interaction between 
indigenous peoples and conservation. On one hand, the project promoting 
organic cacao began implementation in 2012, but originated in long-
standing efforts of the Costa Rican and Panamanian governments of 
promoting inclusive economic development alongside the transfrontier 
river basin that serves as their political boundary. By 2000, a common 
Binational Sustainable Development Strategy (BSDS) was defined, and 
later, divided in order to be executed separately by each state. The Costa 
Rican plan was dubbed Sustainable Development Project of the Sixaola 
River Basin (BID-MAG), was implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Livestock (MAG) and financed by the Inter-American Development 
Bank (BID), and included a major component for promoting organic cacao 
production in indigenous agroforestry systems, which was implemented 
between 2012 and 2016 (see the next table for more details). On the other 
hand, PES appeared as a national initiative promoted since 1998 by the 
National Forest Financing Fund (FONAFIFO) and oriented towards 
protecting the buffer zones of PILA, of which the TBIR and TCIR are part 
of. This project pays the Bribri and the Cabécar in exchange of conserving 
several patches of forest in their territories. REDD+ has been deployed 
afterwards using this PES initiative as a basis from which to design a more 
‘indigenous-inclusive PES’. On the other hand, PES appeared as a national 
initiative promoted since 1998 by the National Forest Financing Fund 
(FONAFIFO) and oriented towards protecting the buffer zones of PILA, 
of which the TBIR and TCIR are part of. This project pays the Bribri and 
the Cabécar in exchange of conserving several patches of forest in their 
territories. REDD+ has been deployed afterwards using this PES initiative 
as a basis from which to design a more ‘indigenous-inclusive PES’. 
These projects show that the relationship between the Talamancans, 
the NGOs and the state is changing here in the context of the tectonic shifts 
of capitalist development. While all of these actors guardedly consider 
each other as allies, given that their particular interests seem to orbit 
around the notion of protecting natural resources, their goals are not the 
same. For the Bribri and the Cabécar, strengthening indigenous rights and 
local autonomy over natural resources could be conducive to 
environmental conservation. Yet, conservationists do not agree with this 
claim, considering that territorial and political autonomy are issues 
beyond their purview, that granting such rights could complicate the 
design of necessary forms of governance to consolidate conservation 
objectives (Dettman, 2006; Candela, 2007) and, in a few cases, because any 
claim of local rights should be rendered void when discussing globally-
valued natural resources resources (Rojas and Porras, 2012). Yet 
compromises should be made. In a context of unusually strong 
indigenous organizations and in which the Talamancans do hold some 
legal power over their territory, it is not a matter of imposing fortress 
conservation and fences-and-fines approaches, but of generating “buy-in” 
to conservation efforts. The green economy has presented itself as an 
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alternative to attend the concerns of both parties simultaneously. It offers 
conservation a way of influencing indigenous livelihoods, behavior and 
perspectives at a local level, while justifying the protection of natural 
resources vis-à-vis other productive uses in a neoliberal economy centered 
on export/foreign investment-led development and a public 
environmental sector each time more dependent on donor funding to 
operate. It also offers indigenous people the promise of inclusive 
development and the recognition of their cosmovision, cultural rights and 
political autonomy.  
In the following chapters, this thesis will analyze these dynamics 
from the perspective of neoliberal multiculturalism, characterizing the 
way in which the green economy seems to respect parts of local traditional 
culture, considering it conducive to conservation and worthy of 
preservation, while discarding others that do not suit this end. In so doing, 
the wider literature of neoliberal conservation will benefit from this 
dissertation given the objective of looking not only at the social, economic 
and environmental impacts of market-based conservation, but also at the 
consequences for cultural and indigenous politics. Moreover, the fact that 
this research is centered on Costa Rica further makes this thesis an 
important scientific and political contribution, due to its nuanced and 
critical understanding of a country that is celebrated both for its 
environmental-friendly policies and the advanced state of protection of 
indigenous rights (see Brockett and Gottfried, 2014; Zimmerer, 2011; Van 
Cott, 2010; Campbell, 2002; Evans, 1999) and which is considered to be a 
benchmark for environmental and indigenous policy in Latin America 
and the world. 
1.3. Research methodology 
This thesis used a qualitative research approach based on an extended 
presence in the field to capture best the different meanings and 
representations of development, conservation, territory, political 
autonomy and governance and resource uses of the Bribri and Cabécar 
people. Main data collected and interpreted was obtained through a 
combination of various techniques (including participant observation, 
structured and semi-structured interviews and document analysis).  
1.3.1. Research setting 
The two indigenous territories studied in this dissertation are located on 
the main flood plain of the upper Sixaola River Basin, and extend from 
there to the foothills of the Talamanca Mountain Range until reaching the 
boundaries of La Amistad International Park. This flood plain is known 
as the Talamanca Valley, a geographical area with a landscape mostly 
characterized by forests interspersed with lowlands which serves as the 
meeting point for five rivers: the Telire, Lari, Coén, Urén and Yorkin. The 
inhabitants of the TBIR and TCIR live in 41 villages. Suretka and Shiroles 
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are two most populated towns in the territories. Both are located about 2 
kilometers apart from each other and about 20 kilometers from Bribri, the 
nearest mestizo township and are easily accessible from Bribri by a 
recently-built paved road. Local Bribri and Cabécar farmers use the 
floodplain to grow plantain, banana and cacao, as well as other 
subsistence crops (e.g.: maize, rice, beans, etc.). Plantains and bananas are 
more commonly seen near the rivers, while cacao and other subsistence 
forms of agriculture are more common in the areas farther away and 
nearby forests.  
The six rivers run through the Talamanca Valley until meeting up 
to form the Sixaola River, a politically-important body of water that serves 
as the international boundary between Costa Rica and Panama. This river 
flows until reaching the Caribbean Sea, thereby creating a basin covering 
an area of 2.839 km2. Despite its size, the most economically important 
part of the river basin is not located in the Talamanca Valley, but in a lower 
floodplain of the Sixaola River called the Sixaola Valley. Separated from 
the Talamanca Valley by two small mountain ranges running 20 
kilometers inland and parallel to the coastline, the Sixaola Valley has a 
landscape mostly dominated by banana plantations owned by 
multinational corporations, spanning from the town of Bribri well into 
Panamanian territory. There has been some tourist development as well, 
but it has mostly been limited to the towns of Puerto Viejo and 
Manzanillo, a couple of mestizo towns located in the coastline, about 40 
kilometers away from Suretka and Shiroles. These banana plantations and 
tourist-related businesses employ a small fraction of the Bribri and 
Cabécar population living in the Talamanca Valley. 
While the lowlands of the Talamanca Valley are easily accessible by 
car, the area beyond the right margin of the Telire River is much more 
difficult to reach as there are no bridges or reliable crossings. A ferry 
service using motorboats allows the Bribri and Cabécar to cross the Telire 
River and from there a network of dirt roads connect the main towns and 
villages, like Amubre, Sepecue, Coroma and Kachabri. From the river 
crossing onward, forests become a more prevalent fixture of the 
landscape, interspersed with small villages and indigenous houses. 
Topology becomes more fractured as one makes its way inland after 
crossing the Telire River in Amubre or Shiroles. The lowlands of the valley 
gradually give way to the Talamanca Mountain Range, where the highest 
peaks of both countries can be found. The area beginning after the base of 
the mountain is more difficult to access. There are no roads for vehicles, 
so walking trails must be used to traverse these parts. Here, distances tend 
to be calculated in hours or days of travel. Many parts of the highlands 
covered by RBLA are pretty much inaccessible without proper physical 
training and an experienced guide (MINAET et al., 2012). 
Administratively, about 80% of the land of the Talamanca Valley is 
located within Costa Rican territory and the rest is in Panama. In Costa 
Rica, local political management should fall on the municipal authorities 
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at the town of Bribri. Yet, it must be said that specific management of 
issues ranging from water provision, electricity, healthcare, education, 
agriculture, road infrastructure, environmental management and border 
control are dependent upon many other public agencies boasting different 
degrees of effective on-the-ground presence and political and managerial 
autonomy from the local and the national government.  
Map	4.	The	Sixaola	River	Basin	
	
Source:	 Elaboration	 of	 the	 author	 with	 maps	 provided	 by	 the	 Central	 American	
Commission	of	Development	and	Environment	(CCAD).	
Consequently, actual land use management happens in different 
geographical locations including San José, Puerto Limón, Puerto Viejo, 
Bribri and the different villages of the TBIR and TCIR. It is relevant to say 
that according to the Law of Indigenous People (6172), indigenous 
territories, such as TBIR and the TCIR, are self-governed and cannot be 
sold, transferred or divided in any way. Therefore, land governance 
should lie on indigenous authorities organized around integral 
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development associations (ADI), that is, local councils created by the state 
to promote the development of indigenous communities and to act as 
formal interlocutors between indigenous peoples and state authorities.1  
While the law declares these organizations as ‘de facto’ local 
governments over indigenous territories, in practice, the extent of their 
territorial autonomy is often considered dubious as state and municipal 
authorities also have some say over many different agendas. 
Environmental management is one of these issues. The establishment of 
RBLA has created a buffer zone overlapping the TBIR and TCIR, thereby 
giving rise to new institutions governing land use through control over 
and restrictions on agriculture, as some forms of the latter have been 
framed as the most important threat to forest cover (Connelly and 
Shapiro, 2006). These land use dispositions are often at odds with 
indigenous and afro-Caribbean populations at both sides of the border, 
given the restrictions that these efforts impose on resource access and land 
use. Further institutions have also appeared through the enactment of the 
green economy interventions that were previously mentioned.  
All of these complexities are the reason why the Talamancan 
Indigenous Reserves were chosen as the research site of this thesis. The 
Talamanca Valley offers an interesting geographic location in which 
indigenous peoples are claiming for recognition of their political 
autonomy vis-a-vis the effects of the institutionalization of conservation 
interventions. This happens in a context where the nature of jurisdiction 
of state agencies over land and resource management is unclear, due to a 
history of struggle between indigenous and non-indigenous populations 
over resources in the wider river basin.  
1.3.2. Methodological approach 
Before I characterize the methodological approach used for this research 
It is important to point at two central facts: first, that I was trained as a 
political scientist and not as an anthropologist; and second, that the 
objective of this work was not to write ethnography. My interest was to 
explore the political interaction between the Bribri and Cabécar peoples 
and state officials and NGOs seeking to devise, plan, consult, implement 
and evaluate development/conservation projects in TBIR and TCIR. 
Consequently, the idea was to explore the way local micro-politics and 
traditional and non-traditional governance structures affected these 
projects, and from there frame these within the historical dynamics of 
regional territorialization in the context of the establishment and 
reproduction of much broader political and economic structures, such as 
neoliberalism (Savin-Baden and Howell-Major, 2013). The ontological and 
epistemological assumption for this thesis is that “(i)n their conscious 
human activity, (people) for the most part unconsciously reproduce the structures 
that govern their substantive activities of production.” (Bhaskar, 1989: 80). In 
other words, while the Bribri, the Cabecar, the NGO representatives or the 
state bureaucrats interviewed for this work may not consider that their 
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own decisions are the means for the reproduction of structure, this may 
be the actual result of their actions. Meaning that the researcher is obliged 
to unpack societal valuations and choices thereby showing the ways in 
which structures affect or become affected by them. Of course, this sort of 
engagement with the field requires gathering an in-depth understanding 
of existing social realities in Talamanca Bribri and Talamanca Cabécar 
Indigenous Reserves, as well as the comprehension of different cultural 
meanings and representations, which is why the methodological 
approach here can be loosely understood as ethnographic (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007).  
Moreover, data interpretation and collection did not take place in 
two distinctly defined stages of work, but happened simultaneously as a 
means of directing the wider research process (Mikkelsen, 2005). And, as 
expected for an ethnographic approach, this research dynamic led to 
changes in the original dissertation design presented in 2013. Second, 
there is no assumption of universal and objective knowledge being 
created with this work (Laws et al., 2013). On the contrary, statements 
made here try to account for nuance and difference in perspectives 
recognized in the field, while also attempting to offer a voice to the lived-
in realities of the Bribri and Cabécar indigenous people. This is a 
particularly important task as the continuous and selective construction 
of these indigenous communities for legitimating interventions is and has 
been, regretfully, a common reality of the discourse and practice of 
agricultural, developmental, educational, healthcare, conservation, and 
even, indigenous state policy-making. While I am critical of the radical 
interpretative accounts that render reality into pure relativism, one must 
not ignore that local understandings about social reality are always partial 
and located (Haraway, 1998). A framing of qualitative analysis must 
therefore be based on the realization that cultural meanings and 
representations offer a partial understanding of reality (Laws et al., 2003). 
It is therefore important to know the research context to understand how 
its particular configurations of social relations reflect on the production of 
these particular forms of understanding. The information produced and 
presented throughout this document has originated from numerous 
sources, but mainly through the continuous interaction of the researcher 
with people who served as informants, in the context of their specific 
social realities. They include local inhabitants of the Talamancan Bribri 
and Cabécar Indigenous Reserves, environmental and development 
consultants and practitioners with great knowledge about the area, local, 
as well as national activists, and state officials in charge of state policy-
making over issues ranging from environmental management to 
indigenous policy.  
Third, reflexivity in interpretation was considered crucial at every 
stage of this research. The objective of critical reflection is to inform the 
researcher about its ontological and epistemological bias by continuously 
asking himself: “what do I know?” and “how do I know that I know?” 
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(Guillermin and Giliam, 2004). Such continuous challenging of research 
findings and tentative conclusions is extremely important to avoid 
misrecognition of developments during fieldwork provoked by my own 
perspective, which undoubtedly may also be affected by factors like 
gender, ethnicity, nationality, religious beliefs and class. Reflecting on the 
perspectives of my interviewees from my position as a well-educated, 
middle-class, mestizo, catholic male Costa Rican allowed me to produce a 
new perspective about the research context in which I lived in and the 
participants that I’ve met during the past couple of years, thereby leading 
to integrating new perspectives that I had not considered earlier. 
1.3.3. Fieldwork dynamics 
Information gathering and interpretation in the field accounted for about 
16 months, between 2013 (when my dissertation design was approved) 
and 2015 (when I presented my post-fieldwork seminar). I also spent two 
months doing preliminary fieldwork to acquaint myself with the case 
studies I ended up choosing, as well as other potential ones. During this 
initial stage, I spent two weeks at Meleruk (a town located in the northern 
boundary of the territory, in the main access road coming from the town 
of Bribri). I conducted some basic interviews with key indigenous leaders 
and members of the Integral Development Association (ADITIBRI), which 
operates as the formal local government of the TBIR. I also interviewed 
consultants and NGO officials with considerable experience working in 
the area to define the best points of entry to the indigenous communities.  
In December 2013, I returned to Costa Rica and stayed there for a 
period of twelve months. The great majority of the time was spent in the 
Indigenous Reserves, though this stay was interspersed with smaller 
periods in San José and Puerto Limón. This research has been multi-sited, 
given that the TBIR and TCIR were not interpreted as isolated social 
spaces, but have been produced through multiple social, economic and 
political processes operating at many different scales. Leaving the 
territories from time to time was a necessity as most conservation and 
agriculture state agencies do not have a permanent office in the 
indigenous towns and policy is planned and executed from offices located 
in the provincial and the national capital. Indeed, before November 2015, 
the park administrator of the Costa Rican side of PILA did not held a 
permanent office in the Indigenous Reserves, nor near the park itself, and 
only visited it with some regularity, thereby “managing the area by remote 
control” (Park Administrator PILA, interview, September 28th, 2014). 
Furthermore, given that transnational dynamics evolving in these 
indigenous territories were also relevant, I also spent about a month in 
total interviewing Panamanian conservation state authorities, NGOs and 
indigenous leaders in Panama City and Changuinola (regional capital of 
Bocas del Toro province).  
Short-stay housing options in the Talamancan Bribri and Cabécar 
Indigenous Reserves are limited. Many consultants, academic researchers 
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and government officials prefer to stay in Puerto Viejo, a coastal township 
located about 30 kilometers outside of the Reserves. The reason is that 
Puerto Viejo offers visitors the expected comforts of a tourism destination 
that are not enjoyed in most places in the Reserves, such as paved road 
access, telephone, Internet access, electricity, air conditioning, etc. 
Personally, though I understand the rationale behind this practice, I 
considered it contrary to my interest of getting to know the reality of the 
research site, which is why I opted for staying at the territories themselves.  
With that said, this decision was not bereft of methodological and 
reflexivity dilemmas regarding where precisely to stay in the Reserves. I 
recognized two different options. One was to stay at a small Bribri farm 
that belonged to some acquaintances and which is in the hamlet of 
Meleruk, over the main access road connecting the Bribri Indigenous 
Reserve to the mestizo town of Bribri, about 8 kilometers away from 
Suretka. This housing option offered me a introspective look at life in a 
Bribri farm, as well as to a clear perspective on local family and clan-based 
relationships. But I also gave me insight in some of the everyday 
difficulties associated to their livelihoods. One of these had to do with 
transportation. Though I own a car that I used to move around the 
Reserves, generally, the Bribri and Cabécar countryside is much more 
difficult to transit without a 4x4, and in many parts (particularly those at 
the other side of the Telire river) car access is impossible. This means that 
walking is the only reliable form of transportation in most cases, with the 
drawback that much of this also entails considerable time investment, 
depending on the selected destination within the territory.  
Complications such as these, eventually obliged me to reconsider 
my decision to stay in Meleruk, given that it was located far from the main 
areas of interest, such as the township of Shiroles, were most indigenous 
political groups are located. Additionally, the small Bribri farm grew 
unsuitable for long-term stays as, much other Bribri farms in the area, it 
lacked phone access and electricity was largely unreliable. Therefore, I 
opted for the Finca Educativa at Shiroles as an alternative housing option. 
The Finca Educativa is a lodge built exclusively for visitors of the 
Indigenous Reserve, using funds provided by international aid, by 
initiative of a local NGO called New Alchemists’ Association (ANAI) and 
under the purview and administration of the ADITIBRI. This place has 
served various objectives over the years since its construction in 1990, 
from being one of the first attempts towards establishing the territory as a 
potential ecotourism destination, to becoming a renowned political space 
for meetings between indigenous organizations and NGOs and state 
officials, to constituting a comfortable location for people doing academic 
research (as it is located in the main townships of the Bribri Reserve and 
has some useful requirements for work, like reliable electrical power and 
internet access).  
The drawbacks of the place are obvious, though. For starters, the 
locals often identify the place as the accommodation of NGO 
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representatives and officials visiting the territory. Choosing this location 
was an undoubtedly difficult affair, but I eventually decided on it because 
of the immediate necessities that required to be attended for research. I 
am aware that this choice was brought about by necessity and may have 
had an effect in my research process, given the potential risk of 
misidentification of my purpose. Yet, it also offered me an interesting 
insight towards the ideational construction of the Bribri and the Cabécar 
from the perspective of conservation territorialities. The Finca Educativa, 
built to sensitize the local Bribri population about the importance of 
safeguarding their “culture” and their “traditional forms of interaction 
with nature”, seeks to offer “a package of diverse options to know, enjoy and 
share experiences, culture, art, customs and traditions of the Bribri” (SGP-GEF, 
2009: 2), through ecotourism, the making and selling of local artisanship 
and the preparation of foods made from organic agriculture. This 
contradiction of objectives – between the defense of local values and 
culture bereft of complexity by conservation/development discourse of 
optimization and simplification – constituted the very representation of 
the fieldwork dynamics I wanted to look at in the territories. Indeed, the 
Finca Educativa was a marvelous physical representation of my subject 
study, being a building made using a few materials used by the Bribri, but 
covering a two-story concrete structure following the pattern of proper 
mestizo architecture; or having a small agricultural plot for organic 
production of cacao, but without a single resemblance of subsistence 
Bribri cultivation crops or fallows available for shifting cultivation.  
Although the Talamancan Bribri and Cabecar Indigenous Reserves 
are very small spaces there is a very interesting heterogeneity in their 
human geographies. The Telire River functions almost as a perceivable 
boundary between different realities of land use integration to the 
capitalist market. Whereas in the towns of Suretka and Shiroles – on the 
left margin of the river, and well connected through two dirt roads with 
the main mestizo towns – one could recognize practices that are similar to 
those of the mestizo that live outside of the territories (e.g.: plantain and 
banana monoculture cultivation, townships centered around state schools 
and clinics and a relative prevalence of wage and service economies), the 
situation is completely different in the communities at the right margin – 
which is totally disconnected from the territory via road. In locations like 
Bajo Coén, Sepecue and Amubre, one can notice the presence of more 
traditional agricultural practices such as shifting agriculture, plots for 
policultivation interspersed with forest cover and semi-traditional 
agroforestry systems using cacao and banana, combining for-profit and 
subsistence forms of agriculture 
1.3.4. Research methods employed 
Data for this thesis was obtained through a mixture of methods including 
participant observation, structured and semi-structured interviews and 
document analysis. Observation was used mainly as a means of 
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expanding wider knowledge of the area and its social interactions. This 
was done in many ways, from engaging local meetings organized 
amongst Bribri and Cabécar people o by NGOs and state agencies in the 
context of the different levels of governance colliding at the Indigenous 
Reserves, to talking to the local bureaucracy of the ADITIBRI, to looking 
at different forms of trade between indigenous farmers and mestizo 
buyers in the riverbanks. I even took part of other more everyday activities 
such as attending local cultural events, spending time with indigenous 
acquaintances on the weekends. During my stay, I visited plenty of Bribri 
and Cabécar farms that used diverging forms of organization of 
agriculture and space. I also had opportunities to observe interactions 
between the main park officials and the local indigenous peoples in the 
context of a couple of verification tours to evaluate local compliance to 
forest restrictions.  
Information on the political dynamics surrounding the BID-MAG 
and the REDD+ negotiations was mainly obtained via interviews with key 
political leaders amongst the different actors involved. Information about 
the cacao component of BID-MAG was obtained through interviews with 
local Bribri and Cabécar farmers whom benefited from the project.2 The 
locations were chosen because of being representative of the 
heterogeneity of the indigenous territories3, the degree of incorporation in 
the for-profit cocoa markets and the interaction of the project in areas 
within and outside the RBLA. Given that the project was implemented in 
various townships, it would be my recommendation that similar studies 
be done in those areas to understand the reasons why those towns also 
presented a noticeable degree of resistance to the project as well.  
Finally, data on the financial resources uses of the PSA program was 
backed with a revision of ADITIBRI’s accounting books and interviewing 
of the higher leadership of the Association as well as local leaders at some 
of the Neighbourhood Council that composes the territorial 
administrative division of the territory. Interviews were also done with 
people living in proximity to the area in which the Program of Payments 
of Environmental Services (PSA) contracts for both forest conservation 
and regeneration were employed, to identify access and use-related 
problems originating from the implementation of the project. Attention in 
these interviews was also oriented towards understanding the rationale 
of indigenous peoples’ internalization of these projects.4 Attention was 
also given to members of indigenous communities that expressed their 
opposition to the PSA and REDD+ projects, either through personal 
interviews and presence in their rallies as an observer. For the REDD+ 
project I also had access as an observer to the internal meetings of the 
Secretariat handling negotiations.  
Semi-structured interviews are tools of data collection that allow for 
a more conversational interaction with the researcher and the research 
participant. There can be some degree of comparability between answers 
obtained through these means, given that there is some degree of order 
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and control in the interaction (Ritchie et al., 2003). Generally, a tape 
recorder was used in every meeting. This was never an issue when talking 
to state agency official or members of NGOs, but it generated some 
resistance when used with local people in some occasions, which is why, 
some interviews were not taped. Interview transcripts and notes taken 
during the interviews were being translated into interview reports. A 
qualitative sampling process was used with attention centered on 
gathering a variety of points of views in different parts of the territory, 
thereby accounting for heterogeneity in perspectives.5 Residents 
constituted the main population for interviewing purposes, but there 
were plenty of other key informants coming from the NGO sector and 
government officials with considerable experience in the region, as a 
result, I met with people from the local municipalities, the main state 
conservation agencies, private consultants, environmental NGO 
practitioners and indigenous representatives living in San José, Puerto 
Viejo and Panama City.  
Besides that, I also engaged in considerable document collection, of 
the regional political history, conservation initiatives, and data on natural 
resources, key state and municipal records about the area. The lack of a 
unified set of archives for government policies in both countries forced for 
countless hours of reading and photocopying of documentation from the 
archives of the key political and academic institutions of the countries 
involved with the local dynamics of the Talamanca Valley. Of relevance 
were the various territorial planning documents developed either by 
SINAC, the ADIs, National Forest Financing Fund (FONAFIFO), the 
Institute for Rural Development (INDER), the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock (MAG) and some of the NGOs present in the area, Tropical 
Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE) in 
particular. These planning documents, spanning over a period of forty 
years of interventions, made it possible to develop the genealogy of semi-
traditional indigenous uses in the Indigenous Reserves as the main 
lynchpin of conservation territorialities, that features prominently in this 
thesis. This documentation provided an indisputably important 
complement to information gathered in the field. 
1.4. Chapter structure 
This thesis is structured into eight chapters. Chapter 2 presents the 
theoretical framework of this dissertation. Chapter 3 contains an 
introduction to the Talamanca region and its inhabitants, by offering a 
historical account of the different territorial projects that have been 
deployed in the region since colonial times (c. 16th Century). The objective 
is to show how the land, resources and people in this region have been 
defined and redefined by discourse and practices of different state, 
indigenous and market territorialities over time, and how these efforts of 
claiming authority over the region have faced resistances and resulted in 
new and unexpected contradictions, leading to the current form of 
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territorialization that defines the contemporary reality of the Bribri and 
Cabécar Indigenous Reserves as territorial formations where indigenous 
peoples’ claims of political and territorial autonomy exist, yet are 
continuously rendered unstable.  
Chapter 4 discusses the wider political and economic context in 
which conservation and land use governance interact in Costa Rica. It 
explains how protected area buffer zones – such as these two indigenous 
reserves – gained considerable importance for national development 
because of a multifaceted crisis in Costa Rican society in the 1980s. With 
the subsequent structural adjustment, these areas were considered key 
accumulation sites for intensifying national articulation to the global 
markets through commodification and financialization of natural 
resources. The introduction of new conservation tools, such as payments 
of environmental services and agroforestry systems currently pushed 
forward by government authorities through the PSA, REDD+ and BID-
MAG constitute the result of this transformation.  
Chapter 5 discusses the history of the RBLA and their interaction 
with the Bribri and the Cabécar through the implementation of exclusive 
forms of conservation and the rationale for change from the perspective 
of SINAC and other state authorities. The core idea of the chapter is 
SINAC’s notion of the “passive frontier thesis”, that is, the idea that 
relations between indigenous peoples and the RBLA can be further 
improved by focusing on their integration to capitalist production 
through sustainable development practices and new forms of 
participative conservation.  
Chapter 6 characterizes the Bribri and Cabécar contestation to one 
of the two specific forms of conservation-related territoriality that are 
being deployed in the Talamanca region: conservation-through-
development. Focusing on the cacao production component of the BID-
MAG project, the chapter explains how conservation territorialities have 
historically attempted to economically and environmentally optimize the 
Bribri and Cabécar semi-traditional agricultural practices to make them 
suitable to neoliberal conservation. This chapter is particularly concerned 
with exploring how these projects have discursively reduced local 
resistance to these practices as a manifestation of an economic problem 
about high production costs, unstable returns and limited investment, 
thereby misrecognizing the logics of traditional land uses and other 
territorial constraints.  
Chapter 7 focuses on the other form of conservation territorialities: 
conservation-as-development. This chapter investigates the conditions 
that allowed the successful appropriation of the Costa Rican payment of 
environmental services program by the Bribri and Cabécar Indigenous 
Reserves. While the specific PSA arrangement is predatory of the 
indigenous governance dynamics rising from their condition in Costa 
Rican sovereignty, it has managed to be appropriated due to the 
somewhat lax implementation of its disciplinary logics of monitoring and 
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benefit disbursements, and not because of integration of the indigenous 
populations into the neoliberal mentality that the project proposes. This 
reality is shown by describing the inherent difficulties of the government 
authorities to include indigenous territorialities into PSA project 
management in the context of ongoing REDD+ negotiations, an issue that 
is discussed in chapter 8.  
Chapter 9 offers a conclusion that returns to the main research 
question, reflecting on potential new other forms of research and offering 
a general redefinition of the main argument made here. It frames the 
micropolitics explored in the previous chapters within the larger context 
of the Costa Rican state and its unique self-portrayal before the world as 
a “green state”. This chapter comments on the orientation of the national 
process of state formation in the context of neoliberal globalization, by 
arguing that since the 1980s, it has been considerably based on the 
material and ideational necessity of diversifying the image of the country 
through the sign value economy. In the context of conservation, the 
necessity to link up with the ongoing national agendas of competitiveness 
and economic development and the strong resistance to the expansion of 
the fortress conservation strategies, have forced local conservation efforts 
to engage in new forms of presenting the country as a paradise for green 
development due to the inherent tendencies of its populace for 
conservation. The objective of this chapter is to puncture that image by 
arguing that this self-image, constructed solely as the enter point to the 
global conservation sign-value economy and presented in the national 
motto of “no artificial ingredients”, constitutes a fallacy that ends up 
rendering local and regional complexities invisible for the sake of 
converting conservation into development, and thereby constituting a 
project of neoliberal multiculturalism. This is done by addressing 
conservation imaginaries of the RBLA as a passive frontier and exploring 
the multiple inconsistencies of that with existing realities of conservation 
in this place. 
 
Notes 
1 Traditional authorities also exist and are often incorporated within the 
village political structures of the ADIs, which are dubbed as Neighborhood 
Councils. 
2 These interviews were done mainly in the communities of Gavilán Canta in 
the TCIR; and in Sepecue, Amubre and Shiroles in the TBIR. Additional 
interviews included those made with members of the indigenous 
communities whom served as project facilitators at these locations.  
3 Overall, the TBIR and the TCIR can be divided into three main sections. The 
first one would be the lowlands of the Talamanca Valley on the left margin of 
the Telire River. Paved road access to this geographical section of the 
territories is effective. As a result, economic and social integration of the Bribri 
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and Cabécar towns with mestizo social structures is considerable. This is 
where the towns of Shiroles and Suretka are located. It is also the area were 
the key state services are located, as people are provided with schools, a high 
school, a supermarket, a health clinic, electricity, TV/cable services, cell 
phone coverage and a bus system between the towns and Bribri, the county 
capital. While Bribri and Cabécar prefer to speak in their languages here, most 
people are also fluent in Spanish, due to the presence of mestizo education 
and the effect of continuous interaction with business partners, employers, 
state officials and service providers from outside of the territories.   
The second region is located between the lowlands and foot of the Talamanca 
Mountain Range after the right margin of the Telire River. It is an area that is 
more difficult to access by road, due to the lack of bridges to cross this body 
of water. Indeed, for some development practitioners interviewed for this 
work, the river is often perceived as a boundary between mestizo integration 
and indigenous livelihoods. These claims can be understood as isolation from 
state services and mestizo economic structures is more noticeable. There is an 
electric power grid that reach some of the towns, but leaving considerable 
gaps in coverage. There are also two small primary schools in Amubre and 
Sepecue. However, after that, state presence is almost non-existent. There is 
considerable integration to the national economy through the production of 
cacao, plantain and banana, yet, some forms of subsistence farming are also 
very noticeable. Most people speak in Bribri and Cabécar (and their many 
variants and dialects), but Spanish is still used by most.  
The third section is located in the mountains. It is considerably isolated as 
unpaved roads give way to dirt trails and time and distance to reach the small 
hamlets grows considerably higher. National education, security and 
healthcare services are non-existent due to the remoteness of the location, 
leading most state officials and authorities to use helicopters to reach this 
section. Indeed, places like San José Cabécar, Alto Urén and Alto Lari require 
a three-day hike to be reached given the difficulty of the terrain. This does not 
mean that there are no economic, social or cultural interactions between 
mestizos and indigenous people living in this section, but it is much more 
limited. The people of these hamlets tend to practice subsistence agriculture 
under their more traditional agroforestry systems and Spanish is spoken 
considerably less.  
4 Most interviews in this sense were done in the towns of Amubre and Gavilan 
Canta.  
5 Overall, interviews were carried out using a topic guide centred on the 
research interests for each of the case studies and lasted from 30 to 60 minutes 
each. 
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Theoretical framework 
 
This dissertation uses a theoretical framework based on political ecology 
to study the relationship between indigenous peoples and modern 
conservation and development interventions mobilized by state agencies 
and international NGOs. The objective of political ecology is to 
understand conflicts over resources by focusing on the underlying 
motivations, interests, power relations and social structures that provoke 
them (Robbins, 2012). This translates into an approach centered on 
understanding conservation projects as strategic attempts by the state and 
other non-state actors to legitimate claims and exercise control over 
natural resources and, by extension, of the usage that indigenous peoples 
make of them (Bailey and Bryant, 1997). It is also a useful approach for 
exploring the nature of political resistance, particularly regarding how 
indigenous communities espouse their own ideas and visions about 
conservation and development, leading to an interplay mired with 
contestation and cooperation that produces, re-produces or transforms 
economic and political structures governing access to and use of natural 
resources.  
Political ecology analyses how new conservation interventions 
affect local institutions governing access and use to resources, leading to 
the uneven production of fortune and misfortune, by bringing back the 
well-known political economy question regarding who benefits and who 
loses from particular configurations of structures determining resource 
control (Ribot and Peluso, 2004). Regarding the study of protected areas, 
conservation projects and indigenous people, political ecology relies on 
the recognition of the role of the former as projections of political power 
manifested geographically and spatially vis-à-vis existing on-the-ground 
indigenous uses which may be conducive to conservation or not (Robbins, 
2012). Some studies have engaged with these interventions by 
problematizing how nature under conservation has been socially 
constructed through environmental discourse and policy and how these 
ideas have resulted in serious material implications on local indigenous 
peoples’ access to resources (see Anderson and Grove, 1989; Neumann, 
2001; amongst many others). Others have discussed how conservation 
measures link to new dynamics of capitalist production leading to 
processes of displacement, exclusion and marginalization of local people 
from their livelihoods (see West, 2006; Igoe and Brockington, 2006; 
Brockington et al., 2008). Finally, some authors have concentrated on 
showing how the establishment of protected areas is related to wider 
processes of state formation and projects related to reinforcing sovereign 
claims over lands vis-à-vis indigenous groups inhabiting the frontiers of 
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political reach of otherwise homogenous nation-states (see Peluso, 1992; 
Dilsaver and Wycoff, 2005; Schwartz, 2006; Büscher, 2013).  
This chapter offers a detailed overview of the theoretical framework 
used for this dissertation. It will commence by defining the green 
economy as the most noticeable manifestation of neoliberalism, 
understood here as a mode of capitalist governance with critical 
implications for regulating the use of and access to nature. It will discuss 
the nature of the concept of neoliberalism being used in this thesis, then 
move onwards to the discussion of the impacts of neoliberalization in 
environmental conservation. Afterwards it will explore what some 
authors have called ‘inclusive’ neoliberalism in order to understand how 
this process has been intertwined with efforts by development 
practitioners to devise more participatory, socially inclusive and 
democratic forms of market-based conservation. Finally, the chapter will 
discuss the relevance of this discussion regarding neoliberal 
multiculturalism, advancing the argument that new discourses toward 
‘inclusivity’ in neoliberal conservation could obscure the disciplinary 
nature of neoliberalism as a mode of capitalist governance.  
2.1. Neoliberalism and social inclusion 
The green economy, alongside its many specific policy iterations (e.g.: 
PES, REDD+, ecotourism, etc.), has been subjected to considerable 
criticisms for being considered a form of neoliberal re-organization of 
environmental governance. Contributions made by people from different 
fields of the social sciences in both the developed and underdeveloped 
worlds, have concluded that market-based conservation measures 
constitute evident representations of a wider process of neoliberalization 
of nature (Büscher and Fletcher, 2015; Igoe and Brockington, 2007; McAfee 
and Shapiro, 2010).  
Neoliberalism is a complicated and controversial concept which is 
often used politically to describe (or conflate) all of the negative 
implications following economic globalization (see Saad-Filho, 2005; 
Duménil and Lévy, 2005). Indeed, conceptualization of neoliberalism as a 
political project imply a number agendas with socially pernicious effects 
such as the imposition of macroeconomic discipline as the key element of 
monetary policy, the liberalization of international trade and global 
finance, the imposition of economic freedoms at the expense of any other 
form of collective organization of production and the hacking down of 
state regulation of the economy through privatization and deregulation 
(Palley, 2005).  
Yet, if viewed as an ideology as some authors do (see Turner, 2008; 
Harvey, 2005), the rhetoric behind all of these measures is unimportant 
compared to the notion that neoliberalism is simply about justifying the 
necessary changes in regulation in favor of the agenda of capital through 
the commoditization of any and all spheres of action previously held by 
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the public sector (Harvey, 2005). In this sense, neoliberalism is not so 
much deregulation as it is re-regulation, an institutional adjustment vis-à-
vis a new regime of accumulation whereby financial capital has achieved 
dominance (Boyer and Salliard, 2003).  
In this sense, depending on whomever one is reading, neoliberalism 
may be conceptualized as set of ideas, as a hegemonic project, as a new 
world order, as a discourse, as a class project, a form of governmentality 
and as political and economic theory. Consequently, debates result from 
the conceptual stretching that neoliberalism has suffered and which has 
led some to think that the concept has been so overused that it is useless 
for consistent and insightful social, political or economic analysis (see 
Peck, 2013). Indeed, some scholars sometimes choose to consciously avoid 
using the term, as they perceive that it is lacking on precision, given the 
previous experience of numerous authors before them which have use the 
concept to conflate every single negative consequence of recent economic 
reform upon poor people (Brenner et al., 2009).  
Yet, one must not ignore the scholars whom still see considerable 
analytical value in making use of this concept in order to comprehend 
larger similarities in the development trajectories of numerous societies 
across the world since the 1970s and 1980s (see Chang, 2000; Gamble, 
2006). Indeed, in an effort to avoid criticism about the imprecisions of the 
term, many authors have discarded the usefulness of the monolithic, 
common and politicized interpretation of term (i.e.: Neoliberalism with a 
big N), in favor of exploring the complicated process by which it becomes 
materialized in multiple, interconnected, yet variegated historical and 
geographical settings (i.e.: neoliberalism with a small n) (Peck, 2013). 
Recent discussions have taken a cue from this difference in order to 
explore neoliberalism not as a single massive transformation, but as a set 
of processes of restructuring happening in a manner contingent to other 
dynamics. Put differently, instead of a discussion about neoliberalism, we 
need to be having an argument about “neoliberalization”, following the 
idea of a process which is always subjected to contradiction, resistance 
and other contextual factors that shape it in different ways (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002).  
The main implication that can be obtained from this is the notion of 
neoliberalism as a transformation that takes place in an erratic fashion 
over time, manifesting in numerous institutional configurations, 
developing in an uneven fashion and often leaving behind a plethora of 
failed policy experiments, partially-consolidated agendas and incomplete 
regulation as a result of constant resistance and other social obstacles. In 
the words of Peck and Tickel (2002), a key feature of neoliberalism is its 
“variegation”, meaning that its “actually-existing” forms are never fully 
complete versions, but hybrid forms contingent on historical and 
geographical realities. Consequently, to talk about neoliberalization 
implies recognizing at least three key aspects: 1) that neoliberalism is 
never a complete process, 2) that it is always contradictory and 3) that it 
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always presents itself in an uneven fashion at the level of actual reality. 
Though, it certainly has some common patterns that may be recognizable 
across the various contexts (Peck and Theodore, 2012). Indeed, local 
context matters greatly to gather on the many forms it becomes 
manifested, but it is also a broader process that gives birth to connections 
between the various actually-existing instances that are produced. Put 
differently, while it shapes every local context, one must not forget that 
there are pressures which consistently promote an ideal market society.  
The conclusion that can be derived from this is that neoliberalism 
transforms erratically over time, leading to various different institutional 
manifestations and developing in a spatially-uneven way, often leaving 
behind a plethora of failed policy experiments, (partially-) surrendered 
agendas due to oppositional resistance and incomplete forms of 
regulations (which often may look as mal-regulation) (Peck, 2013). In 
other words, a key feature of neoliberalism is its variegation, in the sense 
that its actually-existing forms are never incomplete versions of a gigantic 
and all-encompassing process, but the actual process in itself, which is 
defined by the manner in which it gets congealed by historical conjuncture 
into hybrid forms (Peck and Tickell, 2002). As Drainvile (1994: 38) states: 
“neoliberalism is both a broad strategy of restructuring and a succession of 
negotiated settlements of concessions to the rigidities and dynamics of structures, 
as well as the political possibilities of the moment”.  
Consequently, to talk about neoliberalization implies recognizing 
three key aspects of neoliberalism: 1) that is never complete, 2) that it is 
always contradictory and 3) that it always presents itself as uneven in the 
level of actual reality. With that said, accepting the local, complicated and 
varied character of neoliberalization must not impede us from thinking 
about the fact that there are some common patterns, ideologies, projects 
and disciplinary mechanisms that exist across the various contexts it has 
been studied (Harvey, 2011). Local context matters, but neoliberalization 
is not limited to be a collection of its local manifestations (Peck and 
Theodore, 2012), on the contrary it is a much broader process that both 
create and connect these various local instances. Evidence of this is that 
while it shapes every local context differently, there is indeed a neoliberal 
ideology that has consistently promoted an ideal market society, while 
signaling the transformations needed to make it real everywhere (Castree, 
2010).  
From the purview of the traditional discussion on development, 
neoliberalism was an ideology that came strengthened in the aftermath of 
more than a decade of failures of the different variants of social democratic 
or Keynesian economics in the developed world and the many iterations 
of import-substitution industrialization in many parts of the 
underdeveloped world, to resolve the economic problems faced by the 
world economy in the late 1970s. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
neoliberalism managed to consolidate power through the implementation 
of structural adjustment programs (SAP), designed closely following the 
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policy prescriptions set out by the main IFOs tasked with dealing with the 
economic effects of the 1982 Debt Crisis and bring about development to 
the Global South (Palley, 2005). Through the SAPs, a fundamental 
transformation of the relationship between society, states and markets 
took place, shown through the promotion of international trade for 
development purposes, the liberalization of global finance, an aggressive 
deregulation of commodity, monetary and labor markets and a 
significantly reduced social policy framework that contemplated ‘trickle-
down’ as the most effective measure to reduce poverty.  
However, by the 2000s, the policy prescriptions set out under the 
Washington Consensus were undergoing a legitimacy crisis as IFOs and 
governments were incapable of justifying the impacts of market 
fundamentalism in parallel development efforts to reduce poverty and 
control a deepening inequality (Peet and Hartwick, 2009). Expectedly, 
new debates arose regarding need of addressing the failings of 
neoliberalism, but without openly questioning the core economic precepts 
of the Consensus. Whether discussed as ‘inclusive’ neoliberalism (Scheba 
and Sarobidy-Rakotonarivo, 2016), or neoliberalism ‘with a human face’ 
(Weyland, 1996), neoliberal policy has not abandoned its market-oriented 
and financial capital-centered core as the key measures needed to promote 
development and welfare, yet it has certainly introduced a number of 
additional elements with the objective of provoking the integration of 
larger elements of society (Cleaver, 2001). There are many ways in which 
this has been done, but it is relevant to mention the efforts to create the 
appropriate institutions to produce equitable economic growth, the active 
design of pro-poor policies, the introduction of more participatory-
oriented development and the promotion of market-based forms of 
governance. Alongside these changes, NGOs have become a more 
common fixture of development policy along with the usage of “bottom-
up” approaches in order to incentivize involvement and accountability by 
civil society. Underlying all of these new trends is the idea of 
neoliberalism producing a new form of citizenship, whereby people are 
thought as rational and profit-driven agents oriented towards achieving 
self-empowerment and, by aggregation, produce the improvement of the 
wider community (Smith, 1989; more on this on the section on neoliberal 
multiculturalism). 
2.2. Neoliberalization of nature and its effects on 
environmental conservation 
The idea of exploring the effects of neoliberalization in environment 
governance has been strongly in vogue since the early 2000s. Landmark 
studies by Castree (2008), McCarthy and Prudham (2004) and Heynen et 
al. (2007) made critical advances on these issues by exploring a number of 
then-recently enacted policies designed to regulated incipient carbon 
markets and wetland banking, devise market-based urban water 
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distribution systems, promote environmental services and re-design 
institutions for regulating fisheries (see Bakker, 2007; Robertson, 2004; St. 
Martin, 2007; Rocheleau, 2007). As a result, an entirely new area of social 
analysis opened up, orienting itself towards exploring how neoliberal 
ideas and policies were provoking changes in the relationship between 
society and nature. Environmental conservation is perhaps the policy field 
which has gained the most attention through this literature.  
While it is well known that the history of conservation and modern 
protected areas has always been closely related to that of capitalist 
accumulation and colonialism (see Brockington et al., 2008), the rise in 
dominance of neoliberalism has provoked a substantive increase in 
capitalist impingement on conservation projects (Büscher and Fletcher, 
2014). In turn, a literature on neoliberal conservation has been rapidly 
developed defining some common features of these initiatives, as well as 
the manner in which these provoke the exacerbation of material 
inequalities at the expense of livelihoods, values and ideas developed by 
the local communities that make use of these resources.  
Overall there are two strands of neoliberal conservation literature. 
One more inclined to Marxist analysis, whereby scholars, mostly drawing 
on Harvey’s (2005, itself based on previous findings by Duménil and 
Lévy, 2005) account of neoliberalism, contemplate these forms of market-
based conservation as mostly centered on privatizing and commoditizing 
natural resources in order to commercialize them in new capitalist 
markets for the benefit of a class project of capital accumulation. Critical 
to this understanding is the notion of accumulation by dispossession, by 
which new expanded cycles of capital accumulation under neoliberalism 
require the constant transformation of otherwise collective forms of 
property owned by marginal communities to be separated from access to 
their natural resources in an effort to plunge them into market structures.  
The other strand is much more in tune with Michel Foucault’s 
analysis of governmentality. Fletcher (2010) argues that neoliberalism 
must not be understood necessarily as a class project, but as a particular 
form of governance whereby individuals and groups are actively 
disciplined through the establishment of the necessary incentive 
structures that promote a desired form of action. In the case of 
neoliberalism, attention is not necessarily set on deregulation for the free 
operation of market structures, but as re-regulation and enhanced 
interventionism oriented towards creating the structures that allow 
individuals to function in markets, favoring objectives conducive to 
economic growth. Indeed, the rationality behind this form of 
governmentality is not centered in creating Smithian self-interested and 
utility-maximizing actors operating freely in the context of unfettered 
exchange, but disciplined individuals that use rationality to foster 
economic growth that is perceived as productive by society. This thesis is 
much more inclined to the second strand of neoliberal conservation, given 
that conservation here is perceived to be functioning not solely as part of 
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a wider strategy of capital accumulation but as a means of disciplining the 
Bribri and the Cabécar through behavioural incentives for making them 
more docile to modern conservation.  
Whichever the strand of analysis, there are at least three common 
elements shared in most analysis of neoliberal conservation: 1) a 
prevalence of win-win discourses justifying market-based conservation 
projects, 2) an active effort towards commoditizing natural resources as 
the key perceived means of guaranteeing the conservation of natural 
resources and 3) the use of territory as a key tool for the re-regulation of 
market-society-nature relationships (see Igoe and Brockington, 2007). The 
first key element of neoliberal conservation is the notion that market-
based conservation programs are always presented as mutually favorable 
and beneficial solutions to complicated socioeconomic and political 
problems. Indeed, a common feature of most studies is the recognition of 
a discourse claiming the capacity of these forms of conservation to 
reconcile contradicting agendas such as the promotion of economic 
growth alongside with environmental conservation or guaranteeing the 
livelihoods of the locals (Büscher, 2012; 2010). In so doing, these scholars 
argue, neoliberal conservation renders complicated power balances that 
provoke conflicts invisible, such as the notion that capitalist economic 
growth is the most likely the reason why the world is facing and 
environmental crisis requiring conservation projects. Sometimes, this win-
win discourse implies the incorrect idea that solutions to complicated 
problems about production and environmental degradation only require 
technical solutions or managerial responses in order to be fixed.  
Second, commodification is understood as the process of assigning 
exchange value to things in order to be bought and sold in markets 
(Castree, 2003). Of paramount importance for this literature is the fact that 
commodities produced by neoliberal conservation bear considerable 
differences with the more common commodities of our everyday life. 
Indeed, attention is frequently set on the fictitious nature of the 
commodities being produced in the context of these measures. The 
concept of fictitious commodity originates in the writings of Karl Polanyi 
(2001), and is generally taken to refer to things which are not actively 
being produced with the final implication of selling them. For example, 
while people may physically trade in an ounce of coffee, one cannot do 
the same with an hectare of land, as in this latter case, one is not 
exchanging the actual land, but the legal right to it. Of course, to engage 
in this type of trading there must be a complex legal and economic 
infrastructure in place that includes procedures for territorializing, 
measuring, and titling these commodities. This is much more complicated 
when looking at environmental services: first, the specific ecological 
function must be carefully defined and delineated in order to be 
conceptually separated from the rest of the ecosystem that gives it 
meaning, afterwards, a number of methodologies need to be devised in 
order to allocate the ecological function with a measurable unit that 
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permits commercial exchange, finally, state institutions are required to 
locate potential providers of these services with counterparts, thereby 
giving the whole process the appearance of a market (Kosoy and Corbera, 
2010). It is an extremely complicated procedure, which often becomes 
even more problematic as, by nature, ecosystems are often resilient to 
conceptual compartmentalization, in such easily delimited units. Of 
course, implicit to this market-based re-conceptualization of nature and 
its complexity there is also an active effort to ignore other forms of 
valuation of nature that may be central to the representations of the 
stakeholders of conservation projects. Imposition of these forms of 
commodification may result in the modification of patterns of behavior of 
local populations leading them to prioritize individual gain at the expense 
of more community-oriented benefits (Vatn, 2010). 
The third element of neoliberal conservation is the idea that 
processes of neoliberal re-regulation through conservation depend of 
territorialization. Due to the importance of this element in the argument 
of this dissertation, I have decided to treat it independently and at some 
length in this section. Territorialization is a process by which states 
enhance their capacity to rule over people through the division, and 
arrangement of discretely-bounded geographical units that allow the 
control of social uses of natural resources (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1996). 
Environmental policies, such as the creation of protected areas, offer states 
the chance to delimit highly-valued resources, define rules for using and 
accessing said resources, identify proxies for safeguarding these and, in 
so doing, control people in a more optimized fashion. Considering the 
close relationship between territorialization and state formation as well as 
the ongoing tendencies of market-based conservation to promote forms of 
devolved and decentralized governance strongly featuring civil society 
organizations, NGOs and IFOs, Igoe and Brockington (2007) argue that in 
the context of neoliberalism, territorialization becomes an entirely new 
form of state formation driven not necessarily by the state, but by non-
state actors with the objective of privatizing access to natural resources for 
their own benefit. Whereas territorialization is seen by the Marxist strand 
as part of a process of systematic enclosure favoring the commodification 
of natural resources at the expense of local livelihoods, for the 
Foucauldian or post-structuralist strand, territorialization is about the 
active disciplining of subjects by states through the production of 
spatialized power relations (Peluso and Lund, 2011).  
Political ecology has been drawn to the idea of state formation given 
its importance for describing the way conflicts over access to natural 
resources derived from conservation are hinged upon wider processes of 
political domination in society (Bailey and Bryant, 1997). One of the most 
important reflections from political ecology in this sense may well be 
Vandergeest and Peluso’s (1996) landmark article on state 
territorialization in Thailand. In this article, the authors study the case of 
long-standing efforts by the government to take control of the inhabited 
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forests in the periphery of this country. For them, state formation depends 
on the capacity of the state to create new territories, through 
environmental policies, to make them function as complex and 
overlapping units that allow people and resources to be (re-)arranged, 
thereby permitting a more effective administration of space and people. 
This argument hinges upon the adaptation of Sack’s (1986)1 concept of 
territoriality2, which the authors use to narrow down the main indicators 
of territorial activities of the state with regards to natural resource 
management, and more particularly, their efforts to foster or regulate 
logging and forest conservation. Of key importance to Vandergeest and 
Peluso (1996) is the need of looking at the way in which state agencies 
impose new forms of conceptualizing geographic space as a means of 
exercising control over resources and, by extension, control the way in 
which indigenous people behave. “Abstract space” is a hypothetical form 
of space used by state planners for modeling spatial activity often times 
by eliminating extraneous variables deemed irrelevant for analysis 
(Lefebvre, 1991). This abstract dimension is linear, allowing for the 
formation of clear-cut boundaries in geographical space, which are used 
to create discrete and mappable units which can themselves facilitate the 
centralized management of lands for a distance.3 Quite simply, it is a form 
of territorial calculation that has been determined historically by the state 
in an effort to naturalize and reify state-induced territoriality as the only 
legitimate form of socio spatial organization. This means that it is used in 
the establishment of protected areas as discretely bounded units where 
behavior is disciplined through criminalization and surveillance (Peluso, 
1993). 
2.3. Inclusivity and neoliberal conservation 
With all of this said, one must not automatically consider that neoliberal 
conservation only yields negative results, neither one must fall into the 
win-win trap of considering that all of it is positive by default. In reality, 
market-based conservation projects produce positive and negative results 
for the environment, local communities, and the wider economy. There is 
some evidence of this claim in the work of some of the key scholars of this 
literature (see Roth and Dressler, 2012; Büscher et al., 2012). In other 
words, it is difficult to simply assume that the changes provoked by the 
green economy will be either good or bad for the various social groups to 
which said changes are directed.  
Some authors have taken this finding to acknowledge the relevance 
of local contexts to define important stimuli that ends up giving shape to 
different potential outcomes of market-based conservation. Local 
institutions and the particular configuration of social relations at a 
regional, local or household level may produce important effects on the 
way neoliberal conservation interventions get designed and implemented 
on the ground. This brings us again to the concept of neoliberalization, in 
that sense that researching neoliberal conservation implies the need of 
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keeping an eye opened towards the manner in which the local impinges 
on these conservation practices. Roth and Dressler (2012) even come to 
argue that some market-based programs often become so transformed by 
the pressures and resistances of the local context, that become 
fundamentally changed to a point of being able of recognizing them as a 
form of neoliberal conservation.  
This is the reason why efforts at promoting inclusivity in the context 
of neoliberal conservation must not be rejected easily as rhetorical 
strategies of little analytical importance. Over the course of the past two 
decades, debates on internatonal conservation, and especially in the usage 
of market-based tools, have been making a stronger focus on the need of 
addressing local participation gaps (Bebbington et al., 2007). This has been 
done following claims that enhanced local participation in policy-making 
about development offer a chance of developing citizens capable of giving 
form to their everyday lives in a manner that allow them to become 
empowered (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). There are some parallels between 
these ideas and the shifts witnessed in conservation practices since the 
1980s, whereby policy and management practices have been shifting away 
from exclusionary preservationist approaches due to overwhelming 
criticisms of the impacts of these measures in the well-being of poor rural 
communities excluded from natural resources required for their 
livelihood (Büscher and Whande, 2007). In turn, conservation has been 
moving towards a more inclusive style of governance, characterized by 
the interpretation of local people as potential allies and partners for 
conservation (Brockington et al., 2008; Wily, 2002; Agrawal and Kent, 
2006). Indeed, since the early 1990s, these inclusive forms of 
environmental conservation have become very popular and diverse, with 
some focusing on the use of co-management and other forms of 
participatory decision-making, others oriented towards the protection of 
indigenous forms of knowledge and traditional conservation practices, 
while others centered on achieving balanced distributions of the benefits 
(Agrawal and Kent, 2006; Naughton-Treves et al., 2005; West et al., 2006).  
In the meantime, an increasing process of articulation of local 
stakeholders with the structures of the global political economy, through 
complex networks of actors involving international NGOs and IFOs has 
also been moving forward, leading some actors to consider community-
based natural resource management as a major avenue for channeling the 
neoliberalization and incorporation of previously isolated rural areas to 
wider processes of capital accumulation (Büscher and Dressler, 2012; 
Büscher et al, 2012). In so doing, the claim of neoliberal conservation 
scholars is that CBC has opened the door to new processes of 
commodification that lead to the disempowerment of the poor 
communities which were once targeted (Brockington et al., 2008). In some 
ways, criticism around the use of participatory approaches to promote 
environmental conservation have found echo in wider discussion about 
the failure of projects to promote political participation for development 
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in the context of neoliberalism. Based on criticisms of the historical 
difficulties behind achieving the often-praised win-win results, these 
approaches have been questioned in view of the inability to detail with 
issues of enormous importance like power imbalances within local 
communities (Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Igoe and Fortwangler, 2007).  
This has become even more pronounced with the advent of NGOs, 
as these organizations have been characterized as lacking transparency 
and political accountability, often with scholars levelling claims that these 
agencies actively fail to organize effective bottom-up partnerships, in 
view of an overriding prerogative of serving donor interests at the 
expense of local stakeholders (Garland, 2007). Not surprisingly, this view 
has been considered to be unrealistically negative by mainstream 
positions within the international development debate. Scholars writing 
from this perspective, have claimed that NGOs and bottom-up 
approaches to conservation and participatory development do result in 
positive effects such as the establishment of new political spaces from 
which tangible changes can be negotiated and new forms of citizenship 
devised in order for otherwise marginalized people to become 
empowered (Hickey and Mohan, 2005). Indeed, whether being solely 
technical or managerial, inclusion of stakeholders may yield positive 
results and improvements to structural problems, including poverty. Yet, 
it can also be said that transforming citizenship is not enough to counter 
problems embedded in unequal social structures. The lesson that must be 
taken from here is the need for more nuanced perspectives when looking 
at the manner in which local contexts impinge on development and 
conservation interventions meant to foster new forms of citizenship, 
participation and social inclusion. 
2.4. Neoliberal multiculturalism 
While one could accept the idea of inclusive forms of neoliberal 
conservation, some nuance is required when discussing about the manner 
in which states tend to recognize political and cultural rights of 
indigenous populations. In recent decades, Latin American indigenous 
peoples have begun demanding that states tackle historical forms of 
political and social exclusion affecting them. This has been done by 
requiring state institutions to politically recognize more inclusive notions 
of territory, development, conservation and citizenship in the context of 
policy programs oriented towards indigenous peoples. Through demands 
for political autonomy, indigenous control over natural resource 
management in the lands they inhabit, the recognition of Latin American 
states as multi-ethnic, self-representation and self-development, 
indigenous peoples have contested established political institutions and 
the assimilationist tendencies of state development policies from the past 
(see Yashar, 2005; Hale, 2005; Van Cott, 2010; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992). 
Besides that, indigenous peoples have also been key actors in social 
protests against the enactment of neoliberal reforms. As they claim, these 
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have provoked more social inequality and poverty, while also constituting 
a potential threat to their tenure and control over territory (see Isla, 2015; 
Silva, 2009; Escobar, 2008; Hale, 2006). The wider tendencies of political 
mobilization of indigenous peoples in Latin America echo on the 
discourses and politics of mobilization of the Bribri and Cabécar.  
There are two important changes that constitute the context for 
these demands. The first one is the recent re-appearance of representative 
democracy in Latin American societies, which was accompanied by the 
passing of new legal dispositions recognizing these countries as multi-
ethnic and multicultural; as well as the establishing of a new set of rights 
for indigenous peoples and communities (Van Cott, 2010). Costa Rica can 
be included in this group of nations, despite its long-standing democratic 
regime. Indeed, though is generally agreed that the country consolidated 
a formal democratic regime in the 1950s (see Hagopian and Mainwaring, 
2005), legal recognition of indigenous rights did not begin to slowly take 
place until the late 1970s, with some key hallmarks of progress, such as 
the constitutional recognition of the multi-ethnic character of the Costa 
Rican state taking place until 2014. The second important change has been 
the recognition of indigenous rights at the international level. Active 
participation of indigenous leaders and transnational indigenous 
organizations in the context of multilateral organizations like the United 
Nations (UN), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 
Organization of American States (OAS) has allowed for the establishment 
of key international legal frameworks designed to force state recognition 
of their rights, such as the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169 
in 1989 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples of 2007 (Stavenhagen, 2009). In response to these transformations, 
states have attempted to recognize these rights through the 
implementation of new mechanisms designed to include indigenous 
participation and demands. This has happened in policy areas that have a 
direct effect upon the lives of indigenous communities, such as social 
safety nets, education, healthcare, and more importantly for this 
dissertation: environmental and rural development policy.  
With all of this said, recent literature has shown that there is a gap 
between recognition of indigenous rights and their implementation 
through state policy in Latin America, an issue that is quickly becoming 
the source of continuous political contention between indigenous peoples 
and the state (see Stavenhagen, 2009; Hale, 2006). The concept of 
neoliberal multiculturalism is of key analytical importance for this 
dissertation. According to Hale (2006), neoliberal multiculturalism is a 
political project engrained within neoliberal governance that seeks to 
selectively recognize indigenous rights with the objective of making these 
compatible to the wider ideas, interests and logics of neoliberalism and 
capital accumulation. Put in another way, it entails the disciplining of 
indigenous peoples to the economic and political practices and ideas of 
contemporary capitalism, while offering a response to small fraction of 
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their demands. According to Escobar (2008), neoliberal multiculturalism 
constitutes more than just a state attitude, but a cultural and political 
disciplinary project by which indigenous features that are deemed 
compatible with neoliberalism are considered accepted and further 
promoted by state policy, whereas others deemed unacceptable are 
rejected and marginalized, even to the point of active criminalization of 
certain conducts.  
The argument behind neoliberal multiculturalism requires a wider 
interpretation of neoliberalism. Instead of just seeing it as a collection of 
economic philosophies and actions, one must recognize its function as a 
particular form of state regulation. Parallel to the post-structural strand of 
neoliberal conservation, neoliberal multiculturalism does not concentrate 
that much in how state power might be weakened by market reform, and 
instead, it looks at how state regulation becomes more pervasive 
consolidating new forms of discipline society, in this case through the 
manner in which collective identities are constructed. From the 
perspective of Goldman (2001), one feature of neoliberal conservation 
projects is their intention to produce new identities in the form of “eco-
rational subjects”. Indeed, the objective of the projects is to develop 
stakeholders in the sense of people capable of realizing the vision of the 
‘green economy’, in this case by defining the necessary skills, behaviors 
and ethics that are needed to function as partners to conservation (Büscher 
et al., 2012). This endeavor is consistent with efforts from neoliberal 
multiculturalism to simultaneously promote certain forms of involvement 
of indigenous people that are considered helpful for a larger goal, while 
suppressing others that are viewed as opposed to the wider rationality 
expected by the project, or the state (Hale, 2005). Put differently, the 
neoliberal state is meant to created support to market logics by creating a 
community of acceptance to this form of interaction. 
One way of looking at how this impinges in the previous discussion 
about neoliberal conservation is by looking at the interaction between 
state territorialization and localized conceptions of space. Indeed, the 
exploration of the origins and use of abstract space can only lead to 
exploring just one side of conservation-related territorialization. The other 
one has to do with the social interplays that these efforts produce. The 
obvious choice then is to explore how abstract space contrasts with the 
characteristic complexity of local indigenous livelihood strategies (Roth, 
2008: 375). As implied by the common property literature, local scale 
dynamics often produce a form of multidimensional space which is not 
decisively circumscribed and “is flexible and more complex than that used for 
the purpose of state management” (Ibid: 375; see also: Ostrom, 1990). As 
Vandergeest and Peluso (1996: 389) argue, lived space “is not abstract or 
homogenous, but located, relative and varied”. Here malleable tenure, 
intersecting land uses and management based on species and not areas 
contrasts with abstract space (Roth, 2008: 375). For some authors, 
conservation conflicts often surge from the encounter of these forms of 
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looking at space given the contrasts between state-led conservation 
territorialities and local peoples’ spatialities, leading to efforts to either 
obscure, change or eliminate the latter in order for the state to regulate 
human-environment relations and assert control over natural resources 
(Vandergeest and Peluso, 1996). Quite simply, lived space and abstract 
become incommensurable with one another and this leads to the 
production of political instability. The necessary implication is that the 
pulverization of lived space is a central element of the creation of abstract 
space. 
Recent literature on internal territorialization has focused on 
reviewing more closely what are the effects of this interplay and thereby, 
challenging the idea of a separation between states and civil society even 
more thoroughly. Examination has become centered upon how 
territorialization takes place unevenly at very specific locations, leading 
to arguments of how this process is mutually constituted by both state and 
civil society practices (Sikor, 2001; Wadley, 2003; Roth, 2004), depending 
on how locality-specific conditions vary, such as the nature of coercive 
power of states, the involvement of different authorities (i.e.: military, 
paramilitary and police forces) and the historical, political, cultural and 
ecological characteristics of the landscape being studied 
(Sivaramakrishnan, 1997; Ramutsindela, 2004; Ramutsindela, 2008). This 
has been very useful to understand how territories can be produced 
through contestation at different scales (Brenner, 1999; Buch-Hansen, 
2003; Sassen, 2005; Rocheleau and Roth, 2007).  
These efforts are interesting for study because they open up the 
scope of territoriality to address territory, not solely from the perspective 
of the state, but also reflecting on how territorialization works in other 
contexts as well.  In Latin America, this has centered on the exploration of 
how indigenous social movements invoke culturally-specific 
understandings of space in an effort to replace and re-conceptualize 
territory as a more relational concept, instead of a cartographic form of 
space, and therefore, challenge state claims over their territories 
(Echeverri, 2005). Concepts such as ‘pachamama’, ‘sumak kawsay’, or 
even the Bribri term ‘ijuk’ (meaning: land) raise “new ontological concerns 
about what is said to exist” (Bryan, 2012: 219). This challenges commonly 
accepted views about space that are instrumental in the oppression of 
indigenous people and the denial of their cosmovisions and ideas 
regarding, rights to nature and cultural difference (see Toledo et al., 2002; 
Barrera-Bassols and Toledo, 2005; Cervantes Trejo, 2011; Arsel, 2012). 
Simultaneously, the recognition of these new forms of ‘territory as 
challenges to state power’ also entail a more sophisticated critique of how 
territory comes into being, which relates to the contestation that the state 
in turn makes of these new emancipatory efforts through territory. In 
some cases, neoliberal multiculturalism has entailed the appropriation of 
recent territorial vindications like the aforementioned in order to validate 
particular forms of economic production and organization. An example 
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that requires consideration has to do with the growing use of market-
assisted land reforms or market-based conservation instruments to 
address problems of access to land and natural resources or as part of 
political strategies to support indigenous territorial claims (see Nygren, 
2004; Hayes, 2008; Wainwright, 2008; Wainwright and Bryan, 2009; 
Grandia, 2012). This territorial turn has made some of these vindications 
to become channels through which neoliberalism has altered the 
perspective of indigenous demands for territory, by recasting them as new 
sites for expanding neoliberal forms of governance designed at 
maintaining the socio-spatial order that they wished to counter (Hale, 
2005). For the purposes of this dissertation, this entails the need of opening 
the scope of territoriality in political ecology, including a more critical 
exploration of the appearance of territory, how politics molds it and the 
impact of efforts to promote social change (Bryan, 2012).  
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a detailed overview of the theoretical framework 
used for this dissertation. It has explained how the green economy is seen 
as the most noticeable manifestation of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism has 
been defined a new form of regulation of capitalism which entails a 
political project of transforming environmental governance and the 
manner in which nature is conceptualized and used. This discussion has 
offered a brief literature review of the impacts of neoliberalization in 
environmental conservation. This has included an explanation of what is 
meant by ‘inclusive’ neoliberalism in order to understand how this 
process of transforming regulation of the environment has become 
intertwined with efforts by development practitioners to devise more 
participatory, socially inclusive and democratic forms of market-based 
conservation, leading to new contradictions. Finally, the chapter has also 
defined the concept of neoliberal multiculturalism in order to describe the 
manner in which this project of inclusive neoliberalism often times 
include a disciplinary outlook meant not to acknowledge and foster 
cultural differences, but as a mean of appropriating what is convenient to 
market regulation and state formation, while sidelining the rest.  
 
Notes
1 For Sack (1986) there are ten basic ‘tendencies of territoriality’. Although 
these tendencies often refer to social practices related to territory, in reality 
they also include effects produced by territoriality as well (Ibid: 28). While 
the first three are considered to be always present in territoriality, the 
others are contingent: 1) territoriality entails the classification of areas, 
mainly by declaring prohibitions of access to these areas or their contents, 
2) territoriality uses boundaries to make its communication easier; 3) 
territoriality is a more efficient strategy for enforcing control than non-
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territorial ones, 4) “territory provides a means of reifying social power” (Ibid: 
32); 5) relatedly, it shifts attention away from the power relationship of 
control that sustains it (Ibid: 33), 6) apart from hiding this relation, 
territory also makes it impersonal (Ibid: 33), 7) territory entails a “place-
clearing function” (Delaney, 2005: 77) that makes it appears as the “neutral, 
essential means by which a place is made” (Sack, 1986: 33), 8) territories act as 
a vessel that molds space, starting from the scope of authority to identity, 
9) territoriality “helps create the idea of a socially-emptiable space” (Ibid: 33), 
as space that can be devoid of material context and ideas (i.e.: abstract 
space), and 10) territories are prolific, that is, once deployed, they spawn 
more territories. 
2 Vandergeest and Peluso (1996) describe a set of key components of this 
internal territorialization. First is the need of the state of creating and 
mapping boundaries that allow for space to be delimited, classified and 
controlled (Ibid: 388-389). This was done through clear mapping of the 
national boundaries, but also through the forcible creation of villages 
through land classification schemes in sensitive border areas in order to 
control otherwise nomadic or semi-nomadic groups which were 
recognized as threats (Ibid: 404). The authors argue about the need of the 
state of creating an ‘abstract space’, that is an equivalent, grid-like, and 
undifferentiated abstraction of space, which may operate as a tool to 
render space more easily controllable from a distance by political elites. 
This is made easier by a second component that is the establishment of 
rules in order to define acceptable uses of resources within the demarcated 
areas. In the case of Thailand, this is reflected on the expansion of land 
codes and codifications of private property (Ibid: 400). This leads to a third 
component which is the active enforcement of boundaries. State coercion 
an political violence are certainly forms in which this can be mediated, but 
the mustering of active collaboration of private actors through the 
assignation of territorial rights of access can also be another way to fulfill 
state goals (Ibid: 413). Such actors may be private property owners also 
interested in guaranteeing security of their ownership through state 
legislation or even the direct involvement of outside military aid to 
increase the capacity of state agencies to enforce controls over its 
territories (Ibid: 413). Whereas these three components are important, the 
authors also recognize strongly their lack of effectiveness. Indeed, the fact 
that only 5% of areas outside the central region of Thailand were fully 
surveyed and registered as property is an example of the limitations and 
contestation that may be encountered along the way (Ibid: 404). 
3 In this sense, it is often said to operate as a “matrix of socio-spatial 
organization that (…) is produced and regulated by the state” (Brenner and 
Elden, 2009a: 358), with its most important quality the capability that it 
has to make space appear “homogenous and thus devoid of social differences” 
(Ibid: 358) derived from everyday social life. It operates as a tabula rasa 
that “destroys its (historical) conditions, its own (internal) differences, and any 
(emergent) differences, in order to impose an abstract homogeneity” (Lefebvre, 
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1991: 370). This in turn allows for “continuous rational economic calculation 
in the spheres of production and exchange, as well as comprehensive and 
encompassing control in the realm of statecraft” (Brenner and Elden, 2009a: 
358), thereby establishing an unitary rationality that can “make economic 
growth possible and draw strength from that growth” (Ibid: 358). 
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3 
 
Historical territorializations of the 
Talamanca Valley 
 
“The commercial resources of Talamanca can be considered as being 
currently null. (…). A great deal of new tradable goods may widen 
commerce in this district, provided that there is enough interest from 
entrepreneurial people. Coffee, cacao and sugar could be produced in 
larger quantities in Talamanca than all other current harvests of the 
Republic on the day in which an intelligent and laborious people have 
taken possession of these rich lands.” (Gabb, 1978: 74)1 
 
American paleontologist William Gabb wrote these words in 1874 as part 
of his Verified report about the exploration of Talamanca during the years of 
1873-1874, a geographic, geological and demographic investigation 
ordered by the Costa Rican state and financed by Minor C. Keith, whom 
would later become a co-founder of the U.S. multinational United Fruit 
Company (UFCO) (Denyer and Soto, 2000). The report was to become the 
first effort to gather and systematize scientific knowledge about the 
Talamanca and Sixaola Valleys, mainly with the objective of ascertaining 
the productive potential of the land as well as the availability of natural 
resources and the local indigenous populace for capitalist agricultural 
expansion. At the time, this region held a marginal position within the 
national economy, and Costa Rican state claims of sovereignty were 
tenuous at best. Yet, three decades later, Talamanca was transformed, 
from a place inhabited by indigenous peoples to a landscape dominated 
by banana plantations and railroad tracks (Villalobos and Borge, 1998). 
Political pressures from the Costa Rican government, cartographers and 
politicians, led the UFCO to demarcate a small patch of land to become an 
“indigenous reserve” for the Bribri and Cabécar peoples. In reality, this 
plan did not come to fruition at least until 1977 with the creation of the 
Talamancan Indigenous Reserve (Lansing, 2014).2  
The objective of this chapter is to explore the historical origins of 
these territories. The TBIR and TCIR are patches of land shaped out and 
demarcated by the Costa Rican state to be inhabited by Bribri and Cabécar 
indigenous peoples. The irony here is that while both reserves have been 
conceived as the means to include these populations within the Costa 
Rican state, they also have operated as a means of excluding them from 
it.3 I will explain this contradiction by showing how the land, resources 
and people of the Talamanca Valley have been defined and redefined by 
the practices of different territorialities over time, and how the related 
efforts of ruling the Talamanca Valley and its inhabitants have faced 
resistances and resulted in an unstable state territorialization of this 
geographical space and its inhabitants. It is my claim that these historical 
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efforts of state territorialization have been reflective of broader discursive 
and material processes oriented towards rendering the Talamancan 
indigenous populations as objects, ascertaining their compatibility with 
the production of economic value and organizing land governance in 
accordance. This is shown first, in the manner in which the Spanish 
conquistadors attempted to integrate the Talamanca Valley into their 
system of encomienda. Later, this argument is exemplified in the way the 
Valley was converted from illegible indigenous land uses into plantation-
oriented private property, under the control of the UFCO, leading to the 
expulsion of indigenous populations in the early 20th Century.  Finally, it 
will be demonstrated through the fragile coexistence between indigenous 
land uses and for-profit forms of cultivation, after the Talamanca Valley 
was retaken since the 1940s. This chapter will explain how the continuous 
historical bombardment of state attempts to render space legible for 
fulfilling state objectives towards agricultural expansion in the 1960s and 
energy self-sufficiency in the 1970s and 1980s, took place at the expense of 
Bribri and Cabécar autonomy and self-determination over their lands.  
This chapter concentrates in the political construction of indigenous 
peoples and the lands occupied by them vis-à-vis state power over the 
course of these three historical periods. The first section discusses the 
colonial history of the Talamanca region (from the 16th to the 18th 
Century). Attention is centered on the manner in which Bribri and 
Cabécar resistance to Spanish conquest and colonization led to the 
conceptualization of these lands as unruly frontier regions separate from 
the reach of colonizers. Afterwards, I focus on the effects of these unstable 
colonial understandings of the indigenous subject in the context of the 
recently independent Costa Rican republic (from 1821 to the 1940s). The 
focus is set on the processes and territorialities that led to the creation of 
the first – albeit short-lived – ‘indigenous reserve’ created by the United 
Fruit Company in the Talamanca Valley in 1916. Otherwise a brief 
anecdote within a wider process of dispossession and marginalization of 
indigenous peoples, this reserve constitutes a moment of materialization 
of the hegemony of the Costa Rican territorial state. Later on, the chapter 
concentrates on the changes and continuities of the relationship between 
state power and indigenous peoples after the forced withdrawal of UFCO 
in the late 1940s. Emphasis here is on describing the state rationalities 
towards these peoples in the context of state-led development projects and 
the introduction of indigenous recognition policies until the early 1980. 
The final section sets the stage for understanding the territorial logics 
behind the introduction of green economy projects in the context of RBLA 
BID-MAG and PSA, since the 1980s. 
3.1. The failed Spanish colonization of Talamanca 
The Spanish conquest of what today constitutes the territory of the Costa 
Rican state began in the 1560s, and, in the span of forty years, most of the 
indigenous population and lands in the Central Valley, parts of the 
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Northern Pacific and the Central Caribbean seaboard had been forcefully 
subjected to Spanish rule (Solórzano Fonseca, 2002; 1997; 1996). With that 
said, the geographical extension and characteristics of Spanish colonial 
occupation of Costa Rican territory would not change considerably over 
the course of the following centuries, given the considerable political and 
military resistance of the local indigenous populations to Spanish rule, as 
well as to the threats posed by other geopolitical forces with vested 
interested in these areas (Boza Villarreal, 2014). As a result, by the time of 
Independence, in 1821, large extensions of land that was claimed by the 
Spanish - including the Talamanca Valley - have managed to remain 
outside of colonial control. Indeed, these geographical spaces became 
‘unruly frontier regions’ for colonial rulers and ‘safe havens’ for 
indigenous peoples escaping from them (Solórzano Fonseca, 2013).  
Before the Spanish conquest, Talamanca4 was mostly inhabited by 
Bribri, Cabecar and Teribe peoples (Solórzano Fonseca, 1996).5 The region 
is often treated by historians as a ‘loose political territory’ were 
hierarchical control was held by various small chieftainships (or 
‘cacicazgos’), operating as rudimentary forms of socio-political, economic 
and military organization defined by the domination of various clans 
related with each other by kin (Borge and Villalobos, 1998; Boza Villarreal, 
2014). These chieftainships were organized around key regional political 
figures (dubbed by most literature as ‘caciques mayores’, or ‘Blu’), which 
organized joint religious, economic and military actions, as well as 
occasionally gathering and redistributing productive surpluses (Ibarra 
Rojas, 2002). Economically, the Talamancan peoples had developed a 
system of itinerant agriculture based upon the cultivation of maize, beans 
and tubers (Corrales, 1982). Though little is known about pre-colonial 
indigenous trade relationships, it appears that the indigenous populations 
of Talamanca had a network of routes that linked the various 
chieftainships in the region, as well as with other ethnic groups in the 
Central Valley and today’s Nicaragua, Panama and Colombia (see 
Fernández Guardia, 2006; Ibarra Rojas, 2002; Stone, 1961).  
Besides these broad conclusions, information about the internal 
politics and economics of the Talamanca region is scarce. Most 
information about this area and its people during colonial times comes 
exclusively from Spanish reports, descriptions and accounts (Solórzano 
Fonseca, 1997). This limits analysis in various ways, but mainly records 
may be – and often are – biased in different ways. For example, there is 
practically no attention given to either the practices or narratives of 
indigenous resistance against Spanish dominance, thereby leaving us with 
only one side of the story. On the other, it appears that there existed open 
conflicts and political infighting amongst the various indigenous ethnic 
groups, kinship (clan) structures and chieftainships that existed in this 
place, which probably led the Spanish colonists to confusion with regards 
to their accounts of the actual forms of socio-spatial organization of the 
Talamancan indigenous peoples (Ibarra Rojas, 2002).  
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Indeed, some Costa Rican historians have questioned the feasibility 
of a clear-cut spatial definition of the Talamanca region given: a) that the 
overarching imperatives of conquest often led the Spanish colonizers to 
draw arbitrary boundaries to delimit these spaces (see Quirós, 1987; 
Solórzano Fonseca, 2013; Guevara Berger and Chacón Castro, 1992);6 and 
b) that there is recent historical evidence of a much more complex socio-
political and economic relationships between the Talamancan peoples and 
other indigenous groups elsewhere in the country at the time of 
Independence (see Boza Villarreal, 2014). Consequently, the information 
is extensive for describing the overall motivations and interests of the 
Spanish conquerors and colonists in Talamanca, and considerably 
insufficient for characterizing the ideas that propelled the various forms 
of indigenous resistance. 
The Spanish attempt at conquering the Talamanca region was a 
direct result of the considerable structural limitations of the marginalized 
Costa Rican colonial economy. Lacking any noticeable mineral wealth 
(e.g.: gold, silver, etc.), this province was rapidly forced to engage with the 
transoceanic mercantile economy through the trading of surpluses in local 
agricultural production. As in other parts of Latin America, the encomienda 
system was the basis for economic organization of the province. The 
encomienda was a contractual arrangement between the Spanish Crown 
and individual conquerors/colonists, by which the latter were rewarded 
with the right of appropriating captured indigenous population for use as 
labor power, in exchange of pacifying and settling newly discovered areas 
in the name of the former (Quirós, 1987). Often times, the encomienda also 
included land titles over particular patches of land, and occasionally, 
endowed the beneficiaries with the authority of administering the 
allocation of indigenous populations amongst other encomenderos (i.e.: 
colonists to whom an encomienda was granted), as well as charging and 
extracting tributes from both the indigenous and the encomenderos in a 
specific jurisdiction (Ibarra Rojas, 2002). Put simply, the encomienda was a 
system of incentives that allowed the Spanish Crown to expand its 
colonial holdings in Latin America, by transferring all the immediate 
economic benefits and logistical risks of military conquest to private 
individuals.  
However, the marginal economic status of the province resulted in 
little incentives for the colonists to settle, leading to a small and slow-
growing population of colonists. This, in turn, led to most of the 
agricultural surpluses for trade to be extracted through the direct and 
forceful use of indigenous labor in plantations or the indirect 
dispossession of indigenous produces through the use of tributes in 
species (see Dietrich, 1978; González, 1987). This dependence upon 
indigenous labor was not a problem early on due to the abundance of 
indigenous labor. But, over the course of the 17th Century, it rapidly 
became a problem as the local indigenous population rapidly dwindled 
due to the combined effect of diseases; famines, dislocation and the 
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appalling conditions to which the indigenous workforce was subjected to. 
This process eventually led to an imminent economic crisis (Solórzano 
Fonseca, 1996). The local Spanish political and religious elites devised 
various solutions to address the problem, with none oriented towards 
attending the structural problems of the parasitic colonial economy. 
Consequently, the establishment of a new politico-geographical space that 
could serve as a staging ground for appropriating more indigenous labor 
through conquest became the chosen solution. Talamanca was considered 
an ideal candidate due to its condition as both a ‘shelter region’ for 
indigenous people escaping Spanish rule, and its proximity with the cacao 
plantations of the Matina Valley. As a then Costa Rican governor argued 
about the area:  
“The land is fresh and abundant with all forms of fruits, it is inhabited 
by some Indians of a group called the Tariacas (referring to the Bribri); 
as well as other groups around them, all of which come to this beach to 
make salt and to rescue the cacao of which there is plenty. In this land, 
there are gold deposits in the rivers and brooks, I did not search them 
in depth, in order to not seem greedy, and just did my due diligences. 
In this case, to capture Indians; so, I captured the little chief alongside 
all of his family and another four others coming from Talamanca that 
had come to kill turtles. They call themselves atheists, and inhabit the 
banks of a river called Coín. On my side, I have recognized and seen 
the possibility of conquering Talamanca and the Valley of Duy (…)” 
(cited by Solórzano Fonseca, 1997: 151). 
This brief reflection also embodies two major and mutually related 
ideological themes informing the Spanish territorialization of Costa Rica. 
The first one is the overall presumption made about the great agricultural 
and mineral wealth of these lands; whereas, the second, is the idea that 
agricultural productivity was not the result of the actions of indigenous 
peoples, but a “natural” characteristic of the overall landscape. Indeed, a 
common theme in colonial portrayals of indigenous peoples in Talamanca 
was the notion that they were not a factor in explaining the productivity 
of the land. All in all, the role of indigenous labor and knowledge in the 
transformation of the landscape and in the production of the agricultural 
and mining riches present in the idealizations of Talamanca is rendered 
invisible by this statement.  
Though this notion ran contrary to the actual material reality of the 
colonial economy, this particular vision of indigenous labor constitutes 
the basis of the juridical reasoning that serves as the ideational support of 
the encomienda system. Indigenous peoples outside of Spanish political 
and religious control were considered unproductive and uncivilized by 
the colonial authorities, making their submission the only manner in 
which their souls could be saved and for them to become members of 
society, a process of political inscription that was inescapably mediated 
by their role as contributor to the Spanish Crown. Indeed, the legal status 
of the indigenous peoples as part of the Spanish political body was 
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established following the uneven feudal power structure that already 
existed in Spain. As such, indigenous peoples that had been captured 
were assigned with the condition of ‘free vassal of the Crown’, which 
means that they were obliged to give retribution to the encomenderos to 
which the Crown had assigned them (Ibarra Rojas, 2002). Moreover, they 
were considered to be incapable of holding their own lands privately 
(Fernández, 1976). Consequently, such retribution came in the form of 
tributes in species (often in the form of agricultural produces) that were 
directly appropriated by the encomendero and the Spanish Church (in 
charge of the evangelization of the indigenous people). In other words, 
political recognition of conquered indigenous populations as “members 
of the Spanish polity overseas” was mediated by their role as objects of 
production. 
Attempts to conquer Talamanca were numerous and constant since 
the early 17th Century, with the establishment of the city of Santiago de 
Talamanca in 1604. This city was to become a key staging area for the 
Spanish settlers and a major center from which to expand the encomienda 
system and operate the network of indigenous ‘reducciones’ (i.e.: 
agricultural towns set up by the encomenderos and the Catholic Church in 
order to settle captured indigenous peoples and use them as forced labor 
power).7 However, Talamancan resistance was considerable. By 1610, this 
emplacement had been destroyed during a major indigenous rebellion in 
the area. From that point onwards, all military efforts to stifle resistance 
and pacify this region in 1638 and 1665 ended with continuous failure 
(Boza Villarreal, 2014). The most successful attempt was the establishment 
of various Catholic missions between 1675 and 1706, yet, this effort also 
ended in a massive indigenous uprising organized by Pablo Presbere8 in 
alliance with various of the cacicazgos in the area (for a very detailed and 
historiographic account of cases of Talamancan resistance to the Spanish, 
see: Solórzano Fonseca, 2013; Ibarra Rojas, 2002). 
While the Talamanca region strongly resisted and successfully 
remained separate to Spanish dominance, it cannot be said that this period 
had no relevant impact in the lives of the indigenous peoples. For starters, 
there was a significant reduction in the indigenous population of the 
region over the Colonial era. The combination of new diseases introduced 
by the Spanish was a major reason of this (Azofeifa and Barrantes, 1984; 
Boza Villarreal, 2014). But, it is also relevant to point out the fact that, faced 
with the inability of taking over Talamanca, the Spanish centered their 
efforts in capturing indigenous peoples to repopulate areas where other 
indigenous populations were previously annihilated by the encomienda 
(Solórzano Fonseca, 1997). Similarly, since the 18th Century, continuous 
Miskito9 raids - supported by the United Kingdom - ended up with the 
kidnapping of numerous Talamancans to be sold as slaves in Jamaica and 
other English colonies in the Americas (Villalobos and Borge, 1998).  
Economically, the introduction of trade networks between the 
Talamancan indigenous peoples and the Spanish - mainly through some 
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of the Catholic missions – led to the use of new tools for agriculture, and 
new economic practices in Talamanca, such as the use of livestock (Bozzoli 
de Willie, 1979; Stone, 1961). With that said, the indigenous economic base 
remained strongly focused around an itinerant agricultural system mixed 
with hunting and fishing. Moreover, while the political and religious 
structures seem to have remained fairly unchanged, the constant threat of 
Spanish raids and the gradual resolution of infighting amongst the clans, 
led to the reinforcement of the political figure of the ‘Blu’10 – often 
referenced by the literature as either a cacique mayor or a political 
equivalent of an overarching ruler, much like a king – which would be 
extremely relevant after Independence (Monge Alfaro, 1974).  
In other words, even though the provincial colonial authorities of 
the Central Valley claimed sovereignty over Talamanca, by considering it 
just another reducción of their system of territorial ordering, in reality, this 
region remained in a constant state of rebellion against Spanish 
dominance, and outside their factual political control until Independence 
in 1821. It was a nominal political control to say the least. This in turn 
meant that, the newly formed Costa Rican state inherited a territory upon 
which it had no clear control, a particularly complicated situation 
considering the growing interests of other parties to take over these lands. 
On the contrary, Talamanca was a patch of land whose territorial control 
was vied upon by various different parties - namely the Costa Rican state, 
but also the British-supported Miskito, the also recently independent 
Colombian nation and, of course, the very indigenous peoples that 
inhabited the area. 
3.2. State territorialization and agrarian expansion 
At the time of Independence, most of the territory of what is now Costa 
Rica remained outside of the political control of the recently formed state. 
Outside of the Central Valley, where the main urban centers are located, 
government presence was limited to a handful of townships in the 
Northern and Central Pacific seaboards and a single seaport in the 
Caribbean (Boza Villarreal, 2014). Though Talamanca was part of the 
lands that were claimed by the Costa Rican state, there were no official 
representatives assigned to the area, leading state control to be 
insignificant (Fernández, 1976). Moreover, these territorial claims would 
remain constantly challenged by other geopolitical actors.  
On one hand, since the late 17th Century, the Miskito – an ethnic 
group from modern Nicaragua and Honduras – had been involved in 
constant attacks and raids into territories claimed by the Spanish Crown 
alongside the Caribbean coastline of Central America. These attacks were 
backed by the United Kingdom (UK) in an effort to challenge Spanish 
power and guarantee geopolitical control over the Caribbean Sea. 
Effectively, the Talamanca region had completely fell under Miskito 
control for the better part of the first three decades since national 
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independence (Villalobos and Borge, 1993).11 This limited Costa Rican 
state presence in the area, at least until the United States and the UK 
signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in 1850. This agreement required both 
powers to remain neutral with regards to the internal politics of Central 
American nations, thereby settling tensions over geopolitical interests in 
the Caribbean Sea (Solórzano Fonseca, 2013).12 The actual political effect 
of the treaty was Britain’s abandonment of its territorial claims in the 
region (excepting Belize), including of their financial and political support 
of the Miskito.13  
With that said, the end of political dominance of the Miskito over 
Talamanca did not translate into a stronger control by the Costa Rican 
state. Indeed, the Costa Rican government was not able to assign state 
officials to the region until the 1860s (Boza Villarreal, 2014). And, even so, 
a permanent presence was not completely guaranteed until 1885 with the 
establishment of the San Bernardo Agricultural Colony, a state-led land 
reform project that was meant to offer agricultural lands to mestizo 
settlers in the area. It must be added, that this project was abandoned a 
decade later given the limitations of the Costa Rican government to 
guarantee a continuous supply of necessary goods for the colony to be 
actually productive (Viales Hurtado, 2001).  
On the other hand, in the context of subsiding pressures of Miskito 
colonization, political rivalry between Costa Rica and Colombia began to 
pile up. By the late 19th Century, Talamanca became the object of a long-
lasting border dispute. Territorial delimitation of Talamanca changed 
constantly as Spanish authorities in colonial Costa Rica and Panama 
attempted to realize control over this area. After Independence, the 
unclear nature of the boundary led to contesting claims of sovereignty 
between the Costa Rican and Colombian (and then Panamanian)14 
governments (Lansing, 2014). In view of their limitations, Costa Rican 
claims over Talamanca and Bocas del Toro could not have been backed up 
with the constant presence of government authorities or colonists in the 
area (Boza Villarreal, 2014). This situation allowed the Colombian 
government to send a military detachment to Bocas del Toro in 1837, both 
to colonize these lands but also to protect their international boundary 
from encroachment by the Miskito Kingdom. This action by the 
Colombian state was viewed as a challenge for Costa Rican sovereignty 
over the Talamanca Valley. This boundary dispute continued to be a 
serious issue of contention during the 19th Century, and then between 
Costa Rica and Panama after the independence of the latter in 1903. While 
a US-backed border agreement was eventually signed in 1907, granting 
the Talamanca Valley to Costa Rica, the Panamanian state refused to 
accept this decision leading to a violent skirmish in 1921 and the 
suspension of formal relations until 1928 (Guevara Berger and Chacón 
Castro, 1992). It was not only until 1941 that an enduring border 
agreement was finally reached between both states, leading to the current 
configuration of the frontier.  
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In any case, given this continuous tension, and the limitations faced 
to back up their territorial claims with either colonists, troops or 
government officials in Talamanca, the Costa Rican state began 
developing political relations with Bribri and Cabécar leaders in the area. 
This was done as a means affirming the authority of the state upon these 
lands (Solórzano Fonseca, 1996). One way entailed the validation of 
existing indigenous political positions within the governance structure of 
the Costa Rican state. As said earlier, the political position of the ‘cacique’ 
existed in Talamanca since before colonial times (Ibarra Rojas, 2002). 
Historical evidence suggests that this was formerly a third-tier position 
within the indigenous hierarchy – after the Usekar (the Cabécar religious 
leader) and the Usekol (the funeral singers) (Stone, 1961). Yet, in view that 
its functions were that of military commander and intermediary between 
the Usekar and the rest of the population, this position became greatly 
empowered probably as a result of the ongoing indigenous resistance 
against Spanish and Miskito dominance, as well as political infighting 
between the different Talamancan ethnic groups (Bozzolli de Willie, 1973). 
Consequently, by the mid 19th Century, a single cacique with 
considerably more power than the others emerged and adopted the title 
of ‘blu’.  
While the initial plan of the Costa Rican government was to offer 
political positions to various caciques in Talamanca, thereby distributing 
power to facilitate their influence upon the area, the presence of a 
powerful blu led the authorities to select only one. As a result, Santiago 
Mayas was selected as political chief of Talamanca in 1867 (Palmer, 1986). 
The political chiefs were government officials in charge of managing local 
state governance, with responsibilities much like what today would be a 
county mayor, though with far more extensive obligations with regards to 
the administration of justice (Alfaro and Zeledón, 2006). Soon after a 
legislative decree was passed formalizing and deputizing the cacique as 
part of the governance structure of the state, and becoming a key political 
liaison between the state and the indigenous peoples. In 1880, Antonio 
Saldaña – the new blu – was appointed as political chief, and, even though 
he resigned to this position shortly after, he remained part of the 
government workforce and maintained friendly relations with key 
officials (Lansing, 2014). His position not only as political leader, but as 
related to the commercial exchange networks between the Talamanca 
Valley and nearby Puerto Limón, allowed him to become a very effective 
cultural and linguistic liaison between state officials and indigenous 
populations, even though the role of political chief eventually was passed 
to professional bureaucrats after the creation of the San Bernardo Colony.  
Having said this, it is clear that the Costa Rican state had their 
reservations regarding the reliability of indigenous peoples as political 
allies. Indeed, the aforementioned 1861 expedition to the region was 
partly informed by reports received by the local authorities in Limón that 
Colombian claims over the region were aided by the most important 
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cacique in Talamanca (Solórzano Fonseca, 1999). While the expedition 
ended with a political agreement with the indigenous leadership of the 
time, shortly after, some indigenous groups staged an uprising leading to 
the burning of the main state offices in the area and requests to the Miskito 
for them to be put under British control (Boza Villarreal, 2014). This was 
probably an isolated act from specific segments of the indigenous 
populations in the area, as two years later in 1870, Mayas himself 
committed an armed force to aid the Costa Rican military in response to a 
dispute with the Colombian government over a border township 
(Solórzano Fonseca, 2013). While historical sources from the perspective 
of the Talamancan indigenous peoples are scarce, it is more likely that 
these were attempts by indigenous groups to politically manage their own 
tenuous position with regards to whichever geopolitical force suited 
better their own particular interests. Indeed, it would erroneous to think 
of the local Bribri and Cabécar peoples as defenseless subjects in this 
dynamic. In that sense, existing political intermediaries became critical to 
deal between state interests and the indigenous populations, even to the 
point of organizing electoral processes for the various national political 
parties (Villalobos and Borge, 1998).   
While for the indigenous people this involvement was part of a 
strategy oriented at guaranteeing their territorial claims and their political 
survival; for the state, the continuous alliance with these local indigenous 
groups was part of a strategy to emphasize their claims against Colombia 
and Panama (Guevara Berger and Chacón Castro, 1992). The claim of the 
Colombian state depended on an 1803 declaration of the colonial 
government of Costa Rica that claimed that the Miskito Kingdom had 
taken complete control of this part of the seaboard (Solórzano Fonseca, 
2013). This allowed the Colombians to argue that - being populated by 
peoples organized in a non-recognized state – control of the area was lost 
and therefore, it could be retaken by anyone. In turn, the Costa Rican 
argument was that this was not the case, as it still held political control. In 
other words, it is clear that the Talamancan indigenous peoples had a 
strategic legal importance in Costa Rican claims vis-à-vis Colombia and 
which is why it was necessary to integrate them somehow (i.e.: indigenous 
caciques on the payroll as state officials, the organization of voting 
processes and the establishment of legal state authorities with the power 
to exercise national laws in these lands). Put simply, the integration of 
indigenous citizens within the Costa Rican nation-state, while probably 
informed by new liberal notions of citizenship,15 was nevertheless, part of 
a wider strategy to support insecure territorial claims over Talamanca. 
This meant their Bribri and Cabécar integration in national everyday life 
including the rights to hold elected offices, voting and the obligation of 
following political and legal rule from the Costa Rican state.  
Parallel to this process of state territorialization of indigenous 
politics and lands, the Costa Rican state also fostered an aggressive policy 
of agricultural colonization of Talamanca. Indeed, since 1839, new laws 
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regulating the property of the state ended up converting untitled and 
public lands in the country into baldíos, that is unproductive lands that 
could be claimed by individuals or organizations to be used for economic 
gain through a legal procedure called denuncio (Guevara Berger and 
Chacón Castro, 1992). As a result of the rapid expansion of coffee as a key 
source of internal revenues and the means of a rapid integration of the 
national economy into global markets during the course of the 19th 
Century, the Costa Rican state eventually stopped acknowledging any 
and all forms of communal tenure held by indigenous peoples as a means 
to facilitate land grabs by private actors (Viales Hurtado, 1998).  
Ideologically, the denuncio process was supported by new liberal 
ideas with regards to the relationship between private property and 
productivity, which overall regarded tropical jungles and otherwise 
unused lands as an obstacle for economic and social progress (Mahoney, 
2006). This is a view that has had a considerable influence in the Costa 
Rica agricultural policy, to the point that until the late 1980s, Costa Rican 
forestry laws used to offer incentives to farmers whom have managed to 
convert standing forests into pastures and agricultural plots, as part of the 
‘opening up’ of the national agricultural frontier (Brockett and Gottfried, 
2002).  Indeed, land colonization narratives during the 1960s often saw the 
process of colonizing forests for agriculture as a means of constructing the 
nation’s future and therefore imbued these practices with ideas about 
rural progress and a clear sense of nationalism, through the pacification 
of the agricultural frontier (Llaguno Thomas, 2013). It is no coincidence 
that the Costa Rican national anthem frequently refers to the country as a 
nation made up of agricultural laborers, as a way of describing the very 
identity of the nation state.  
Now, within this ideological basis, indigenous lands were more 
often than not considered to work against this self-construction of the 
Costa Rican vision of the future. In this context, indigenous peoples were 
often seen as backward and as vestiges of traditional societies vis-à-vis 
dominant ideas about enlightened progress in the country. Indeed, plenty 
of historical accounts of these political actors describe the Talamancans as 
having a fairing limited capacity to use land in a productive and modern 
manner, somewhat reminiscent of previous ideational construction of the 
indigenous peoples by the Spanish colonists before. For example, the 
previously cited William Gabb, was the first researcher to study land 
productivity of the Bribri and Cabécar peoples in Talamanca. His studies 
became the basis for new state agricultural policies in the area (Gabb, 
1978). His impression was that indigenous peoples lacked optimized 
means of using the land, thereby becoming incapable of exploiting the full 
capacities of agricutlure. Indeed, when explaining why indigenous 
populations in Talamanca were smaller that he expected, he argued:  
“(…) it is due to the unbeatable indolence of these people. While they 
could, with little effort and small labor invested, achieve very good 
harvests of corn, rice and nutritional legumes, and in spite of the 
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abundance of oxen, pork and poultry meats, their lack of foresight 
reaches the extreme of not raising more animals than what they need 
for immediate use, and they not hesitate on killing or selling their last 
cow, pig or chicken, instead of conserving them for raising. They are 
happy living all year long with plantains and chicha (alcoholic 
beverage). The natural consequence of such a voluminous and little 
fulfilling diet is an inferior state of vitality and without any power 
against disease.” (Gabb, 1978: 77). 
This functioned to reinforce claims of the lack of civilized practices 
amongst the Talamancans as well as their inability to attain self-progress. 
The key government officials in the region also voiced such views about 
the irrationality of the indigenous economic practices and regarding their 
limitations to produce economic value over time (Lansing, 2014). Indeed, 
historical accounts of the region conclude in the need of developing 
programs that could allow them to reform the ‘uncivilized’ Bribri and 
Cabecar inhabitants in order to counter their traditional ways (Fernández, 
1976). This discourse extended to the spaces that these people occupied, 
which were exclusively characterized as derelict, reflecting onto the 
notion of the indolence of indigenous bodies. In other words, the 
Talamancans were considered to be incapable of producing economic 
value and therefore, superfluous to the dominant notions of economic 
progress. This view proved to be a major consideration of the main 
economic endeavours developed in the area, such as the establishment 
banana plantations in the area (Bourgois, 1994).  
The obvious effect of these aggressive agricultural and land policies 
was the opening up of an agricultural frontier in the country from the 19th 
Century until the mid 20th Century when the denuncio process was 
repealed. In the Caribbean seaboard, the use of denuncio led to a rapid 
opening up of an agricultural frontier for colonization. Between 1881 and 
1935, there were over 650 denuncios declared in Limón, of which, plenty 
took place in the Talamanca region. Overall, these denuncios led to the 
privatization of roughly a quarter of the current land area of the province 
(Viales Hurtado, 1998). Foreign businesses were greatly helped by these 
measures. The United Fruit Company quickly became amongst the 
biggest beneficiaries (Boza Villarreal, 2003). Already the largest 
landowner in the province due to considerable land concessions, awarded 
by the Costa Rican state for its role in the building of the railroad 
connecting the coffee fields in the Central Valley with the main national 
seaport in the Caribbean Sea, with the denuncio process, the UFCO also 
became interested in expanding their productive area towards the 
Southern Caribbean, leading to a claim for about 20.000 hectares in the 
Talamanca Valley which were to be used as part of their banana 
plantations extending from Bocas del Toro in Panama (Bourgois, 1994). 
The land appropriation was so large that it spurred interests by land 
speculators whom began declaring denuncios over indigenous lands in the 
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Valley in order to sell it afterwards to the UFCO in exchange of a hefty 
profit (Lansing, 2014).  
For the Costa Rican state, though, the denuncio process entailed 
serious contradictions. For once, the process marginalized the indigenous 
inhabitants that were otherwise necessary for supporting national claims 
upon the frontier, thereby deteriorating state sovereignty in the region. 
All in all, by 1913, the UFCO had managed to obtain over 13.000 hectares 
of land in the Talamanca Valley, integrating them to their banana 
operations organized from Bocas del Toro by its subsidiary, the Chiriqui 
Land Company (CLC) (Viales Hurtado, 2000). As part of this plan, the 
Company had begun the construction of a railroad line in order to 
communicate this area with their main base of operations in Panama in 
order to channel the production of banana that were planted by 1916. 
Indeed, by the 1920s, more than 3 million bunches of bananas were being 
exported from these regions alone (Bourgois, 1994).  
This originated concerns for the Costa Rican state, as the 
colonization of the Talamanca Valley by the UFCO seemed to integrate 
this area much strongly with productive networks originating in Panama. 
For example, the main railroad line built by the Company ended up 
offering way more connectivity between this region and the provincial 
capital of Bocas del Toro than with the Costa Rican province of Limón 
(Viales Hurtado, 1998). Similarly, economic operations of the UFCO rarely 
used indigenous labor and eventually became extremely dependent of 
migrant labor including Panamanians brought from the main operation 
base in Changuinola. Consequently, most economic operations there 
became greatly dependent of the local Panamanian economy, to the point 
that the locals tended to use Panamanian or U.S. currency, instead of Costa 
Rican colones (Bourgois, 1994). With stronger transportation and 
production ties to the Panamanian economy, the use of the denuncio as a 
means of colonizing this frontier region ended up backfiring for the Costa 
Rican government, leading to serious concerns regarding the effect of 
economic development in the area for future claims of sovereignty over 
the Talamanca Valley.  
This situation eventually provoked serious preoccupations for the 
local and national state authorities, given the existing political tensions 
with Panama over the international boundary. Local political authorities 
of the time complained to state officials in San José about rumors of the 
UFCO attempting to purchase the San Bernardo agricultural colony, a 
move that could have led to a serious challenge to Costa Rican national 
integrity (Lansing, 2014). Eventually, consistent political pressures put on 
the UFCO led to a nominal recognition of the law that established the 
colony in 1885 and the ones that followed which stated that this area 
should be set aside for its use by indigenous peoples. In other words, out 
from the contradiction between state claims of sovereignty and the 
expansion of capital to the region, is that the first indigenous reserve in 
Costa Rica was set aside and recognized by the state.  
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Nevertheless, the actual concession of the UFCO to state demands 
of an indigenous reserve was an extremely short-lived chapter of the story 
of the Talamanca Valley, and by 1918, the company had begun planting 
bananas in the area, while engaging in further incursions in the Valley 
throughout 1919, despite evident concerns from the Costa Rican Congress 
regarding that the conversion of the Colony into property of the colony 
(Boza Villarreal, 2014: 235) could constitute a serious threat to the national 
sovereignty. In reaction, the state established a much smaller plot of land 
of 35 hectares for nationally-born Costa Rican citizens in the region, and 
defined a 2.000-hectare plot for indigenous peoples, under the terms that 
these lands could not be sold afterwards (Solórzano Fonseca, 2013). Yet, 
these new dispositions never came into fruition and the UFCO not only 
occupied the entirety of the lowlands of the Valley, but also forcefully 
expelled the indigenous populations towards the nearby mountains.  
In short, the two contradictory processes of state territorialization – 
namely the expansion of capitalist spaces through the denuncio process 
and the inclusion of indigenous peoples and lands as-part-of the Costa 
Rican state – reinforced the exception of indigenous peoples within 
society. Discursively, two very important changes took, which still 
political importance in current discussions about the Bribri and the 
Cabécar. First, there were renewed considerations of indigenous peoples 
and their lands as requiring economic improvement as a means of making 
them compatible with capitalist uses. Yet, secondly, given that the state 
lacked the means to support its hegemonic claims, there was also a 
concurrent discourse regarding the need of including the Talamancans as 
subjects of state power, which is why these groups rapidly involved 
themselves in national politics. This insecure position of the indigenous 
groups in the Costa Rican political landscape reflects the broader tensions 
that lie within internal territorialization, in that creating spaces for capital 
accumulation imply results that are not in unison with state power, and 
often excludes the very peoples that the state attempts to bring under its 
fold. 
3.3. State territorialization and indigenous rights in the 
Costa Rican Welfare State 
The UFCO was eventually forced to leave its banana and cacao plantations 
in the Talamanca Valley over the course of the 1930s. This move was the 
combined effect of a serious outbreak of the Sigatoka disease which 
diminished banana production, the considerable exhaustion of the 
Company’s lands due to poor land management practices, the reduced 
demand for banana as a result of the economic depression of the late 1920s 
and the imminent outbreak of the Second World War and the significant 
losses in infrastructure investment resulting from recurrent flooding of 
the Sixaola River (Villalobos and Borge, 1998). The withdrawal of UFCO 
from these lands led to two different consequences. The first was the 
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transferring of some of UFCO lands in the Sixaola and Talamanca Valleys 
to former banana workers through shareholding agreements, while still 
controlling the commercialization of banana and cacao production from 
their administrative division at the Bocas del Toro province in Panama. 
Indeed, this spurred a rapid colonization of lands – mainly in the Sixaola 
Valley – by migrant workers coming from other already exhausted 
agricultural frontiers of Costa Rica (such as Guanacaste), and even of 
Nicaraguan migrants (Bourgois, 1994).  
The second consequence was a more vigorous process of 
indigenous land invasions of areas previously occupied by the UFCO. 
There had been land invasions of UFCO properties in the Talamanca 
Valley since 1919, yet these were significantly fostered by the gradual 
withdrawal of the Company since the 1930s. Indeed, records from the 
Institute for Rural Development (INDER, originally the Institute for Lands 
and Colonization) contain numerous references to land invasions by 
indigenous families since the 1931 (ITCO, 1963). Bourgois (1994) argues 
that this dynamic became so frequent that UFCO was eventually forced to 
hire a supervisor to charge rent to anyone who took over parts of their 
lands, thereby at least giving the façade of the Company having some 
claim over legal possession on these otherwise abandoned properties, in 
case of resuming production in the area sometime in the future. However, 
by the 1960s, the legal standing of the Company had become ambiguous 
due to the fact that the 14.000 hectares of UFCO land in the Valley had 
been abandoned for over two decades (Quesada and Ramírez, 1989). 
Consequently, the UFCO gave possession of these lands to the Institute of 
Lands and Colonization (ITCO) – a public agency in charge of land reform 
– as a public relations move, according to an internal company 
memorandum: “in exchange of the lands donated, we (the UFC) will be given 
assistance to undergo the eviction of squatters in our holdings in other parts of 
Costa Rica” (UFCO, 1963; cited by Bourgois, 1994).  
The expulsion and subsequent re-settling of indigenous peoples of 
the Talamanca Valley provoked considerable socioeconomic and political 
effects within the Bribri and Cabécar people. One was the introduction of 
a dual productive system in the region. The arrival of UFCO introduced a 
new agricultural system in the Talamanca Valley based on the production 
of banana and cacao for the international market. This system included 
both UFCO as well as other non-indigenous producers whom sold their 
products to the Company for export through Panama (Bourgois, 1994). At 
the centre of this productive logic was UFCO, with an operating base that 
extended from Coroma in the lowlands of the Talamanca Valley to the 
province of Bocas del Toro (Quesada and Ramírez, 1989). With the 
withdrawal of the Company, some of these non-indigenous producers 
remained in the Talamanca Valley and introduced cacao and banana as 
cash crops amongst the recently arrived indigenous peoples that were re-
settling the area.  Cacao – a product that was already part of the 
indigenous cultural practices (see Bozzoli de Willie, 1979)16 – became a 
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new economic alternative for the Bribri and Cabécar, partly integrating 
some of them within the wider commodity market controlled by UFCO. 
Though, it must be said that, while diversified between cash crops and 
other produces, local agrarian production remained mostly directed to 
self-consumption, as these new crops were used to finance commercial 
exchange for other goods not produced locally, but required for 
subsistence (e.g.: salt, matches, linens, machetes, medications, etc.) 
(Villalobos and Borge, 1998). Indeed, anthropological accounts from the 
early 1960s clearly state that: “(t)he circulation of money is scarce, and 
therefore, money is not that important for the Bribri” (Stone, 1961: 92). Itinerant 
agriculture and crop rotation practices continued to exist after the 
resettling process, yet collection of food from nearby forests was 
diminished compared to hunting and fishing (Borge and Castillo, 1994).  
Socially, the indigenous re-settling of the Talamanca Valley 
happened without following the geographical patterns that existed prior, 
leading to a considerable decomposition of former kinship dynamics and 
a land use pattern combining geographical concentration around the main 
railways left behind by the UFCO, that also connected the Valley with the 
rest of the country (Bozzoli de Willie, 1979). This is considered to be the 
cause of the current geographical differentiation of the indigenous 
reserves between the left and right margins of the Telire River. The former 
is where the non-indigenous peoples settled alongside former indigenous 
workers of UFCO and new indigenous re-settlers. Here, productive 
systems have not lost some traditional components, yet are much more 
oriented towards for-profit agriculture. Moreover, culturally, there has 
been a greater adoption of Spanish as the main language, nuclear familiar 
structures are more prevalent than kinship relations and wage labor is far 
more noticeable. Differently, on the right side of the Telire, productive 
systems are much more varied, subsistence farming is prevalent even 
though banana, plantain and cacao are harvested for trade, and fishing 
and hunting are used regularly as well (Whelan, 2005). In other words, 
Bribri and Cabécar re-settling did not mean unchanged continuation of 
land uses prior to the arrival of UFCO. On the contrary, it implied a 
combination of economic and cultural practices that have transformed 
Talamanca into a veritable frontier region whereby geographical space, 
still illegible to state power, but shared by capitalist and traditional 
subsistence practices and between mestizo and indigenous culture. Of 
course, this is not a harmonious coexistence between capitalism and Bribri 
and Cabécar indigeneity. On the contrary, it is a continuous tension that 
affects land use and the spatial distribution of productive activities in the 
Reserves, while defining land and territory in the very center of the 
ongoing contradictions of Talamancan indigenous societies. While more 
about this will be said about this issues in the following chapters, its 
relevant to explain how the state rationalities and territorialities have 
historically continued to put pressure on these contradictions after the 
1940s.  
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Concomitantly to the return of the Talamancan indigenous peoples 
to the Valley, the Costa Rican state abrogated the legal dispositions that 
allowed indigenous lands to be declared as baldíos, thereby making 
practices of land grabbing of indigenous land illegal, through the 
elimination of the denuncio process. Indeed, the General Law of Baldíos of 
1939 – which derogated the denuncio – is often considered to be the first 
“indigenist” law in Costa Rica (see Montero Vargas, 2002; Chacón Castro 
et al., 1999; Guevara Berger and Chacón Castro, 1992),17 given that it was 
the first disposition that recognized (or even mentioned) land rights of 
indigenous peoples in national history. While being a law oriented 
towards defining the limits of an ongoing agricultural practice, its article 
8 defined exceptions to appropriation of baldios, which included, amongst 
other things, indigenous lands, which were considered to be “unalienable 
and the exclusive property of indigenous peoples”. Behind this unusual 
piece of legislation is the rise of a new form of state rationality informed 
by early 20th Century indigenist movements in Latin America.  
Much like in the case of Mexico or Peru, the new indigenist state 
policies in Costa Rica centered on planned acculturation and the 
integration of indigenous peoples within the nation-state, through the 
modernization of indigenous economies and the implementation of 
mestizo-oriented educational programs (Dietz, 2004). In 1945, Costa Rica 
created the first state entity in charge of the tutelage of the indigenous 
interests – the Board for the Protection of Aboriginal Races of the Nation 
(JPRAN) – with the objective of “(…) elevating the cultural level of the 
indigenous peoples and protecting their health” (article 2, decree 45 of 1945). 
The Board did not include any single indigenous representative within its 
governing bodies and was to be directed by state officials of the Ministries 
of Public Education and Health (MEP and MINSA, respectively). Yet, 
JPRAN was also given the power to create, delimit and administer new 
indigenous reserves, on behalf of the people living there.  
Of course, the very understanding of indigenous lands at this time 
is questionable, given that they were mostly interpreted as “refuge zones”, 
that is, as the places were indigenous people lived and have their 
agricultural crops; discarding the recognition of other natural resources 
that were fundamental to their survival which were often cut down and 
made into pastures for mestizo agriculture, especially in the reserves 
created in 1956 in the Southern Pacific region (Chacón Castro et al., 1999). 
This process was probably intensified in the early 1960s, when a new Law 
on Land and Colonization determined that indigenous lands were to be 
declared part of the state patrimony and under administration of ITCO, a 
state agency in charge of promoting agrarian land reform in Costa Rica. 
In other words, while created for the protection of indigenous rights, 
JPRAN effectively became the means through which the Costa Rican state 
would offer state assistentialism oriented towards the optimization of 
these peoples through mestizo education and capitalist production 
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techniques, at the expense of any form of indigenous participation to 
materialize their wills. 
Information of the effect of these changes in Talamanca during the 
1950s and 1960s is scarce, as studies on the region were few and mostly 
concentrated in analysis of Bribri cultural practices, lacking a detailed 
exploration of the wider agrarian political economy (see Stone, 1961; 
Bozzoli, de Willie, 1973). Yet, it is unlikely that land reform policies would 
have a considerable effect given that the most easily accessible lands of the 
Valley (in the left margin of the Telire) remained in legal possession of 
UFCO and did not entered into the state patrimony until the mid 1970s, 
when the TIR was created (Bourgois, 1994).  Of course, this is not to imply 
that there were no cultural or economic effects whatsoever. The already-
described cultural changes had great influence in the territories due to the 
establishment of nine public schools in Amubrë, Shiroles, Bratsi, Suretka 
and Bribri between 1956 and 1963 (Arias et al., 2015). This followed the 
acculturation method with little regard to any recognition of bi-cultural 
teachings in any way, at least until the late 1970s when this began to 
change slowly (ADITIBRI Official in charge of Indigenous Education, 
interview, March 3rd, 2014; see also Borge, 2012). Besides education 
policy, the growing relevance of the Catholic Church and various other 
evangelical churches that settled there since the early 1960s also led to the 
transmission of ideologies running counter to indigenous culture and 
practices, opposing the role of the awapa (shamans), organization of 
chichadas,18 or polygamy (Tafjord, 2016). Only the Bahai faith has been 
respectful, though not actively supportive of indigenous customs (Awa 
from Kachabri, interview, April 17th, 2014). 
Table	2.	Indigenous	reserves	adjacent	to	the	Costa	Rican	part	of	La	Amistad	
Biosphere	Reserve	
Indigenous	reserve	 Year	of	
creation	
Ethnicity	 Population	 Towns	
Talamanca-Bribri	 1977	 Bribri	 8.368	 30	
Talamanca-Cabécar	 1985	 Cabécar	 1.435	 11	
Telire	 1985	 Cabécar	 545	 11	
Tayní	 1984	 Cabécar	 2.850	 14	
Chirripó	 1993	 Cabécar	 6.341	 19	
Cabagra	 1977	 Bribri	 3.188	 19	
Salitre	 1977	 Bribri	 1.807	 15	
Ujarrás	 1982	 Cabécar	 1.321	 11	
Source:	Elaboration	of	the	author	with	data	collected	from	INEC,	2013	
Growing pressures from the indigenist movement and, in no small 
measure, by some indigenous leaders themselves19 led to the 
promulgation of new key indigenous legislation during the 1970s. The 
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JPRAN was replaced by the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs 
(CONAI) in 1973, numerous indigenous reserves – including the TIR – 
were created by executive decree between 1976 and 1977, and a new 
Indigenous Law was promulgated in 1977. This law recognized 
indigenous rights to self-government of their territories, the formation of 
their own representative bodies following their own traditional customs, 
shared sovereignty over access to natural resources (alongside the nation-
state), and the reaffirmation of these indigenous reserves as “inalienable, 
imprescriptible, non-transferable and exclusive for the use of indigenous 
communities inhabiting them” (art. 3). With this said, this latter piece of 
legislation, rather than being a well-structured mechanism that clearly 
defined the means through which to exercise all those rights, ended up 
offering considerable leeway to state authorities to interpret the manner 
in which these precepts were to be implemented. For example, while 
article 5 of the Indigenous Law states that “indigenous reserves should be 
ruled by the indigenous peoples in their communal traditional 
structures”, the Costa Rican state unilaterally defined Integral 
Development Associations (ADI) – a non-indigenous political 
organizations – as the political agent in charge of representing indigenous 
peoples of a reserve before the state.  
Effectively, this combination of lack of implementation of the 
Indigenous Law and of extensive legal leeway of state power over the 
reserves has been a mechanism for mobilization of state rationalities and 
territorialities at the expense of indigenous peoples since the 1970s, and 
Talamanca is not an exception. Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, 
the region gained national attention in view of its potential importance 
with regards to energy security. As a response to the rise of oil prices and 
in the context of implementation of import substitution policies, the Costa 
Rican state – through the Costa Rican Oil Refinery (RECOPE), a state-
owned enterprise – began considering the possibility of exploring for oil 
in the national territory, with Talamanca as the main area of focus. While 
these preoccupations had appeared in 1973, RECOPE found the necessary 
funding and technical support to realize this endeavour by early 1980 
(Villalobos and Borge, 1998). Unsurprisingly, the state company gained 
the political support of the Integral Development Association, whose then 
president claimed that the paid jobs of the oil exploration (in a context of 
serious diseases affecting cacao, as I will present in the next chapter) 
would allow the Talamancan indigenous communities “to abandon 
isolation in which they had lived through all of their history” (La República, 
02/12/1980). This is not an unexpected position of the ADITIBRI, both 
considering the rationale behind the creation of these entities, but also the 
fact that Talamancan indigenous positions towards external intromissions 
to the reserves has never been of monolithic dissent; on the contrary, some 
indigenous groups often times ally themselves to the interests of 
businesses and/or state agencies, in order to propel projects which they 
may consider as modernism or developments with regards to an 
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underdeveloped Talamanca. This finding is not unusual for the political 
interplay of regions lying on the social frontier between traditional and 
capitalist livelihoods (Li, 2014). So, despite the stringent political dissent 
of various indigenous political leaders, whom demanded the project to be 
developed outside of the reserve and with considerable ecological 
controls, ADITIBRI signed, alongside CONAI the agreement that allowed 
RECOPE to explore for oil in the area. Effectively, oil explorations in the 
TIR began in December of 1980.  
Over the course of four years, RECOPE directly made significant 
changes to the Talamancan landscape, while also setting the stage for 
many indirect ones, even though the actual oil exploration ended up being 
completely unsuccessful. For the state company, the project was the 
means through which to finally develop the region, indeed as its chief 
economic officer said in press declarations in 1981: “The marvellous part is 
not only to see roads, trails and camps emerging from the stormy mountains of 
Talamanca, but to witness the mystic and faith with which geologists, tractor 
operators, drillers, helpers, carriers, and drivers work from dawn until dusk” 
(Gaceta Legislativa, 1981). Indeed, amongst its biggest impacts, the oil 
exploration accelerated the introduction of wage labor to the region, 
leading to a plethora of negative social effects, such as familiar 
disintegration, migration, alcoholism, conversion of smallholders into 
wage laborers, all of which greatly related to a higher monetization of the 
local economy (Toledo, 1982). The project also facilitated easier access to 
the reserve through the introduction of more efficient transport systems 
as the company opened up numerous roads and built various bridges, a 
process that its considered to have led to land use changes and 
deforestation due to greater access to external markets (Borge and 
Castillo, 1994). Finally, the project – compounded with the various 
education and healthcare policies that preceded it – also led to changes in 
settlement patterns in the left margin of the river, as people became 
concentrated around public services created or improved in the context of 
the project (such as local schools, clinics, communication and trade 
(Barrantes, 1993). This set the stage for a more thorough involvement of 
state authorities with indigenous communities as well, leading to 
programs that eventually concluded with a dramatic change in land uses 
which included a significant rise of area devoted to permanent crops and 
a reduction of forested areas.  
In other words, while in the early 20th Century, the Bribri and 
Cabécar peoples saw themselves displaced from their lands due to the 
interests of banana production for profit, later on they have faced the 
threat of similar displacements due to state interests in promoting energy 
production as capital attempts to encroach upon these unstable territories. 
With that said, currently these same indigenous peoples are also included 
within conservation initiatives, such as the payments of environmental 
services program, from which indigenous territorial authorities obtain an 
annual payment from various environmental services provided by these 
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lands. All of this means that the local Bribri and Cabécar seem in a way 
mobilized by the state in forms that are not precisely exclusionary of their 
condition as Costa Rican citizens, but that nevertheless, are guided by the 
purview of making these lands to realize their economic value by 
contending its indigenous character. As we will see in the following 
chapters, this is the way in which new development and conservation 
projects seem to mirror the realities of early colonialism and the processes 
witnessed in the early 20th Century, by territorializing indigenous 
peoples and their spaces in a manner that considers them as part of the 
nation-state, but separate from the spaces for capital accumulation that it 
wants to build in these regions. 
3.4. A final thought on the historical territorialization 
of the Talamanca Valley 
Developing a historical background of the nature, orientation and goals of 
territorial interventions of the Talamanca Valley and the recurrent themes 
that these efforts share is of critical importance given that it offers an 
interesting ground to reflect on the manner in which current political 
actors behave and reflect on these histories, thereby affecting current 
political circumstances of conservation. From this perspective, the next 
two chapters argue that current conservation efforts in the Talamanca 
Valley are reflective of prior political strategies with deep roots in the 
historical development of the national and regional political economy of 
Costa Rica, as well as in the ethnic struggles and the history of 
dispossession that determined it.   
The Talamanca Valley has historically been a geographical space 
mired by the competing claims between capital, state power and 
indigenous people and it is also an example that embodies the way in 
which territory comes into being transforming both discursively and 
materially both land and people in the process. The historical 
territorialization of the Costa Rican capitalist state in the region became 
materialized in the land grab of UFCO in order to transform the 
Talamanca Valley into a banana plantation in the early 20th century, and 
later into an energy production facility in the 1970s and 1980s and, as we 
will see later on, into a key region for achieving the promises of 
sustainable production of cacao and environmental security and 
financializing through forests-as-carbon-storage. In all these instances, the 
indigenous subject was formed and reformed discursively according to 
changing state rationalities and territorialities. This is a process that 
clearly reflects and informs the very constitution of the Costa Rican 
nation-state, particularly with regards to the formation of a national 
imaginary about national progress.  
At the beginning of the 20th Century, state territorialization was 
related to a discursive formation of the indigenous people as both an 
obstacle to capital accumulation and as tool for state sovereignty. These 
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contradictory discourses mirror the politics and economics that outlined 
the 20th Century of the Talamanca Valley. Indigenous communities were 
defined as being part of the nation-state, yet separate from the capitalist 
processes that co-constituted its very formation. This contradictory 
position has been a feature of the Talamancan relationship with capitalist 
development and state formation ever since. It resulted from state 
attempts to consolidate control over national territory and the 
contradictions implied by the use of capitalist accumulation as a means to 
realize these goals. This tension was eventually reflected in the status of 
the Talamancan region as a contested space between transnational 
interests towards capitalist integration with the Panamanian economy 
and state interests of safeguarding the already weak territorial claim and 
adverting any further encroachment in the region by its geopolitical 
neighbors. This concluded with the reinforcement of capitalist relations 
and a violent insertion of the Bribri and Cabécar into these through 
marginalization. Some nominal hegemony was maintained and reflected 
in the formation of special state-mandated reserves which were extremely 
weak at first and then consolidated with considerable limitations in the 
1970s. In this sense, the indigenous reserves studied here are in some way 
a manifestation of the contradictions resulting from internal 
territorialization, and of the compromised position of the Talamancan 
peoples within the Costa Rican nation-state. It is critical to remember this 
when dealing to the new forms of territorialization guided by 
conservation and the green economy. 
 
 
Notes
1 Though this quote was originally part of a report made for the Costa Rican 
government, it was first published in 1895 by Swiss geographer Henri Pittier 
and then re-published in Luis Ferrero’s compilation of Gabb’s writings in 
1978.  
2 In 1988, the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve was separated to create the 
Talamanca-Bribri Indigenous Reserve and the Talamanca-Cabécar 
Indigenous Reserve. 
3 To exemplify this: these lands are formally considered as property of an 
Integral Development Association (a private local community board with an 
assembly composed of all inhabitants of the indigenous reserve), whose 
Development Council is responsible of handling the sale and demarcation of 
property, as well as constituting the main form of political governance within 
the indigenous territory. Consequently, within these territorial forms the 
delineation of property rights is handled as an internal matter without 
involvement of the national authorities in charge of land registries and 
surveys. While being exempt from legal obligations in terms of property, 
indigenous people are required to follow the environmental laws. The 
extraction of timber, as well as mining rights, for example, must follow 
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guidelines mandated by the state to all other property owners in the land (see 
Guevara Berger and Chacón Castro, 1992).  
4 Colonial historical sources on Talamanca often use this name to refer to a 
region much larger than the Valley studied by this dissertation. Recently, 
Costa Rican and Panamanian historians have contested the idea of a clear-cut 
conceptualization of this geographical space, as its characteristics originate 
from the intended political district of the Costa Rican province that the 
Spanish colonists wanted to establish in the area. Indeed, the very name 
‘Talamanca’ was actually given in honor of a town located in the outskirts of 
Madrid. In any case, most historians tend to use the name Talamanca, much 
like the Spanish did, in order to refer to an area roughly including all lands 
between the Chirripó and the Changuinola Rivers, alongside what is now the 
Costa Rican and Panamanian seaboards (see Fernández, 1976; Guevara Berger 
and Chacón Castro, 1992). With that said, recent studies have argued that the 
local indigenous people conceived a much wider area as their lands, including 
most of the Southern Pacific seaboard of Costa Rica (see Boza Villarreal, 2014). 
This redefinition is based upon evidence of trade relations, migration 
processes and jurisdictional power structures linking this entire area under a 
loose form of indigenous governance. In any case, the Talamanca Valley 
constitutes a small fraction of both these historical conceptualizations of the 
Talamanca region. 
5 Spanish records also speak of other loosely defined ethnic groups in the area 
of which there is very limited historical information, such as Dorasques, 
Changuenas, Ara, Cureros, Urinamas and Siguas. Yet, there is little historical 
evidence to evaluate this claim.  
6 An obvious example of this is the fact that the ‘encomienda’ contracts 
between the Spanish Crown and the colonists – which legalized the capturing 
and forceful use of indigenous labor – rarely referred to a specific place, but 
to a particular indigenous group. This became an incentive for some colonists 
to expand the definition and the variety of groups recorded in order to reap 
higher benefits from the captured populations (Fernández, 1976). 
7 The reducciones were the most evident means of colonial state 
territorialization of indigenous groups in Costa Rica. Centralized living 
quarters composed of the house of the encomendero; a local church, a military 
emplacement and the houses of the indigenous people that inhabited the 
town often formed these townships. The town was surrounded by a large 
patch of common lands, where indigenous people worked on and the 
products of which were to be used to pay the tribute to the Church, the 
encomendero and for self-sustenance (in that order). 
8 Pablo Presebere was a Talamancan Blu that led a successful indigenous 
insurrection against Spanish authorities in colonial in 1709. During the 
rebellion, several Spanish priests and soldiers were killed as fourteen 
missionary temples were destroyed. This rebellion appeared to be well-
supported by indigenous populations from Chirripó in Costa Rica to Bahía 
Almirante in Panama, an alliance that eventually guaranteed the loss of 
political control of the colonial government over Talamanca until 
Independence in 1821.  
9 The Miskito are an ethnic group that inhabits the Caribbean coastline of 
Central America from Honduras to Nicaragua. During the 18th Century and 
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well into the 19th, the Miskito people entered in informal alliances with the 
British privateers that were arriving to the Caribbean as part of the effort of 
the Crown to beleaguer Spanish trade route towards the European mainland. 
In 1740, a formal treaty of alliance was signed between these indigenous 
peoples and the Crown leading to the establishment of a British protectorate 
as a means of disrupting Spanish governance in Central America. The Miskito 
often raided Spanish colonies and indigenous territories in Central America 
and often sold people captured here as slaves in the British colonies.  
10 It is likely that the position of King of Talamanca was adapted by the Bribri 
people as a result of their historical interaction with the Miskito, which 
themselves have developed a loose political structure of government with a 
King (Solórzano Fonseca, 1999). 
11 The Miskito Kingdom territorial claims were extensive and included a 
significant section of the Caribbean coastline of Central America, from 
Yucatán to the Talamancan coast in Costa Rica. At the time of Independence, 
and with the support of the British, the Miskito held considerable military 
power to the point of dissuading any action by the recently independent 
Central American states. Indeed, the Costa Rican government actually paid 
tribute to avoid attacks by the Miskito during the early years of independent 
life.   
12 The main purpose of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 was to guarantee 
the political neutrality over any potential project to build a canal crossing 
Central America, thereby impeding any form of exclusive use either by the 
United States or Great Britain. To do this the treaty also demanded both 
powers to refrain from participating in the internal politics of the Central 
American nations in order to gain leverage over the control of the canal. This 
included avoiding the use of protectorates in this fashion.  
13 With British interests beginning to wane in the region, the British 
systematically allowed the various Central American nations to have 
uncontested claims to the last areas occupied by the Miskito Kingdom in 
Nicaragua, provided that these peoples were allowed to self-govern 
themselves and remain under a semi-sovereign status. This led to the 
complete occupation of these lands by Nicaragua in 1894. 
14 Panama attained its Independence from Colombia in 1903.  
15 Indeed, the first nationalist governments of the recently independent Costa 
Rican state quickly denounced and repudiated colonial policies with regards 
to ethnic groups and even questioned the abuses that were allowed by the 
Crown (Molina, 1986). Indeed, according to president Braulio Carrillo’s 
speech to Congress in 1839: “it is important to communicate with these groups, to 
tolerate and respect their uses, cultural features and government, removing all devices 
used by our predecessors (the conquerors), so that, erasing hate and fear, we may open 
our doors to commerce, to our population and to our discoveries, and, in so doing, to 
show the world our moderation and democratic virtues” (cited by Guevara Berger 
and Chacón Castro, 1992: 40). 
16 Cacao was used extensively for self-consumption and with ceremonial 
means by the Bribri and Cabécar. It symbolizes the blood of the Talamancan 
indigenous peoples and was used in various rites, such as marriages, as well 
as birth and death ceremonies at the time of this transition (Bozzoli de Willie, 
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1979). It continues to be significant in Bribri and Cabécar social practices, 
though with the expansion of Catholicism and Bahai religions, this is a much 
less relevant practice. With that said, cacao drinks are still prepared by Bribri 
and Cabécar households in order to receive guests, which implies the social 
and cultural relevance of the product. 
17 Before the 1939 General Law on Baldíos there was a previous fleeting 
disposition that recognized the political right of indigenous peoples to vote in 
the national elections. This was introduced as an article of the Constitution of 
1844. Not only does this disposition was never actually implemented, but it 
completely disappeared with the promulgation of the Constitution of 1847. 
Afterwards, no form of legislation was created in order to define the legal 
position of indigenous peoples in the country, nor that of their lands within 
the property system (Chacón Castro, 2002). 
18 Chichadas are Bribri celebrations in which they drink chicha, which is an 
alcoholic beverage made of maize. These celebrations take place for various 
reasons, from recreation and leisure to bringing together dispersed relatives 
and family members to the repayment of communal farm labor. Indeed, 
anthropological studies about the Bribri and the Cabécar often bring this latter 
use to the fore as a means of exemplifying economically-relevant traditional 
or cultural practices (see Borge and Castillo, 1994; Bozolli de Willie, 1979; 
Stone, 1961). 
19 The Costa Rican Association Pro-Indigenous Peoples was formed by very 
influential scholars that were experts on indigenous affairs at the time, 
politicians informed by the Latin American indigenist movement, and a few 
indigenous leaders selected from some of the various communities around 
the country. Amongst their biggest patrons was Karen Figueres, the daughter 
of one of the most influential leader of the National Liberation Party (PLN), 
the most well organized political party in the country at the time (Guevara 
Berger and Chacón Castro, 1992). 
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4 
 
A political economy of sustainable 
development in Costa Rica 
 
The objective of this chapter is to portray and discuss the material and 
ideational context in which the green economy has been conceptualized 
in Costa Rica. Although a common assumption is that the relationship 
between economic development and conservation is defined by struggle, 
this chapter argues these two are actually quite compatible between them. 
Indeed, it will be argued here that, in a context defined by neoliberalism, 
the current efforts towards the development of Costa Rican rural areas are 
being spearheaded by policy interventions centered on the need of 
optimizing social, economic and, also the environmental and conservation 
practices of Costa Rican rural societies through the green economy. These 
interventions are thought as being “diversified” given their separation 
from traditional preservationist schemes, yet it is clear that all of these new 
alternatives for improving rural livelihoods depend upon a narrow 
rationality of economic value and market practices, through which 
complex rural realities are being essentialized and territorialized.  
This chapter explores the origins of renewed interest of state 
agencies towards protected area (PA) buffer zones in Costa Rica, an issue 
of great importance for the study of TBIR and TCIR, given their buffer 
status vis-à-vis RBLA and BID-MAG. In the first section, I argue that the 
PA buffer zones gained considerable importance for national 
development in a historical context determined by the aftermath of the 
economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, the structural 
adjustment of the 1980s and 1990s was used by international financial 
organisms (IFO), international conservation NGOs and the Costa Rican 
state to put these areas – alongside other rural regions – in a policy 
pathway oriented towards modernization through the strengthening of 
their articulation to the global markets. While initial policy measures were 
centered on developing non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAE), 
these policies’ intensification of historical problems of unproductive 
deforestation led the adjustment to change its approach towards a new 
form of capital articulation through commodified and financialized forms 
of “conservation commodities”.  
Later, I explain how was this was achieved through the creation and 
implementation of new market-oriented policy measures, such as the 
establishment of payments of environmental services (PES) and the 
fostering of agroforestry systems (SAF), both of which were designed to 
promote forest cover as a means of safeguarding the goal of 
macroeconomic stabilization achieved by the adjustment. This trend 
continues as the current National Forestry Development Plan (PNDF), 
REDD+ and the National Strategy for Climate Change (ENCC) – the basis 
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of the national pledge for carbon neutrality in 2021 – contemplate the 
promotion of financialized carbon trade as the means of achieving 
competitiveness and productivity in rural areas.  
Finally, I argue that, following the neoliberal adjustment, 
conservation policy of the Costa Rican state has become subject to political 
and economic purposes, including business- and market-based ones 
centered on offering incentives for the private sector to profit from the 
protection of the forest and the overriding requisite of nature “paying its 
part” to national development. Overall, the development of 
agricultural/forestry and conservation policy in Costa Rica can be 
considered to be coherent with what Büscher and Arsel (2012) and 
Büscher and Fletcher (2015) have already discussed regarding the ongoing 
tendencies of global capitalism of creating capitalist markets for new 
environmental commodities as a means of resolving its own negative 
environmental and economic contradictions. More than that, following on 
the rationale exposed by the ENCC and the PNDF, this chapter supports 
the claims that these trends in conservation policy have been ingrained 
within current processes of state formation in Costa Rica (see Fletcher and 
Breitling, 2012; Lansing et al., 2015). Indeed, here, forest resources and 
their conservation have been aligned with global accumulation as a means 
of securing natural resources for future capitalist appropriation. 
4.1. The 1980s Debt Crisis and its environmental 
effects 
The 1980s was a time of crisis and change for all of the Latin American 
economies. Costa Rica, in particular, was faced with a multilayered crisis 
that affected its economy and environment. The so-called “Debt Crisis” 
can be considered a turning point for the Costa Rican economy, given that 
it offered a political opportunity for a new project based on diversified 
export-led strategies as the new central feature of development planning. 
This major policy change led to a complete transformation of rural 
geographies through the expansion of new productive practices to achieve 
this goal. Yet, with economic recovery and renewed capitalist articulation, 
the country also witnessed a more intensive use of the country’s forests. 
This environmental crisis would soon be the center of attention from IFOs 
and aid organizations, given the threat posed by dwindling resources for 
the new outward-oriented economic model. In this section, I briefly 
characterize the main features of the “Debt Crisis”, before moving 
onwards into dealing with the national policy debate for solving the 
environmental crisis. 
The ‘Debt Crisis’ marked the exhaustion of the Costa Rican variant 
of the structuralist (or interventionist) economic model that the country 
had followed for over two decades. Until the late 1970s, Costa Rica 
featured a regime of accumulation based on an agro-export economy 
centered on a handful of traditional products (e.g.: coffee, bananas, meat 
 67 
and sugar), alongside an incipient industrial sector, which was strongly 
fostered by import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policies (Rovira 
Mas, 1987). Industrial production was strongly fostered by the state 
through rent transfers through taxes on the agro-export sector and the 
Central American Common Market (MCCA), which was originally 
conceived to become a highly-protected trading space oriented towards 
fostering regional accumulation, allowing the inward-looking Central 
American productive sectors to overcome the limitations resulting from 
each countries’ small national markets (Robinson, 2003). Of course, 
traditional agro-exports were still promoted as the main source of income 
for the state (Hidalgo Capitán, 2003).  
The effect of the economic crisis faced by the Costa Rican state 
forced the country into entering negotiations with the IFOs in 1982. 
USAID also became a key actor for the economic recovery of the country, 
as the U.S. was channeling considerable amounts of aid resources to 
restructure the national economy and avoid the country falling to 
communist hands like it happened to Nicaragua in 1979 (Sojo Obando, 
1991). After various interim economic stabilization agreements between 
1982 and 1985, IFO pressures congealed in the deployment of three rounds 
of structural adjustment programs (SAP) in 1985, 1988 and 1993. 
Conditionality was a key element in the structural adjustment as these 
IFOs used the internal political tensions amongst the economic and 
political elites over the mounting external debt and balance of payments 
crisis as leverage for promoting a new strategy of economic development 
(Robinson, 2003). Based on contemporary theories and empirical studies 
claiming an association between free trade policy and economic growth 
(see Bhagwati, 1978; Krueger, 1978; Balassa, 1985), the neoliberal project 
aspired to a significant departure from the previous ISI policies. The new 
main objective was to promote an export-led development centered 
around the diversification of exports of goods and services as a means to 
consolidate new sources of income. By generating new sources of income 
from the international markets, policy official argued, the country would 
be able to counter balance of payments instabilities and lead to 
macroeconomic stabilization, a much-cherished political objective for the 
Costa Rican state and economic elites after four years of ongoing crisis. 
Discussing all measures implemented through the adjustment would 
divert considerably from the objective of this chapter, but suffice to say 
that the SAPs centered on the necessary means to promote export-led 
development, mainly: the dismantlement of protectionist tariff structures, 
the promotion of agricultural and industrial exports and tourism through 
tax incentives and the deregulation of market prices, the implementation 
of far-reaching legal reforms oriented towards financial and trade 
liberalization, a more aggressive foreign trade strategy centered on 
integrating the country to key free trade zones, and a partial state reform 
based on the privatization of some state-owned enterprises (Hidalgo 
Capitán, 2003). 
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Costa Rican rural areas have been notably affected by the neoliberal 
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, given the emphasis of these measures on 
restructuring the agricultural sector and promoting a new services sector 
based on tourism. For starters, financial liberalization measures led to a 
strong contraction in credits for non-competitive forms of agriculture. 
Furthermore, the government also eliminated price and direct subsidy 
deregulation to basic grains production and cattle-ranching (Fernández 
Arias, 1999). Meanwhile, tax incentives were created in order to favor 
competitive non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAE) (e.g.: pineapple, 
melons, cassava, ornamental flowers, etc.), which have expanded 
significantly both in economic importance as well as in terms of their 
occupied geographic area in the countryside. Besides this, the neoliberal 
project also profiled tourism as a centerpiece of the measures that were 
pushed forward to diversify the exporting base and attract investment 
(Campbell, 2002). The decision of promoting tourism in the rural areas of 
the country also gained the support of the regional agro-export elites, 
which wanted to diversify their accumulation strategy beyond 
agricultural production and was strongly supported by IFOs under 
consideration of creating revenue for the least developed regions of the 
country (Ramirez Cover, 2011). As a result, the Costa Rican state actively 
promoted tourism in complete collaboration with the IFOs leading it to 
become one of Costa Rica’s highest remittance-earners.  
Taken together, these measures have led to a significant 
transformation of the agrarian landscape of the country, which was 
previously dominated by a combination of traditional crops (e.g.: coffee, 
banana, sugar), government-supported basic grain production and 
pasture for cattle-grazing. According to Zimmerer (2011), the agricultural 
area in Costa Rica extended by about 6% since 1985 due to enlarged 
production of traditional (banana) and non-traditional agro-exports 
(pineapple and melons). This extended production has been the source of 
a remarkable intensification in agricultural practices, evidenced by a 
pervasive use of agrochemicals (Galt, 2008). Moreover, this expansion and 
intensification of agricultural uses – alongside the prevalence of cattle 
ranching – considerably affected forest cover, especially in privately-
owned buffer zones nearby national parks (Sánchez Azofeifa et al., 2003). 
Indeed, by the early 1990s, there were increasing concerns from key 
conservation agencies that deforestation provoked by old and new forms 
of agricultural production would eventually isolate national parks as the 
only forested areas in the country (Boza, 1993).  Similarly, growth in 
tourism has been accompanied by the development of a dynamic and 
highly profitable real estate market in touristic destinations (Barrantes, 
2011; Robinson, 2003). This form of urban growth has taken place nearby 
or within PA buffer zones as well, as national parks and other protected 
natural landscapes constitute the basis of Costa Rican tourist attractions. 
This situation has been followed by serious concerns regarding the direct 
effect of changes of land use nearby guarded ecosystems, as well as the 
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indirect effects of growing demand for lumber as building materials at 
these urban centers (see Honey, 1999; Honey and Krantz, 2008). In other 
words, while the country had achieved some degree of macroeconomic 
stability through export-led development by the end of the 1980s, this new 
capitalist articulation also meant new intensive uses of natural resources 
in a country faced with a crisis related to resource degradation. This crisis 
would soon be the center of attention of IFOs, aid organizations and the 
government as the potentially deleterious effects were considered a direct 
threat to the highly-cherished objective of neoliberal stabilization. 
4.2. Neoliberal fixes to the environmental crisis in 
Costa Rica 
Costa Rica was also facing a serious, yet slowly advancing, environmental 
crisis by the mid 1980s. This issue was not entirely new, as the country 
was experiencing serious degradation of its soil, forest, water and coastal 
resources since the 1940s. Yet, the old problems related to cattle-ranching 
had now compounded with the effects of structural changes in the rural 
economy, due to incentives for NTAE cultivation. By 1987, this issue had 
gained the attention of public officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Mines (MIRENEM) and influential policy practitioners at the 
National Parks Foundation (FPN) and the Fundación Neotrópica, leading 
to fairly influential reports determining the need of immediate policy 
action to reduce deforestation. These policy reports entailed the formation 
of a new forms of conservation rationality focused on developing new 
tools for environmental governance, which unlike previous fortress 
conservation-oriented policies established by the country during the 
1970s, were designed under specifications of creating new forms of 
commodification of natural resources through environmental 
conservation. 
Environmental issues were not addressed in the first stage of the 
SAP by the IFOs and USAID (which was the most influential bilateral aid 
agency, due to the geopolitical situation of the time). Yet, over the course 
of the 1980s, concerns were growing amongst these agencies regarding the 
potential effect of resource shortages regarding the natural resource-
dependent export-led development strategy set in those initial policies:  
“Depletion and degradation of the renewable resource base is 
becoming an increasing constraint to future economic and social 
development in Costa Rica. (…). With few mineral and petroleum 
resources, the country is heavily dependent upon renewable natural 
resources for generation of income in productive sectors, such as 
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, energy generation, and tourism, as well 
as to supply the raw materials for most manufacturing and processing 
industries.” (USAID, 1987: 3).  
Effectively, for USAID and the IFOs, attending resource deficits in 
the future was of the utmost importance to guarantee the long-term 
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success of the economic programs developed in the context of the 
structural adjustment, as these could potentially undermine gains 
obtained with regards to macroeconomic stabilization in the future 
(USAID, 1987; WB, 1993; FN, 1987). As a result, the problem had to be 
identified and policy needed to be designed in order to provoke a market-
oriented transformation in the manner in which these resources were 
managed. USAID was particularly inclined towards this alternative, as 
seen in the Natural Resource Management Strategy for Costa Rica 
published in 1987. The document became extremely influential for the 
development of new policy measures during the late 1980s. This 
document framed this environmental crisis as having its origins in more 
than four decades of serious forest mismanagement resulting from the 
indiscriminate clearing of Costa Rican forests (USAID, 1987). With the 
highest deforestation rate in Central America, and 60.000 hectares of forest 
lost every year during the 1980s, Costa Rican forested lands had been 
reduced almost in half between 1970 and 1987 (USAID, 1987). This, in 
turn, had resulted in a dwindling water supply for human consumption, 
productive use and energy generation at key river basins; and 
considerable soil degradation due to erosion in previously forested areas. 
Moreover, with this forest loss and the subsequent degradation of water 
and soil resources, concerns were growing regarding the state of wildlife 
resources and future expenditures on risk management related to 
flooding and potential weather events (USAID, 1987). 
For the USAID, the origin of this forest mismanagement originated 
in the land use policies defined by the Costa Rican state since the 19th 
Century. As explained in the previous chapter, legislation on the 
“baldíos” allowed farmers and peasants to gain tenure to public domain 
lands outside of the established state-owned protected areas, by clearing 
the forests, and thereby “improving” said lands by putting them on 
agricultural or other productive use. While attempts were made to quell 
this practice through the derogation of previous “baldíos” legislation in 
1961, these forms of colonization of forested lands continued. These 
measures were reinforced further by tax dispositions as well. For example, 
until the mid-1980s, people holding forested lands were subjected to 
higher property taxes than people that held cleared lands, even though 
both lands remained idle (Augelli, 1987). Given this particular 
configuration of legal dispositions over land uses, considerable land 
speculation due to heightened development pressures upon agricultural 
lands, the rapid expansion of cattle ranching due to generous tax credits 
and low-interest banking loans since the 1940s and notable internal 
migrations in the rural areas during the 1960s, deforestation augmented 
quite noticeably, leading the country to lose about 40% of forest cover 
between the 1940s and the 1980s (USAID, 1994). This increased even 
further, provoked by policy encouragements towards further forest 
clearings in order to establish agricultural lands for non-traditional agro-
export production (Zimmerer, 2011). 
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While USAID recognized that the Costa Rican state had made some 
efforts towards curbing the negative effect of this land use regime, so far 
accomplishments were limited. Indeed, the 1969 Forest Law have 
established several dispositions meant to prohibit spontaneous settlement 
on public lands. Yet, the Law could not be effectively enforced partly due 
to the lack of an adequate cadastral registry that could permit 
identification of public land; as well as to the inability of state forest 
agencies to act, due to serious budgetary and administrative constraints 
(USAID, 1987). At the moment, USAID considered that the only effective 
policy implemented by the Costa Rican state to deal with deforestation 
was the system of protected areas which was established and expanded 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, even in this case, this specific policy was 
limited in scope and under threat of failing due to growing pressures 
mounting upon the private forests that existed contiguous to these 
protected areas: 
“The Government of Costa Rica, with the help of private Costa Rican 
and U.S. conservation groups has made a good beginning of protecting 
the wildlands and initiating management of some of them. However, 
the wildlands are under increasing pressure of encroachment. Much of 
the threat comes from unplanned, chaotic development of the lands 
contiguous to the parks. Here valuable forests with commercial 
potential are cleared for low yielding pastures. With time, the parks 
will stand like islands in a sea of degraded pastures.” (USAID, 1987: 
78). 
While it is clear that USAID was quite concerned with the appalling 
magnitude of deforestation in Costa Rica, the truly vexing issue for the 
agency seemed to be the enormous wastefulness and economic 
irrationality of the process in itself. According to the Strategy, not only 
were most of the lands being logged unsuitable for agriculture, but 
deforestation itself was rarely productive. Citing Ashe's (1978) study, the 
U.S. aid agency is shocked to recognize that 86% of the timber cut between 
1955 and 1973 was not productively used whatsoever, as most of it was 
left to rot or was burned down on site. This is then followed with serious 
preoccupation regarding the notable lack of efficiency of the Costa Rican 
forestry industry. According to the Strategy, sawmills here often operated 
well under capacity, requiring absurdly large amounts of timber to 
produce significantly smaller amounts of lumber for further industrial 
uses (e.g.: 646.200 m3 of timber to produce 303.000 m3 of lumber in 1986), 
and leading to the production of lumber of which only 4,3% of its cost was 
actually reflective of the price of standing trees (USAID, 1987). In other 
words, the principal problem identified by USAID was that existing forest 
management in Costa Rica was based on the lack of recognition of the 
commercial value of forests in favor of other less efficient land uses. 
Moreover, considering the magnitude of forest cover loss over the course 
of the previous four decades, unless some new forms of rational 
management that allowed farmers to recognize the inherent commercial 
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value of forests were implemented soon, imports of forest-related 
materials would increase undoing the macroeconomic stabilization 
achieved by adjustment policies: 
“(...) the commercial forests which are the main sources of wood for the 
economy will be approaching depletion around 1995 if present trends 
continue. Thereafter, Costa Rica will have to import increasing 
amounts of wood and its substitutes, burdening itself with a possibly 
unsustainable cost which could cancel out many of the gains in exports 
achieved with USAID help.” (USAID, 1987: 56) 
In other words, attention had to be directed to maintaining forest 
cover, with particular emphasis made on protecting the highly-valuable 
patches of private forest that were left, all of which were located within 
the buffer zones of existing protected areas. The solution offered by 
USAID was to improve management strategies for exploiting these 
commercially-viable strands of forests, that is making these forests 
valuable for farmers through market-oriented intervention. For this to 
happen, USAID was to assist the government into effectively 
operationalizing a new scheme of forest management, partially based on 
innovations introduced with the recently passed 1986 Forest Law. The 
lynchpin of the plan was the offering of aid for the Costa Rican state to 
effectively implement sustainable forest management plans as well as 
introducing new measures to make forestry industry much more efficient 
and cost-effective. 
The new management plan was much more thorough than what 
existed earlier and required obliged forest owners to include a variety of 
additional information including inventories of individual trees, their 
distribution in the farm, and a detailed explanation of the goals with 
harvesting them; thereby attempting to offer a more rational account of 
the use of forest resources, under close guard by the Costa Rican state 
(Brockett and Gottfried, 2002). In theory, such managing practices would 
ensure a sustainable harvesting process, as well as giving the means for 
state forestry agencies to keep a reasonable management and accounting 
system capable of limiting illegal felling and avoiding forged 
documentation, a serious problem before 1986. In essence, the 
management plan could be considered as a means for collecting 
information and promote self-discipline to promote the presence of a 
sustainable supply of forests for the forestry industry. The proposal made 
by USAID also suggested accompanying these efforts inventories of 
standing timber in order to assure fair pricing, as well as financing better 
infrastructure for control agencies (USAID, 1987).  
The agency also suggested changes meant to encourage a greater 
level of efficiency and vertical integration between forest plantations, 
sawmills and the rest of the forestry industry. Amongst the measures 
supported, USAID considered the establishment of financial subsidies 
and aids to support investment on forest properties, and diverse tax 
incentives for sawmills that had managed to guarantee themselves a long-
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term supply of lumber through forest owners using management plans. 
By assuring the continuous supply of timber to the sawmills, USAID was 
expecting to foster sustainable forest harvesting and reforestation 
practices through the use of forest plantations or agroforestry, thereby 
creating a sustainable feedback loop that could eventually stop 
deforestation. With sufficient assistance, USAID considered that forest 
owners would be able to realize the financial benefits from harvesting 
trees rather than just cutting them down in favor of pastures, thereby 
leading to a more economically and environmentally efficient forest 
industry and eventually reducing pressures of encroachment on national 
parks and forest areas surrounding these:   
“(…) the areas surrounding some of the national parks of Costa Rica 
offer unusual opportunities for demonstrating the complementarity of 
conservation and development, and creating models for expansion.” 
(USAID, 1987: 79).  
In summary, the USAID Strategy was meant to counter the 
deforestation problem by attending its mismanagement origins. This 
mismanagement was considered to be the result of state-produced 
irrationality, whereby forest owners were encouraged to overlook the 
economic value of forests in favor of clearing them for agricultural 
purposes. For USAID, the best alternative was to encourage farmers to 
recognize the economic and market value of conserving forest resources 
by promoting a diversification of the countryside near protected areas, 
particularly through the development of an efficient forestry industry 
with considerable agroforestry components. Nevertheless, as Lansing et 
al (2015) has argued, USAID recognized that technical assistance in the 
elaboration and enforcement of sustainable management plans for forests 
would be eventually ineffective to develop a competitive forestry 
industry, mainly because, in the land use policy context of the Strategy, 
sustainable forest management was not financially viable (USAID, 1989). 
This conclusion was similarly reached by the World Bank in 1993, as part 
of their Forestry Sector Review, a fairly influential paper which defined 
the necessary policy changes to be made in order to foster environmental 
planning, and which later became a template for the 1996 Forestry Law 
(Brockett and Gottfried, 2002). According to the Review: “(t)he key issue in 
multiple use management is to reorient incentives to conserve environmental 
values” (WB, 1993: viii).  
Much like the 1987 USAID Strategy, the 1993 World Bank Review 
talks plenty regarding the need of recognizing the ecological value of 
Costa Rican forests through markets. Yet, differently from the USAID 
document, language in the Review changes from attention on the use of 
tax incentives, subsidies and direct development aid in forestry 
development, and concentrates a lot more on market mechanisms for 
recognizing the value of environmental services. For the World Bank, new 
policy action should be oriented towards eliminating the numerous 
market distortions established by the Costa Rican state that lead to 
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deforestation (WB, 1993). Curiously enough, while the Review does 
consider that some of these distortions originate in the land use regime, 
the conservation policy measures implemented by Costa Rica are also rife 
with these distortions in favor of deforestation. The document explains 
that conservation here has been excessively oriented towards a command-
and-control approach that actually ends up favoring forest cover loss. This 
policy was centered in four specific areas: 1) the creation of state-owned 
protected areas, 2) the regulation of private forests through permits that 
controlled harvest rates, 3) trade-based protections through export bans 
and import tariffs on forest products and 4) subsidies for forest 
plantations.  
The first measure is considered to be somewhat effective, albeit 
lacking the implementation of efficient management practices. Quite 
simply, protected areas are becoming too costly to maintain and expand 
without an adequate financial agenda that could generate fresh resources. 
The inherent solution is to streamline management through privatization 
of conservation services or by facilitating market recognition of 
environmental services provided by protected areas:  
“The World should pay therefore for the environmental benefits that 
Costa Rica produces. These benefits include tourism, discovery of new 
pharmaceuticals, existence and other option values and carbon 
sequestration. Already Costa Rica is benefiting from tourism. 
Nevertheless, there is a scope for more tourism industry and for 
returning revenues to the management of protected areas.” (WB, 1993: 
vi). 
With this said, the main focus of the Review is centered on the other 
conservation policies dealing with private forest management. For 
starters, while restrictions on private forest management, including the 
introduction of sustainable management plans, are perceived as relevant 
by the World Bank, these are considered to be ineffective given that the 
state never had the capabilities of enforcing these regulations on private 
landowners in such a complicated policy environment so biased towards 
forest clearing practices (WB, 1993). Moreover, the Review argues that 
even trade protections meant to defend the forestry industry eventually 
became market distortions that reinforced deforestation. The 
establishment of a ban on log exports made any accumulation strategy 
based on forest harvesting unviable, while import tariffs subsidized the 
local forest industry, leading it to become wasteful and uncompetitive. 
Also, these protections eventually made the local forestry industry 
expensive to consumers, whom eventually choose to consume other 
alternative building materials. In other words, both command and control 
measures and trade protections were defined by a problematic 
misrecognition in the economic value of sustainable harvesting of forests, 
thereby reinforcing their elimination in favor of pastures as a more 
reasonable economic alternative (WB, 1993). 
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Besides this, the World Bank continues, with such low timber prices 
resulting from trade protections, reforestation practices were eventually 
discouraged. Moreover, while Costa Rica introduced subsidies for 
reforestation since the late 1970s, these prove to be completely ineffective 
to provoke changes in forest cover loss, an argument shared by other 
authors as well (see Ortiz Malavassi et al., 2003; Brockett and Gottfried, 
2002). Being mostly designed around income tax reductions, most of these 
benefits only targeted large commercial plantations, which in a context of 
diminishing support from banks to small and medium-scale forestry 
activities, meant that the actual owners of natural forests ended up not 
supported. Moreover, by functioning as subsidies for private commercial 
forestry, these measures were not environmentally sensitive, thereby 
leading to the fostering of forest plantations of low ecological value and 
not to efforts to conserve the much more biodiversity-rich natural forests. 
In this context, small and medium forest owners saw themselves lacking 
sufficient support or incentives to protect natural forests, as subsidies for 
reforestation rarely reached them and credits for agroforestry were 
virtually non-existent (de Camino et al., 2000). In a context in which land 
use policy environment still demanded “improvements” for securing 
tenure, then the existing forest subsidies and tax incentives, different from 
what USAID would argue, were actually part of the perceived problem of 
forest mismanagement contemplated by the World Bank (WB): 
“Perhaps the main problem with plantation incentives, however, is that 
they help perpetuate the bias against natural forests in the Costa Rican 
economy. Lands receiving the plantation subsidies will forego the 
opportunity of maintaining or re-growing a natural forest, which 
produces more environmental benefits than plantations. These 
incentives thus add to the negative impacts of agriculture, cattle 
ranching and land tenure policies, overregulation of forest activities 
and trade protection. The problem of lagging reforestation can be 
solved more efficiently by changing these policies rather than by 
applying subsidies.” (WB, 1993: iv).  
In this sense, the solution presented by the World Bank required a 
complete overhaul of the forest use incentives in order to allow 
landowners to visualize the undistorted economic value of forests. Of 
course, this implied the necessity of deregulating forest clearing-biased 
incentives through the reduction of tariff barriers to imports, the 
elimination of the export ban on logs, and the derogation of tax-based 
subsidies for reforestation as well as other distortions provoked by 
financial credits still given to the agricultural sector, in particular cattle-
ranching. Yet, the truly innovative suggestion made by the World Bank 
entailed the introduction of measures meant for private forest owners to 
realize the economic value of environmental services of their forests 
within the economy. Within a wider discussion of policy alternatives for 
improving environmental management of buffer zones with 
economically-important forests, the World Bank suggested the creation of 
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a mechanism to induce voluntary compliance towards conserving forests 
centered on a management agreement with the government in exchange 
of monetary compensation. In other words, the World Bank then 
suggested an ideational predecessor of the current payments of 
environmental services program (PSA). The document even considers 
extending the reach of this mechanism towards recognizing the forest 
services with regards to watershed protection.  
It could be argued that this discursive shift from direct subsidizing 
forest harvesting towards environmental services is based upon ongoing 
changes in the national debate regarding economic tools for dealing with 
deforestation. In the end, forest policy elites in the country were already 
implementing the Forestry Management Certificate (CAFMA), which 
financed forest owners in exchange of conserving or sustainably 
managing natural forests, thereby constituting a direct predecessor of the 
PSA (see Ortiz et al., 2003). Yet, the actual language of “environmental 
services” is probably the result of, first, an ongoing change in mindsets 
from a fences-and-fines approach towards the use of ecological landscape 
management to address wider environmental phenomena like climate 
change. Indeed, it is no surprise that the 1993 Review emerged between 
the passing of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Kyoto Protocol, a period rife with the introduction of new political 
technologies to address climate change through market-mediated tools. 
Second, it is clear that this discursive shift also entails a perspective 
influenced by the structural adjustment, whereby attention towards 
privately-owned forests in the buffer zones require a form of management 
centered in market practices.  
Indeed, over the course of the following five years after the 
publication of the Review, the Costa Rican government passed the 1994 
General Law on the Environment and the 1998 Law on Biodiversity, 
which replaced the centralized National Parks Service (SPN) with the 
National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC), a decentralized office 
that began implementing new conservation approaches based on 
ecosystem management through buffer zone and biological corridor 
management. Moreover, the 1996 Forestry Law designed a new approach 
to forestry based on decentralization and the introduction of market 
mechanisms – including the aforementioned PSA. The Law also created a 
business sector-oriented National Forestry Office (ONF) to advise the 
Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) on forestry activities. It 
abolished permits for logging, transporting and exporting timber from 
forest plantations, while still requiring these to present sustainable 
management plans (Brockett and Gottfried, 2002). Yet more relevant to 
this chapter, the Forest Law put banned conversion of forests into 
agriculture (punishable with prison sentences) and created FONAFIFO as 
the executor of a national PSA designed to pay for environmental services 
provided by the forest (Fletcher and Breitling, 2012). This implies a new 
conservation rationality on the rise centered on environmental 
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governance oriented towards new forms of commodification of 
conservation. 
4.3. Neoliberal contradictions and carbon neutrality 
With all this said, I must also reiterate that this discursive vision of the 
buffer zones and its policies, including the PSA program, contrasts heavily 
with its factual execution of the PSA and other buffer zone management 
tools over the past twenty years. While environmental services are being 
commodified, and financialized into derivatives under property of 
FONAFIFO, there is little indication to the rising of a carbon abatement 
market as a result of the PSA program (Sánchez et al., 2003). Fletcher and 
Breitling (2012), as well as Brockett and Gottfried (2002) have argued that 
this is probably due to the complex – and largely unexplored – politics of 
implementation of the PSA program and the Costa Rican forestry policy 
sector at large. They have argued that the PSA has come to the fore in the 
context of a political negotiation made between two opposing political 
groups within the Costa Rican forestry sector, namely one oriented 
towards the political defense of state interventionism in conservation 
policy and another much closer to market-oriented policy design. The 
result of this political tension has been a “hybrid policy regime” in which 
many conservation tools combine the two approaches in themselves and 
that is reflective of the contested nature of neoliberalism in Costa Rica.  
Surely, there have been some instances in which FONAFIFO has 
managed to find buyers of carbon sequestration efforts, such as when it 
sold 2 million U.S. dollars in carbon abatement through PES to Norway in 
1997. But experiences like this have been quite small compared to the 
projects being developed with other non-market forms of funding. The 
PSA has not succeeded to motivate the arrival of an internal 
environmental services market either. While some nationalized electric 
companies have financed PSA contracts to protect river basins in order to 
protect water for hydroelectric generation (Fletcher and Breitling, 2012), 
their whole contribution was of about 1 million dollars in 2009 (Blackman 
and Woodward, 2010). In other words, whereas these sorts of programs 
are supposed to be just a preliminary stage before the appearance of full-
fledged environmental services markets, in this particular case that 
situation has not become a reality yet.  
On the contrary, since its inception, the PSA program has depended 
almost exclusively of public revenues obtained either from indirect taxes 
to fossil fuel consumption, a tariff on water uses established in 2006 and, 
in no small measure, by donations made by IFIs (mainly the WB, itself), 
which are by all accounts administered as public funds. And while one 
could say that both taxes are meant to function under the user pays 
principle, the execution works through forceful state intervention and not 
under the neoliberal precepts of voluntary distribution of resources 
through markets (Fletcher and Breitling, 2012). The hierarchical features 
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of the mechanism are reflected in the actual implementation. The program 
features a very low additionality that could not be supposed to be a 
sensible acknowledgement of the value of the land according to market 
prices, let alone a clear reflection of cost-opportunity if the owner were to 
use the PSA for any other purposes.  
This is why some FONAFIFO officials tend to equate the PSA to a 
“positive reward for compliance of the (Forestry) law” (FONAFIFO Monitoring 
Officer, interview, April 18th, 2014), given that it fails to account for cost-
opportunity. Indeed, a 2003 survey of forest users benefiting from PSA 
contracts found that most users were not convinced to protect their forests 
due to potential profitability of forest for conservation or even because it 
was a way of obtaining “free money” in any way; the study finds that the 
more likely reason why they have not made changes to land use in their 
farms (at least in the case of farmers in the Central Valley, the Northern 
Zone and the Osa Peninsula, where the study was focused) is due to 
“structural reasons manifested since 1985, whereby agriculture and cattle-
ranching practices have not become viable economic alternatives for them, and 
have caused a very low probability of them selling their lands as well” (Ortiz et 
al., 2003: 29). Interviewees that questioned the program often argued in a 
similar line by stating that actual decrease of deforestation is not the 
consequence of the PSA program itself, but of the structural change of the 
country from an agricultural-based to a services-based economy, where 
tourism and real estate development has gained considerable importance 
in rural areas vis-à-vis agricultural activities (IUCN-ORMA ecological 
economics unit director, personal interview, September 6th, 2014). Other 
studies also question the actual effectiveness of the PSA contracts claiming 
that these were mostly established on forests that tackled no real danger 
of deforestation (Daniels et al., 2010). Porras et al. (2013) argue only about 
0,2% and 0,4% of total deforestation was avoided through the PSA in 
Costa Rica, thereby arguing that the bias towards protecting existing 
forests is. This is also supported by a 2011 report by the Comptroller 
General Office (CGR) which challenged the cost effectiveness of the 
program, saying that it had been only soberly positive when attending all 
conservation problems.  
All of these arguments are being made even without questioning 
the political inner workings of PSA implementation, which also seems to 
entail features that make the program more analogous to a hierarchical 
mode of governance than to a market-oriented one. For starters, 
commodification of environmental services is extricated from 
additionality. The PSA is supposed to finance four different services (i.e.: 
carbon sequestration, scenic beauty, hydrological services and 
biodiversity conservation), yet this distinction is not made in most of the 
contract modalities, leading to a tendency of ‘bundling environmental 
services’, leading to questionable forms of commodification. Castree 
(2003) argues that for commodification of nature to take place, the thing 
that is supposed to be transformed into a commodity first needs to 
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undergo several processes allowing the thing to be calculable, discrete and 
commensurable to economic value. While clean water and carbon 
sequestration are feasible of being commodified, scenic or landscape 
beauty, or even biodiversity, precludes any possibility of defining 
commensurable values, as both services are dependent on extremely 
complicated interaction of social, physical and biological factors, 
rendering them very difficult if not impossible to be assigned a discrete 
financial value (Muradian et al., 2010). And even in the case of carbon 
sequestration, the PSA program has been questioned as there are 
differences between local experts regarding what is the actual 
sequestration capacity of forests of different species and ages (ITCR expert 
on forestry, interview, April 10th, 2014). Indeed, up to 2016, Costa Rica 
did not have an agreeable standard for calculating carbon sequestered due 
to the variegation in information offered by forestry maps (REDD+ 
Strategy consultant, interview, August 17th 2014).  
Finally, the directedness of the environmental service is 
questionable. Intermediary organizations are frequently allowed with 
substantial influence in the execution of the PSA. As demand for these 
contracts grow, FONAFIFO gains a considerable power in determining 
which sellers of environmental services may be considered or not (de 
Camino et al., 2001). FONAFIFO defines in no small measure, under 
political pressures put over the program by other entities such as MINAE, 
SINAC and the more conservation-minded civil society organizations, 
whom have push the program towards the protection of more 
biodiversity-rich and hydrologically-important forests; rural 
development agencies (such as the Agrarian Development Institute and 
MAG), whom pressure the program into becoming a tool for combating 
rural poverty, thereby fostering it to become a supplementary aid for poor 
farmers; and IFOs (such as the WB) whom have sponsored for it to both 
become a more business-oriented environmental tool, as well as making 
it more inclusive of some critical sectors, such as indigenous communities 
(Vaas, 2013). Indeed, one of the most noticeable political features of the 
PSA program both in the context of the World Bank-financed 
Ecomercados I and II projects and, currently with the FCPF-backed 
REDD+ strategy, is that it has attempted to gain more political stability in 
the context of these continuous pressures, by diversifying the 
stakeholders to which it caters. As I will show on chapters 6 and 7, the 
PSA program was considerably expanded to include forests at indigenous 
territories and has been expanding in order to offer alternatives to peasant 
farmers as well since the implementation of the first Ecomercados loan in 
2003 (FONAFIFO, 2013). Moreover, the PSA program has also been open 
to consider alternative forms of contract to account for agroforestry 
schemes in the context of REDD+ (Porras, 2010).  
Despite all of these contradictions facing the PSA program and also 
other buffer zone-oriented policies in Costa Rica, there are ongoing 
attempts towards solidifying the financial link between forests and 
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carbon. The National Strategy for Climate Change and the National 
Forestry Development Plan 2011-2020 constitute a fairly clear attempt of 
the Costa Rican state to secure its forest resources through a deeper 
integration of forests within the circulation of capitalist finance. The PNDF 
is the most important strategic instrument for forestry policy planning in 
Costa Rica. In its 2011 iteration, the objective for policy planning is to 
“maintain and sustainably augment the country’s forest cover through the 
efficient valorization of forests (…) through guarantees of juridical security, a 
clear land tenure regime and the right of forest owners to use their private 
property to produce goods and services necessary for the inhabitant’s quality of 
life” (MINAET, 2011: 11). To accomplish this, the PNDF defines a number 
of specific policies to be developed over the course of the current decade, 
under the challenge of moving forward from a forest policy that is 
separate from productive necessities, to one that integrates them fully: 
“The greatest challenge is to move forward from an advanced policy of 
conservation of natural resources and environmental protection, which 
has often been seen as disarticulated from economic and social policies; 
towards an integrated approach of sustainability, in which prosperity 
is built from the talent of the people and the environmental wealth. 
Before the dichotomy of preserving or conserving, we need to adopt a 
model in which environmental protection, the intelligent use of natural 
resources, economic development and job creation reinforce each other 
mutually.” (MINAE, 2011: 16). 
Much like the 1987 USAID Strategy and the 1993 World Bank 
Review argued, for the PNDF the biggest problem that needs to be 
surpassed in order to deal with this challenge is the current de-
valorization of the forest vis-à-vis other productive alternatives in rural 
areas (agriculture, tourism and urban growth). This in turn, is considered 
to be the result of the lack of competitiveness of the wood production 
value chain, which has gradually lost its productivity and sustainability. 
Indeed, the Plan argues that these problems are fairly noticeable in the 1) 
low rate of reforestation, 2) the presence of continuous deforestation, 3) 
the closure of critically important forest industries, 4) constant claims from 
the forestry sector of more government support, 5) the lack of 
competitiveness of forest resources vis-à-vis other alternative productive 
materials, particularly in the context of the construction sector. While 
useful to maintain over 300.000 hectares of forests over time, the PNDF 
considers that the sources of income for the forestry sector through 
FONAFIFO and the PSA are limited to maintain an adequate forest cover 
and that more resources are required to diminish deforestation and lead 
to a better supply of forest plantations and the wider forestry commodity 
chain.  
In this context, the Plan argues that there is need of new projects 
that may guarantee a continuous and predictable financing for both the 
public institutions in charge of conserving forests in the context of 
protected areas, but to the private sector in order to expand forest cover 
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through natural regeneration, new forest plantations and agroforestry 
systems. In this context, climate change is seen as an opportunity for new 
forms of funding these credits through a deeper financialization of forests 
through carbon. Being developed alongside the PNDF, the ENCC 
delineates the main issues of policy action under the rubric that “the 
decarbonization of the economy constitutes an excellent opportunity for 
competitive sustainable development and attraction of investment and financial 
resources” (MINAET, 2009: 46). The hallmark of this Strategy is its pledge 
to abate the country’s greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere 
through policy action in forests, industry and private consumption, 
guaranteeing national carbon neutrality by 2021. At the forestry level, this 
is supposed to be accomplished through four policy actions: 1) the 
development of new economic and financial stimulus for reforestation, 
particularly in buffer zones and biological corridors around national 
parks, 2) the promotion of agroforestry systems, 3) the expansion of the 
PSA in order to include efforts for human-directed natural regeneration 
of forests (i.e.: plantations and productive-oriented reforestation) and 4) 
devising stimulus for avoided deforestation through the integration to 
global initiatives such as REDD+ (MINAET, 2011). Alongside these 
measures and as the lynchpin of the entire Strategy, the state has proposed 
the creation of a voluntary carbon market through the financial 
consolidation of the PSA using REDD+ resources, the establishment of 
new clean development mechanisms under the context of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the introduction of an eco-labelling mechanism dubbed C-
Neutral for the local market, which is supposed to become a national 
branding of Costa Rican production as being neutral to climate change.  
While it is too early to revise on the effects of these policies as some 
have not reached the implementation stage (e.g.: REDD+), it is clear that 
the current efforts towards the promotion of the country as a carbon 
neutral state are the last stage in a wider process of guaranteeing the 
protection of forests through linking them to capital accumulation and 
financialization. While in the past, USAID contemplated this 
financialization through the use of sustainable management techniques 
and subsidies designed to foster forestry as a potentially profitable trade 
industry in the context of implementation of trade diversification, and 
later on the World Bank revised these policies into developing PES as the 
means of financializing forests through the creation of commodified and 
financialized derivatives like the PSA; today, the Costa Rican state is 
following on this tendency by promoting a deeper financialization of 
forests through its exclusive linkages to carbon economies. By centering 
PSA as a means of promoting climate change abatement, the PNDF and 
the ENCC are promoting the value of carbon abatement as the key 
environmental service financed by the PSA, thereby relinquishing the 
importance of the other, this in turn entails a new valorization of forests. 
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4.4. Conclusion 
All in all, this history shows how there has been a historical governmental 
trend towards providing environmental protection through financializing 
or commodifying the very natural resources that are to be conserved. The 
exposure of conserved resources to accumulation originates in the 
precepts of the neoliberal adjustment priorities, particularly those 
regarding the need of dealing with natural resource security problems 
without compromising macroeconomic stabilization. Following on the 
same road as the new outward-oriented economic model for Costa Rica, 
the new environmental policies for forest conservation have been 
determined by policy diversification within a narrow mentality of market 
imperatives and the introduction of particular forms of territorialization 
of resources in order to fulfill the obligations of new calculations and 
forms of optimization. This of course is completely coherent with recent 
arguments regarding accumulation by conservation, that is, arguments 
about how new forms of conservation have been drawn along market-
based lines of efficiency, optimization and commodification, despite being 
driven by the very same contradictions that spur their appearance (see 
Buscher and Fletcher, 2015).  
This brief account of the Costa Rican government conservation 
policies argues that the current conservation-development endeavors 
based upon the green economy originate in governmental imperatives of 
securing control of resources and population, to face the economic 
unbalances of public debt and international threats from abroad. Yet, it 
also shows that there are some areas around which consensus has not been 
necessarily reached. Indeed, following on the work of Fletcher and 
Breitling (2012) it is clear that a market vision has not been fully realized 
through the PSA, nor with respect the ongoing ENCC, PNDF and REDD+. 
As I will show in chapters 7 and 8, FONAFIFO has been forced to separate 
from the idealized institutions of free-market governance in developing 
the PSA in the context of the indigenous territories studied here. These 
authors speculate about the reasons behind these difficulties at the 
national level, discussing on problems with the overall cost effectiveness 
of the program in a middle-income country with a previous presence of a 
well-managed system of protected areas. While it is difficult to ascertain 
the reasons behind this tension, it is possible to recognize some of them 
through the manner in which the green economy has been territorialized 
in the Talamancan territories.  
In the following chapters, I will delve deeper on the effects of these 
trends in conservation, capitalist accumulation, territorialization and state 
formation in the context of the Bribri and Cabécar indigenous peoples and 
their political struggles with the Costa Rican state. I will bring these issues 
to orbit around a discussion of neoliberal multiculturalism. Following 
Ong (2006), if states operate by conceding and abrogating rights to benefit 
from the resources over which these have sovereignty, what does this 
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process of “green economy” state formation involves for the Bribri or the 
Cabécar, living at the edge of the Costa Rican state?  Indeed, not only these 
conservation policies have been developed thinking in the discrete 
territorial formations occupied by these populations and not reflective of 
their own territorialities (e.g.: the buffer zone), but these have been 
determined in a context marked by ongoing tensions between political 
activism from these indigenous groups and the existing neoliberal 
technocratic approaches for natural resource management. The rest of this 
dissertation will delve deeper into the institutional cracks produced by 
this tension as SAF, PES, REDD+ and PA co-management allow some 
leeway for dealing with issues of greater interest of the Bribri and the 
Cabécar, than simply conservation, such as social welfare, poverty 
alleviation, cultural integration and political development.
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5 Environmental governance and the 
‘passive frontier’ thesis 
 
“It is possible to argue that the Caribbean sector of La Amistad 
International Park constitutes a passive frontier, and that the Pacific 
sector has an active frontier, which is why both frontiers demand a 
different treatment.” (MINAET et al., 2012: 45).  
Chapter 3 showed how state territorialization, exploitation and violent 
dispossession of lands and resources have been three key defining 
processes of the history between the Costa Rican state and its indigenous 
populations, particularly those that inhabit the Talamanca Valley. The 
chapter showed how these processes were central to the formation of the 
Costa Rican state and the consolidation of colonial mercantilism, and later 
on, agrarian capitalism. Finally, that chapter showed how these 
asymmetrical processes remained prevalent at the time new legal systems 
and forms of political governance were established with the objective of 
protecting indigenous rights. Overall, the section was meant to show that 
there has been a historical tendency of using state policy in order to 
legitimate the rule and development objectives of a mestizo majority vis-
à-vis the material and cultural practices of indigenous peoples, even in 
cases in which said policies were supposedly meant to liberate them. This 
chapter follows on these ideas, by understanding this historical practice 
not as a feature of an agro-export political economy of the past, but also of 
the reality prevalent in the political economy of forest and biodiversity 
conservation of today.   
In this regard, this chapter begins by explaining the legal outcome 
and institutionalization of the long-standing struggle by Costa Rican 
indigenous populations for their right to political recognition, including 
their demands for political autonomy and sovereignty over access, use 
and benefit from natural resources present in their lands. This fight has 
undoubtedly resulted in some victories for the indigenous populations, 
represented in the fact that there are legal dispositions that defend, to 
some extent, their political autonomy and their influence over state 
decisions regarding use of natural resources in their reserves. Yet, in 
practice, these provisions have also allowed the state to exercise important 
power and influence over their local politics, as well. As it will be shown 
here, the authority to regulate land uses can and is influenced greatly by 
the state, thereby impeding the Bribri and Cabécar to exercise true self-
determination and autonomous governance (see PEN, 2011; Chacón 
Castro, 1999; Montero Vargas, 2002). In this sense, historical asymmetries 
defining the relationship between indigenous populations and the Costa 
Rican state remain prevalent, especially with regards to critical 
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governance areas such as natural resource management and 
environmental conservation.  
This will be demonstrated in this section by exploring the manner 
in which restrictive forest and biodiversity conservation policies are being 
implemented by state environmental authorities through La Amistad 
International Park (PILA) and La Amistad Biosphere Reserve (RBLA) 
through actions that sometimes involve the indigenous local governments 
as well. To do this, this chapter will explain how PILA was created 
following different political and environmental objectives than those of 
the indigenous reserves. Indeed, PILA was created through an 
international cooperation project between Costa Rica and Panama in order 
to guard the shared landscape of the Talamanca Mountain Range, by 
protecting forests and wildlife from encroachment by mestizo farmers in 
the Southern Pacific region of both countries, and safeguarding water 
source of strategic importance for hydroelectric power generation. 
Protection of indigenous culture was never an objective behind the 
creation of this transfrontier protected area. Yet, being developed in a 
historical context of a paradigm shift in international conservation politics 
in which openings were made in favor of allowing indigenous sustainable 
uses of ecosystems, pressures existed for environmental authorities to find 
a way of involving the adjacent and highly-forested indigenous reserves 
that existed around PILA as buffer zones of a much larger RBLA, 
including the TBIR and TCIR.  
The task has not been easy for environmental authorities as the 
establishment of PILA in the 1970s was bound to create some resentment 
from the Bribri and Cabécar peoples claimed lands used for creating the 
park. This includes Namawoki, a small section of PILA, that exists in the 
middle of the TBIR and separate from the main body of the park, and that 
is currently inhabited by a few Bribris. Despite the existence of an informal 
alliance between the Talamancan indigenous local governments and state 
and non-state conservation organizations, there is a history of contestation 
fueled by overlapping territorial claims that reflect  upon: 1) the current 
conflicts over the rights to engage in traditional biodiversity and forest 
uses, enactment of which has been deliberately left in a legal limbo in 
favor of state conservation priorities; and 2) periodic political struggles 
over the lack of means of consultation of indigenous people for land use 
and environmental decision-making by park authorities. This situation 
will be exemplified by characterizing the manner in which park 
authorities seem to sideline indigenous authorities in co-management 
processes, as well as in evidence of political violence brought upon the 
Bribri and the Cabécar peoples living nearby the Namowoki sector 
regarding access to traditional forest uses.  
With that said, this chapter will also explain why there are 
incentives for state conservation agencies and NGOs to approach 
environmental governance in a less conflictive manner. Not only do 
pressures exist from funding agencies to include the Bribri and Cabécar 
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into environmental management schemes, but local indigenous 
authorities are also in a reasonable bargaining position to demand their 
inclusion as well. Indeed, the political position of the Talamancans is 
strengthened by the fact that: 1) natural resources at TBIR and TCIR are 
considered to be well-protected, even if conservationists constantly 
acknowledge the potential threats to these in the future due to indigenous 
population growth and wider economic integration;  and 2) Talamancan 
peoples’ property over their territories is not being actively compromised 
by other actors (e.g.: mestizo farmers, transnational corporations, other 
state agencies, etc), thereby not requiring the Bribri and the Cabécar to join 
conservation as a means of solidifying territorial claims. The outcome of 
this political situation has been the idea of the “passive frontier”, a policy 
notion of state conservation agencies that recognizes that while there may 
be ongoing socioeconomic and demographic processes that could threaten 
natural resources at PILA in the future, actual environmental degradation 
has been limited so far thereby meriting other forms of interaction 
different than the use of forceful fences-and-fines territorial approaches. 
As the PILA Park Management Plan of 2012 argues:  
“(…) is possible to strengthen a good synergic relationship between this 
wildlife protected area, the other protected areas and the indigenous 
territories. This may be a policy based on prevention, conservation and 
sustainable development (...such as…) green seal certifications for 
banana, plantain and coffee production and also environmental 
services and tourism in the area.” (MINAET et al., 2012: 66). 
The “passive frontier” thesis lies at the core of almost all of the 
recent state- or NGO-led conservation-development interventions to the 
Talamanca Valley and its popularity is almost self-explanatory. Based on 
the recognition of a long history of political and economic abandonment 
of this environmentally-rich frontier region of Costa Rica, it is easy to 
attain political support through a discourse (no matter how fictitious it 
may be) that both claim to defend local biodiversity without the use of 
political violence, while offering its indigenous inhabitants a chance to 
“catch-up” to development. It is a tactic not unheard of as plenty of other 
protected areas have often been the object of discourses that understands 
them as mechanisms to undo central state negligence, in order to 
recognize and empower the cultural and economic characteristics of 
indigenous territories (see Sale, 1985; Alexander, 1990; Arias and Nations, 
1992; Fall, 1999; 2003; Wolmer, 2003). It even becomes a passionate 
discourse for the defense of decentralized environmental governance 
structures hinged upon the empowerment of indigenous populations as 
guardians of these biological regions, despite discursively redefining 
them, their practices and lands as “new” subjects, that could be much 
more “beneficial” to said conservation efforts. However, as this 
dissertation will show in this and the following chapters, the re-forging of 
existing socio-geographical spaces through this “passive frontier” thesis 
is not a simple task. Indeed, its effectiveness hinges upon the political 
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interplay, material processes and discursive practices that take place in a 
completely separate territorial form – the Bribri and the Cabécar 
Indigenous Reserves – and which are dependent of a long history that 
affect the aforementioned circumstances. 
5.1. Indigenous politics in Costa Rica 
Legally, in Costa Rica, indigenous peoples seem to inhabit in a “zone of 
indistinction”1, whereby rights validated through various pieces of 
legislation – including an Indigenous Law and ILO Convention 169 – are 
often times set aside and its execution suspended by state authorities 
through political fiat. This is manifested in the form of a legal, political 
and bureaucratic framework that deliberately misrecognizes and omits 
cultural and racial differences and rights of the indigenous communities 
with regards to the needs of dominant mestizo population, while 
rhetorically embracing these identities and the multicultural nature of the 
nation-state. Furthermore, this zone of indistinction seems to function as 
a political mechanism whereby the state is given the authority to define 
what is to be considered as legally and politically viable for indigenous 
populations often times through the effective negation of the right of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination with regards to the legal and 
political principles through which their lands, and their access and use of 
natural resources should be governed.  
Historically, politico-legal relations between the Costa Rican state 
and indigenous peoples were defined by omission. While there were a 
couple of legal dispositions recognizing the existence of indigenous 
peoples and their position as citizens of the country prior to 1939, these 
were never enforced effectively. During the 19th and most of the 20th 
Centuries, political institutions continuously disregarded their land 
rights, property systems, cultural practices or even their very existence as 
members of the nation-state. On the contrary, as I have been shown in 
chapter 3, their lands were automatically transformed into “baldíos” 
(which is a term in Spanish for “empty lands”), and indigenous 
populations were swiftly dispossessed of them for productive goals or as 
a means to reinforce claims towards national sovereignty. This situation 
changed with the promulgation of the 1977 Indigenous Law, as well as 
several other legal dispositions, which carved out the 24 Indigenous 
Reservations that currently exist in the country – including the ones in 
which this thesis focuses. Moreover, the creation of the Constitutional 
Court in 1989 and the ratification of ILO Convention 169 led to the 
formation of a more robust legal system that recognizes, at least 
discursively, their cultural and political rights.  
Nevertheless, this indigenous legal framework is rife with 
contradictions and opportunities for unilateral bureaucratic interpretation 
by government authorities when it comes to being implemented. Take for 
example the aforementioned Indigenous Law. Far from being a well-
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structured piece of legislation, this legal document is imbued with 
dispositions that offer considerable leeway to interpretation favorable for 
state authorities. Article 5 of the Law states that “indigenous reserves should 
be ruled by the indigenous peoples following their communal traditional 
structures”, a political right also reaffirmed by Convention 169. Yet, in 
practice, and through interpretation by executive decree, the Costa Rican 
state has unilaterally defined the local integral development associations 
(ADI) as the sole means of territorial representation of these populations 
and the actual legal owners of the land that indigenous populations 
inhabit. Clearly, ADIs are not traditional structures in any way, nor do 
they share any resemblance with other political structures developed by 
the Bribri and the Cabécar over time, a reality that is recognized often by 
local political leaders in the Reserves (Candela et al., 2007). On the 
contrary, ADIs were public non-state entities, created under the venue of 
the central state, in order to coordinate government policy in frontier 
regions during the 1960s and 1970s (DINADECO, 1983). At their original 
inception, ADIs were supposed to function as “transmission belts” that 
could mobilize national policies of agricultural modernization and 
development (as conceived in the context of the U.S.-backed Alliance for 
Progress Program2), into isolated rural areas (Rivera Araya, 1998). In other 
words, these were originally conceived as proxies that localized state 
power, and as such, were (and continue to be) subject to national laws and 
dependent of financial resources provided by the central state, while 
allowing the latter to oversee their operation, even to the point of holding 
the legal power to intervene, reorganize or disband them if deemed 
necessary.  
Of course, this is not to say that local ADIs are just simple “pawns” 
subservient to state power in the Indigenous Reserves. On the contrary, 
there have been many occasions in which these local organizations have 
been the center of political resistance to government agendas, such as in a 
later stage of the struggles against RECOPE’s oil explorations of the early 
1980s and Harken and Mallon Oil exploration in the coastlines in the early 
2000s.3 Indeed, many indigenous leaders do recognize the potential of 
these organizations to be mechanisms for guiding political struggles of the 
Bribri and the Cabécar vis-à-vis the state (Méndez Benavides, 2014). But 
with all of this said, one cannot deny that ADIs do work in a wider 
political reality determined by power asymmetries, whereby the central 
state does reserves itself the power to allocate key financial resources for 
them to organize and act accordingly to policy (Candela et al., 2007). 
Indeed, due to the fact that ADIs are in no legal position to levy taxes upon 
the local dwellers of the Reserves, nor have any other form of gathering 
the financial resources needed to mobilize their own development 
strategies, they are made structurally dependent of resources provided by 
other sources, namely the central state through the National Directorate 
for Communal Development (DINADECO) or other state agency with the 
legal power to provide resources to these organizations; or alternatively, 
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NGO- or IFO-financed projects in the region. And given that both types of 
resources available generally come through projects whereby ADIs have 
rarely had any say on initial planning and formulation (see Candela et al., 
2007), this means that these organizations are set to have a limited degree 
of actual political autonomy in practice.  
Local governance is but one of the ways in which the Costa Rican 
state systematically disregards the implementation of the indigenous law, 
and more will be said about this in the following chapters as I engage with 
the specific projects studied for this dissertation. Yet, it is relevant to say 
that there are plenty of other forms in which this zone of indistinction 
becomes manifested. Costa Rican civil law fails to recognize communal 
property, thereby impeding indigenous authorities and grassroots 
organizations to ask for credits for their own locally-organized and 
autonomous development projects (Guevara Berger, 2000). Judicial 
entities often fail to recognize the presence of indigenous legal orderings, 
in spite of the implied rhetorical adoption of the pre-constitutional thesis 
(Guevara Víquez and Rodríguez Aguilar, 2006). Educational policies 
implemented in the territories rarely account for multicultural education, 
even though articles of the 1977 Indigenous Law and various 
constitutional sentences have deemed otherwise (Borge, 2012). Political 
consultation processes are rife with legal vacuums that are often 
circumvented by political fiat at the expense of indigenous participation 
(Chacón Castro, 2002). And perhaps, the most critical issue in many 
indigenous reserves – the Talamancan Bribri and Cabécar excluded, is that 
the state has not even initiated the process of reclaiming lands from non-
indigenous land owners, despite these territories existing for over 40 years 
(Chacón Castro et al., 1999). Perhaps all of this is best summed up in the 
following extract from a 1992 constitutional ruling about the legal 
situation of indigenous peoples (which could still be used to describe 
current reality):  
“The current legislation does not recognize their own (indigenous) 
forms of organization, forcing them to organize legally around the 
Integral Development Associations, or as simple private non-profit 
associations, thereby imposing them with organization models that are 
foreign to them. They cannot obtain financial credits because lands are 
not legally theirs, and because the law considers them inalienable and 
imprescriptible. And there are no juridical procedures designed to 
grant guarantees over communal property. Moreover, they claim that 
the institutions that were created by law in order to defend them, are 
not theirs, but of the state.” (Constitutional Court, ruling 3003-1992, 
October, 1992). 
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is important to take a look at 
how this “zone of indistinction” manifests itself with regards to the 
politico-legal framework governing the access to and use of natural 
resources in the Indigenous Reserves. Indeed, the legal framework has a 
fair share of ambiguities and contradicting pieces of legislation regulating 
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indigenous and non-indigenous access, use and exploitation of natural 
resources. For starters, while article 15 of Convention 169 demands the 
protection of “the right of these (indigenous) peoples to participate in the use, 
administration and conservation of these resources”, article 7 of the Indigenous 
Law removes any type of indigenous participation from key decision-
making with regards to forests as it: 1) forces indigenous territories to 
leave forest cover unaltered in order to guard the hydrological equilibria 
of river basins, 2) demands forest uses to be organized exclusively by state 
institutions and 3) determines that only the state can name park rangers 
for the protection of these forests. The article does require the state to look 
for prior authorization of CONAI, but as seen in the previous chapter, this 
is an institution that has a long history of supplanting indigenous political 
will in favor of state territorialities (also see Chacón Castro and Guevara 
Berger, 1992; Chacón Castro, 2002; Villalobos and Borge, 1998). Perhaps 
the only environmental decision-making process whereby the Indigenous 
Law states that there should be obligatory consultation with the locals has 
to do with mineral resources found in the subsoil of the Reserves, which 
are considered “patrimony of the state and indigenous communities” 
(article 6). But, even so, this article is rarely followed up by the state in 
practice as it is considered to be lacking in applicability, because of 
incompatibilities with the Mining Code (PGR, 2006).  
Between 1977 and 1996, when the Forestry Law entered in effect, 
indigenous reserves were subjected to much more stringent 
environmental measures than any other forested land tenure in the 
country (except, perhaps the strictest protected areas), given that this legal 
standing had allowed for complete bans on land use changes involving 
forest cover. Yet, afterwards, these dispositions have continued to be very 
strict. Formally, the 1996 Forestry Law does not contemplate the existence 
of communal land tenure such as present in the indigenous reserves, as it 
only considers the existence of public and private property. Whereas the 
ADIs are the legal owners of the Reserves, land is internally distributed in 
the form of either individual, familiar or communal plots, and therefore, 
property is much more difficult to track on the field, as there appears to 
be no formal land registries or cadastral plans. This situation forced the 
central state to regulate forest uses through an executive decree on the 
Guidelines for Forest Use at Indigenous Reserves since 1995. The 
Guidelines defined a stringent limit to tree felling in the Reserves of three 
trees per hectare, per person, with an annual limit of 9 trees in total. 
Moreover, if trees are felled, the Guidelines demanded that they should 
be exclusively used locally and not to be traded with people outside of the 
territory. It was a legal measure clearly defined to establish a strong 
control over indigenous natural resource uses, surpassing any type of 
state limitations made over private forests and also, created without any 
type of indigenous mediation or participation (PGR, 2016). Indeed, the 
Guidelines have produced considerable conflicts for the Talamancans and 
have been contested continuously (more about this in the following 
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section), to the point that it has been subjected to several constitutional 
rulings as organized indigenous groups in Talamanca and elsewhere have 
made efforts to suspend its execution.  
Another way in which the legal ambiguities that form this state of 
exception are manifested has to do with traditional uses of resources, 
given that in Costa Rica, as the very Management Plan of PILA states: 
“(t)here is no legal definition of ‘traditional use’” (MINAET et al., 2012: 116). 
Article 14 of Convention 169 does contemplate that: “measures shall be taken 
in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands 
not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access 
for their subsistence and traditional activities”, meaning that such behavior 
should be permitted, which in the case of the Bribri and the Cabécar it may 
entail practices of extraction of flora from forests for medicinal and 
religious purposes, willful intervention of forested areas for controlling 
plagues and cultivation of orchards and agroforestry systems, as well as 
hunting and fishing (see Borge and Castillo, 1997). Yet, in practice, the 
extent of these activities is closely regulated by state authorities, 
governing from their own self-benefitting rules of interpretation, whereby 
laws meant for the general population can be implemented here, such as 
the Conservation of Wildlife Act or the Biodiversity Act, which entail 
considerable fines for these practices, and on occasions, even jail 
sentences.  
In synthesis, while the Costa Rican legal system has managed to 
evolve by introducing new legislation that allows for the political 
recognition of its indigenous communities, it still has not been able to 
abolish the zone of indistinction by which indigenous peoples are 
governed by omission or contradiction. Indeed, this approach to 
indigenous affairs and policies seems to be directed at erasing the 
longstanding political traditions that tied them to the land that it is now 
considered as the indigenous reserve. While each of the ethnic groups still 
have some remnants of their own governance structures, and political 
visions of their territories that are central for land management, 
stewardship and consultation, such traditions and perspectives are not 
even considered by state authorities as the manner in which indigenous 
communities should govern and manage themselves. In turn, the 
emphasis has been given to imposing particular forms of political 
authority, which historically have operated as unquestionable channels of 
state influence and aid dependence. In the following section, the intention 
is to show how this wider politico-legal context also impinges on 
indigenous livelihoods by looking at the role of conservation policy within 
this zone of indistinction. 
 92 
5.2. Historical origins of La Amistad International Park 
and La Amistad Biosphere Reserve 
Different from other territorial formations in the Talamancan region, 
historical information on the origins of PILA is very scarce and difficult to 
track down, especially from the side of indigenous peoples.4. With this 
said, my research allows me to conclude that the park was created in the 
backdrop of two processes: one related to the initial efforts of the Costa 
Rican state to counter deforestation as a result of encroaching of crop 
areas, plantations and pastures in forested lands during the 1970s (Boza, 
2012); and the other has to do with renewed efforts to foster international 
cooperation and development in Central America. The history behind the 
establishment of the first state-mandated protected areas has been well 
documented from a conservationist point of view by Evans (1999), 
Fournier (1991) and more recently, by Boza (2012). Indeed, these authors 
agree that the creation of PILA followed systematic efforts taken by the 
Costa Rican state to reduce forest cover loss, by declaring certain frontiers 
of agricultural expansion as protected areas. This process was supported 
all along by international cooperation and a vibrant conservation policy 
community which fostered considerable governmental intervention in 
regulating forest uses (Zimmerer, 2011).  
Yet, it is also relevant to say that PILA, in particular, was also the 
result of wider efforts by the Central American region of promoting 
international cooperation. Indeed, PILA was planned first in the context 
of the First Central American Meeting on the Conservation of Natural and 
Cultural Resources in 1974 (Matul Romero, 2007). Being an international 
meeting developed in the context of the recently created Man and the 
Biosphere Program of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), environmental conservation became a 
priority of the negotiation agenda. There already existed a plan amongst 
Costa Rican state authorities of creating a national protected area covering 
a significant section of the Talamanca Mountain Range (Boza, 2012). This 
idea was supported and expanded by the Panamanian government that 
suggested a similar area be created in their territory. As a result the Costa 
Rican side of the protected area – originally dubbed Talamanca Forest 
Reserve – was transformed into an international protected area named La 
Amistad (Spanish for “friendship”), with the intent of being “a symbolic 
gesture of the excellent relations of friendship and fraternity between the two 
governments, of the high scientific and ecological value of the region and the 
necessity of conserving and preserving the area’s flora and fauna” (Bilateral 
Agreement for the Creation of PILA, 1978).  
Following a joint agreement between both governments, the 
recently created Costa Rican National Park Service (SPN) began 
developing the initial planning documents alongside Panamanian 
authorities, with the funding of UNESCO. The Tropical Agricultural 
Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE) produced the formal 
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version of the management plan for the Costa Rican side of the park in 
1981, leading to its formal determination as a Heritage Site in 1982. 
Panama did not delineate, nor created its side of the park until 1988, an 
issue which reinforced the belief amongst institutional actors in Costa Rica 
that the park should be governed as two different and separate parts, 
divided by the national boundary; a reality that is prevalent to this day 
(Panama former head of Protected Areas Directorate, personal interview, 
December 5th, 2014). Although being the first transfrontier protected area 
in Central America and one of the first actions of binational cooperation 
between Costa Rica and Panama, PILA has never operated as a single 
internationally managed project. This is due to the desire of each state to 
retain their autonomy regarding territorial management practices. As a 
result, there is a significant lack of coordination which is materialized 
today in the fact that MINAE and the Panamanian National Authority of 
the Environment (ANAM) have different legal frameworks and 
management plans to orient actions in the protected area. Indeed, even 
the reports that both countries need to present at UNESCO as a part of the 
commitments related to the day-to-day operation of RBLA are not 
produced in a binationally, but result from the independent work by each 
country (MIDEPLAN, 2011).5   
For Costa Rica, the agenda of rapid territorial expansion of 
protected areas came to an end with PILA. While newer protected areas 
were created afterwards and some expansions did take place, these were 
very limited. As the then director of SPN stated with the creation of PILA: 
“we are moving out of the decade of declaration and into a period of consolidation 
and refined management of the parks” (Boza, cited in Tico Times, 15 October 
1982). While the park was created following quite explicit scientific and 
biological determinants, one cannot deny the importance of other much 
more productive goals as well. Indeed, the executive decree that created 
the park openly stated that it was justified due to its “extraordinary 
hydroelectric potential, given its abrupt topography and rainy weather”. This 
energy potential was probably a priority at the time, as the Costa Rican 
Electricity Institute (ICE) – the state agency with the responsibilities of 
manage electricity generation in the country – was contemplating to 
develop a massive hydroelectric project in the area, by damming the 
Sixaola River and creating a reservoir that would have flooded the entire 
surface of the Talamanca Valley lowlands (Villalobos and Borge, 1998). At 
the time, it was considered that the Sixaola River was capable of 
producing up to 17% of the energy consumption of the country in 1978 
(see Afonso, 1978). The project has since been abandoned by ICE.  
PILA was created almost without a budget as “there were no facilities, 
nor tents or sleeping bags, medicines or horses. Everything had to be built from 
the ground up and literally create the park from the ground” (former PILA 
administrator, personal interview, May 2nd, 2014). In Costa Rica, the park 
is currently administered by two different offices of SINAC: Regional 
Office for La Amistad-Pacifico Conservation Area (ACLAP), which 
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handles the side of the park facing towards the southern Pacific region 
and the Regional Office for La Amistad-Caribe (ACLAC), which handles 
the Caribbean side. Because of lack of accessibility and funding, to this 
day, ACLAC does not have a single permanent office in the park grounds 
proper. It is relevant to highlight this “absenteeism” in the state approach 
towards PILA, given that it is the object of considerable criticism by the 
Bribri and the Cabécar. The reason behind this is that PILA as such was 
created over land that is either inhabited by some indigenous 
communities (such as in the Namawoki sector) or that is generally 
considered by the Talamancan indigenous peoples as part of their own 
cultural and religious heritage. Indeed, they claim that some of the 
mountains covered by PILA, have special cultural meanings, especially, 
mount Kamuk, which is considered to be the original place where Sibö 
sowed the cacao seeds from which the ditsewö (the Bribri and Cabécar, 
though literally, “the people”) emerged (awa from Meleruk, interview, 
March 4th, 2014). Also important is the fact that being lands which the 
Bribri and Cabécar used to utilize as hunting grounds, fishing and trading 
with the Bribri and the Cabécars in the Pacific side of the Talamancan 
Mountain Range, they should be the legal owners of these lands. It must 
be added that one reason why PILA was so easily carved out with so little 
financial cost to the state, despite of its massive size, is that the park was 
considered to be on unclaimed baldíos by ITCO, thereby considered to be 
legal property of the state following the dispositions of 1839 and 1939 that 
I discussed in the third chapter. All of these issues, combined with the 
aforementioned absenteeism, tend to anger the locals as they considered 
these to be land of little significance for the state, whereby for them it is, 
quite literally, the origin of life itself. 
5.3. The ‘passive frontier’ thesis 
The initial management approach taken by both Costa Rican and 
Panamanian state authorities regarding PILA followed a fences-and-fines 
orientation (Candanedo Díaz, 2010). Authorities interviewed for this 
research were often reluctant and elusive of being interviewed about 
earlier implementation of conservation policies in the area, but from the 
little data obtained, it seems that the management approach entailed 
excluding local peasants and indigenous peoples from all park 
management decision-making process, while also establishing measures 
to limit uses of resources by them at both the Southern Pacific and 
Caribbean sides of the protected area (see also Villalobos and Borge, 1998; 
Wo-Ching, 2011).  
Indigenous leaders did recognize that there were no eviction 
processes in the Talamanca Valley, though they did complain about the 
implementation of policies for controlling forest and wildlife uses on the 
buffer zone, particularly after the biosphere reserve was created in 1990. 
The lack of enactment of these eviction processes in Talamanca was 
probably the result of the fact that the actual limits of the park are remote 
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and difficult to access with the existent infrastructure, thereby not 
requiring the need of maintaining a permanent presence in the park 
proper (former PILA administrator, interview, May 2nd, 2014 and 
September 28th, 2014). Indeed, PILA has no administrative office within 
the bounds of the Caribbean sector, as this is located in Suretka within the 
administrative complex of the ADITIBRI. This evidence contrasts with the 
Pacific sector of PILA, where park ranger offices are located in Pittier and 
Biolley at the boundary of the park, with park rangers and officials often 
engaging in local patrolling of the the area to avoid potential 
encroachment by local peasants (Candanedo Díaz, 2010). Indeed, in the 
Southern Pacific side of PILA, Schelhas and Pfeffer (2008) calculate local 
evictions to be at least of about 3.000 hectares and 150 landholdings. 
Moreover, they also argue that compensations for these lands were 
considered to be inadequate by the former peasant settlers, and therefore, 
continue to be the reason for ongoing resentment. 
Of course, this comparison between the situation in the Southern 
Pacific and the Caribbean sides of PILA is not to imply that there is no 
conflict or contestation present in the Caribbean sector with regards to 
top-down conservation measures. Indeed, conflicts exist regarding the 
implementation of measures and its negative effects upon local 
livelihoods and with regards to the governance of areas inhabited by 
indigenous peoples in which PILA overlaps. More on these conflicts will 
be discussed in the section immediately following this one, but for now it 
is relevant to acknowledge that the management approach used at both 
sides of the park differs significantly, event to the point of becoming two 
completely management imaginaries and philosophies for the park 
authorities involved. It is critical to understand the difference between 
these management philosophies as both have important implications 
regarding the adoption of new forms of conservation implemented after 
the creation of LABR in the 1990s.  
The 1990s was a decade of substantial change in Costa Rican 
conservation governance. The promulgation of the 1996 Forestry Law and 
the 1998 Law on Biodiversity entail a general overhaul of the bureaucracy 
administering protected areas, moving from a centralized system towards 
a decentralized one (Isla, 2015). The SPN was transformed into the 
National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC), a decentralized agency 
operating through various semi-autonomously managed regional offices 
in charge of administering protected areas in the sector of their purview, 
as well as in charge of handling regular forestry and wildlife use controls 
in each outside of PA boundaries (Evans, 1999). Alongside this process, 
the state also began promoting much more complex protected areas 
featuring zones for sustainable development practices beyond exclusive 
conservation (such as wildlife refuges, wetlands and marine management 
areas, see table 3) as well as co-management practices in those places in 
which protected areas were directly adjacent to local communities and 
conflicts over resource management existed (Campbell, 2002).  
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Table	3.	Categories	of	protected	areas	according	to	Costa	Rican	environmental	
legislation	
Category	 Characteristics	 Property	regime	
Absolute	
biological	
reserves	
Protected	areas	created	by	law	or	
executive	decree.	Their	objective	is	to	
promote	strict	conservation	of	natural	
ecosystems	
Absolute	biological	
reserves	can	only	be	
created	in	public	
lands.	
National	and	
international	
parks	
Protected	areas	created	by	law.	Their	
objective	is	to	promote	strict	
conservation	of	natural	ecosystem.	
Recreational	and	tourism	uses	are	
admitted	
National	parks	can	
only	be	created	in	
public	lands.	
National	
wildlife	
refuges	
Protected	areas	created	by	law	or	
executive	decree.	Their	objective	is	to	
promote	conservation	or	sustainable	
management	of	ecosystem	or	specific	
species.	Recreational	uses,	tourism	and	
other	forms	of	sustainable	management	
are	permitted	
National	wildlife	
refuges	can	be	
created	either	in	
public	or	private	
lands	
Forestry	
reserves	
Protected	areas	created	by	law	or	
executive	decree.	Their	objective	is	to	
promote	sustainable	forestry	
management.	Resource	extraction	is	
permitted.	
Forestry	reserves	
are	established	on	
lands	under	state-
regulated	private	
property	
National	
monuments	
Protected	areas	created	by	law,	
executive	decree	or	municipal	regulation.	
Meant	to	protect	places	with	recognized	
cultural	or	natural	value.	Recreational	
uses	and	tourism	are	permitted.	
National	
monuments	are	
established	on	
public	lands.	
Wetlands,	
marine	
reserves	and	
marine	
management	
areas	
Protected	areas	created	by	law	or	
executive	decree.	Meant	to	protect	
marine	and	coastal	wildlife.	Their	
objective	is	to	guarantee	sustainable	use	
of	resources	in	territorial	waters	and	
coastlines.	
Wetlands	can	be	
created	in	private	
property.	Marine	
reserves	and	
management	areas	
are	established	in	
territorial	waters.	
Source:	Elaboration	of	the	author	with	data	obtained	from	the	Law	on	Biodiversity	
(7788)	and	their	regulating	bodies.		
While PILA was already a Heritage Site and subjected to some 
degree of interaction with the indigenous populations inhabiting its buffer 
zone, decisions were made to also make it a biosphere reserve in 1990. 
According to the Man and the Biosphere Program, a buffer zone is 
supposed to act as a mechanism that delineates a “core” conservation area 
from outside land (and societal pressures put upon this land), by 
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controlling a space that is adjacent to this “core”, thereby helping in its 
protection, that is, a buffer zone (Fall, 2003). Often the management of 
these buffer zones entails the organization of activities that produce a 
lower environmental impact, such as organic or shade-grown cultivation, 
sustainable ecotourism, and other market-oriented conservation 
instruments (Paasi, 1999).  
Table	4.	Protected	areas	in	the	Sixaola	River	Basin	
Country	 Protected	
area	
Management	
category	
Area	 Year	 Adjacent	
to	TBIR	
or	TCIR?	
Costa	
Rica	and	
Panama	
La	Amistad	
International	
Park	
International	
park	and	
UNESCO	World	
Heritage	Sitea/	
400.929	ha	
(193.929	ha	in	
Costa	Rica	
and	207.000	
ha	in	Panama)	
1978	 Yes	
Costa	
Rica	
Hitoy-Cerere	
Biologica	
Reserve	
Absolute	
biological	
reserve	
9.949	ha	 1978	 Yes	
Costa	
Rica	
Gandoca	
Manzanillo	
Wildlife	
Refuge	
Wildlife	refuge	
and	RAMSAR	
siteb/	
5.013	ha	
(terrestrial),	
4.436	ha	
(marine)	
1985	 No	
Panama	
San	San	
Pond	Sak	
Wetland	
RAMSAR	site	 16.414	ha	 1993	 No	
Panama	
Palo	Seco	
Protection	
Forest	
Forestry	
reservec/	 254.445	ha	 1983	 No	
a/	Designation	as	a	World	Heritage	Site	imples	the	obligation	of	the	parties	to	protect	
and	preserve	the	object.	UNESCO	monitors	on	the	condition	of	the	site	every	6	years	
as	well.		
b/	A	RAMSAR	 site	 is	 a	 category	 given	 to	wetlands	deemed	 to	be	of	 international	
importance,	 under	 the	 Ramsar	 Convention	 of	 1971.	 As	 a	 protection	 category,	
governments	 must	 ensure	 the	 conservation	 of	 these	 areas,	 though	 sustainable	
development	is	permitted.		
c/	Protection	forests	in	Panama	are	an	environmental	management	category	akin	to	
forestry	reserves	in	Costa	Rica.		
Source:	Elaboration	by	the	author	with	data	provided	by	SINAC	and	ANAM. 
In turn, this makes activities developed in the core and buffer zones 
to be extremely limited, particularly if they involve the extraction of 
protected nature for consumption. Through these means, biosphere 
reserves are meant to serve three objectives: 1) the conservation of 
ecosystems of high biodiversity, 2) the promotion of socio-economic 
human well-being in the buffer zones and 3) the development of new 
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opportunities for environmental education and research. In that sense, the 
obvious change that such denomination instills is a major change in 
direction of management practices from a traditional top-down fortress 
conservation approach (which may still remain prevalent in some cases) 
to a more community or participatory oriented one, particularly in the 
buffer zones.  
This is how the aforementioned imaginaries come into play. 
Different historical geographies have entailed different problematiques 
and have translated into different management approaches in both sides 
of PILA, leading to two different theses with regards to how to address 
these wider changes in conservation policy, especially the transition from 
PILA to RBLA. In ACLAP, local peasant farmers driven by economic 
pressures from lowland agro export plantations have been brought next 
to the boundaries of PILA, and, in some cases have even begun to 
encroach on the park itself. This dynamic lead park authorities of PILA to 
refer to the Southern Pacific boundary of the park as an active frontier. As 
such, while a participatory or sustainable development approach is not 
discarded in any way, the nature of existing pressures entails an approach 
based on fences-and-fines and top-down forest management policies, in 
order to control land uses nearby the Park (MINAET et al., 2012: 64).  
Whereas, in ACLAC, in the Caribbean side, the frontier is considered to 
be “passive”, that is, the notion that actual conservation action must not 
be centered on the specific natural resources present within the 
boundaries of PILA, but in the buffer zones that surround it, given the fact 
that PILA is remote and inaccessible, and that surrounding indigenous 
reserves have maintained such a well conserved forest cover over time 
(MINAET et al., 2012: 66). 
The idea of a passive frontier recognizes that while there may be 
ongoing socioeconomic and demographic processes that could threaten 
natural resources at PILA in the future, actual environmental degradation 
has been limited so far. It follows that conservation should not focus solely 
on the buffer zone using forceful conservation tools (e.g.: active vigilance 
of resource uses, use of law enforcement to control access or punitive 
strategies to address illegal resource uses). Alternatively, the passive 
frontier implies that it: “(…) is possible to strengthen a good synergic 
relationship between this wildlife protected area, the other protected areas and the 
indigenous territories. This may be a policy based on prevention, conservation 
and sustainable development.” (MINAET et al., 2012: 66). As the current 
Management Plan of PILA states, the passive frontier thesis implies a 
general involvement of park authorities into the actual development 
processes of its buffer zones as a means of protecting forests, which is why 
attention is drawn to the need of working in and around any other 
conservation and development initiatives that could allow for the 
“absolute conservation of water-producing forests in the Caribbean seaboard” 
(MINAET et al., 2012: 67). Indeed, amongst the proposals made within this 
management document, there are three which are relevant to highlight: 1) 
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philosophical principles of RBLA must be harmonized with those of 
conservation of PILA, that is, every other territorial formation governing 
land management must be put in coherence with the protection of its core 
area (i.e.: PILA); 2) attention should be given to the means for 
guaranteeing the sustainable development of the Bribri and the Cabécar, 
through processes of sustainable agricultural production, payments of 
environmental services and ecotourism, but also through engaging in 
mechanisms for shared responsibilities of conservation-oriented buffer 
zone management (i.e.: the transformation of indigenous reserves into 
areas for the conservation of nature); and 3) the strategic engagement of 
PILA with other territorial projects being developed in the region as a 
means of finding common grounds for cooperation. While these three 
measures have been developed for PILA’s specific management, in reality 
constitute the very center of almost all state- and NGO-led 
conservation/development interventions to the Talamanca Valley.  
As said before, this passive frontier thesis is completely coherent 
with popular discourse in favor of landscape conservation approaches. 
This means that efforts are being made to decentralize environmental 
governance through the delegation of conservation tasks to local actors, 
including NGOs and indigenous populations. Of course, this delegation 
functions through a dominant interpretation of the objectives of 
indigenous populations being completely coherent with environmental 
conservation. And therein lies the conflict. While the Costa Rican 
government apparently did not require evicting the Bribri and the 
Cabécar in order to create PILA, the creation of the park is considered to 
be a transgression of indigenous rights nevertheless. The manner and 
nature of these transgressions differ regarding which of the various 
conservation-as-development intervention we look at for this thesis, but it 
is relevant to begin by looking at how top-down mechanisms are 
employed in that way. 
5.4. Perceived effects of top-down conservation 
practices in the indigenous reserves 
5.4.1. Consultation, participation and co-management 
The “passive frontier” thesis has been conceived from a paradigmatic shift 
in the conservation agenda of PILA, mainly from a top-down policy 
approach based on fortress conservation and maintaining park integrity 
alone, to one in which ecological viability is dependent on connectivity of 
PILA with the other protected areas and indigenous reserves surrounding 
it (MINAET et al., 2012). While existing legislation (presented in the form 
of the aforementioned state of exception) allows SINAC to impose 
environmental policy to indigenous reserves, the Management Plan does 
recognize that Bribri and Cabécar cooperation with government policy is 
desirable – in recognition of the noticeable lack of financial resources and 
manpower to actually administer PILA. So, involvement of the 
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indigenous reserves is relevant for these purposes, which is why one of 
the main actions of the Plan entail the recognition of shared 
responsibilities between the main interested parties recognized by the 
document, namely SINAC, indigenous peoples and the local municipality 
(MINAET et al., 2012). This is supposed to be done in two different ways. 
First, by fostering sustainable development activities that could offer 
alternatives to unsustainable management of forests, land and other 
natural resources (more about this in chapter 6 and 7); and second, by 
directly including indigenous organizations – the ADIs in particular – into 
responsibilities with regards to natural resource management.  
In respect to this second form of “shared responsibilities”, it is 
relevant to say that over the past two decades, various forms of co-
management practices have appeared at PILA as a result of pressure from 
the Bribri and Cabécar regarding forest uses, featuring various degrees of 
success. For starters, since 1999, the previously mentioned Guidelines for 
Forest Resources at the Indigenous Reserves (DE-27800) do provide for 
the two local ADIs – ADITIBRI (for the Bribri Reserve) and ADITICA (for 
the Cabécar Reserve – to handle the distribution and allocation of permits 
for felling trees and commercializing lumber (Steiner, 2006). Of course, 
this particular transference of competences from SINAC to the ADIs was 
somewhat limited as: 1) SINAC did reserve the right to audit and control 
the activities of the local ADIs regarding the distribution of these permits, 
and 2) there were considerable limitations to the ADIs regarding where 
could these permits be granted. For example, article 5 of the Guidelines 
state that such permits will not be permitted in: patrimonial sites, areas of 
hydrological resupply, water springs for communal uses, areas where soil 
management is in effect, endangered species of trees, non-traditional 
forest products and areas destined for ecotourism. Indeed, by elimination 
the Guidelines seem to almost limit tree felling to species located within 
agroforestry systems, which seems to make the policy somewhat biased 
towards for-profit agricultural systems at the expense of other indigenous 
forms of production (see chapter 6 for more on this).  
With this said, originally, the handling of forestry permits was 
given the local “Consejo de Vecinos” (or Neighborhood Council, i.e.: a 
decentralized power structure of the ADIs designed to elevate political 
demands of people from the local townships and hamlets to the ADIs), 
thereby allowing for a true form of political participation and 
decentralization of decision-making processes regarding resource 
management. Yet, this practice was short-lived and eventually eliminated 
in 2005, as the ADIs transferred permit management to Environmental 
Units within their main administrative structure, as pro-conservation 
political leaders at ADITIBRI and ADITICA and SINAC considered that 
there were ongoing “conflicts of interests” regarding forestry permit 
allocations at the local level (Candela, 2007). Different than the Consejos, 
the Environmental Units are managed by highly qualified indigenous 
ADI officials with knowledge on agroforestry and supported by experts 
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from SINAC (including the PILA administrator) and other organizations 
(at the time of my fieldwork, a member of the German Embassy was 
working alongside them in a project to improve permit management 
practices). While this could be seen positively as control over forest 
management, this change also means that SINAC has much more 
influence over the allocation of permits. In contrast, local indigenous 
demands for a more prominent role as environmental authorities in the 
Reserves are limited.  
Indeed, this dispute over the nature of the conservation agenda and 
the need to integrate local demands for development and territorial self-
determination is reflected in almost every form of co-management 
structure developed for PILA and the Reserves-as-buffer-zones. An 
example of this is the Local Forestry Council of Talamanca (CLFT). The 
CLFT is a consultation body created by the Ministry of Environment and 
Energy (MINAE) in order to promote the exchange of points of view over 
environmental legislation between local actors and SINAC, particularly 
regarding forestry. In the case of the CLFT it integrates various actors 
including MINAE, the Ministry of Health, the “Fuerza Pública” (Public 
Force, i.e.:  the state police and law enforcement agency), some local 
organizations and the ADIs. The curious part of my involvement in the 
meetings of this organization was the noticeable difference between 
representatives regarding the overall goals of intervention. For MINAE, 
and some of the other organizations the objective of CLFT was to establish 
a system of control and vigilance over forest resources extraction and 
trading within the Indigenous Reserves, almost as a first response 
coordinated system to avoid illegal deforestation. Yet, for the local 
indigenous leaders, while controlling deforestation was important, the 
objective of the CLFT was to offer the necessary resources, knowledge and 
political legitimacy for the ADIs to become the sole authorities over 
natural resource management within the Reserves.  
Indeed, when asked about their impressions regarding park 
management, indigenous members of the CLFT often expressed feelings 
of government neglect regarding conservation efforts in the park and its 
surrounding areas. They claim that there is no nearby offices, personnel 
or resources dedicated to conserve the park, and that is the Bribri 
themselves whom need to be administering the rules and regulations 
given from the MINAE. Furthermore, many questioned the rules used to 
protect natural resources as they are implemented upon indigenous 
people, rejecting any type of indigenous knowledge and with little to no 
participation of indigenous peoples in natural resource conservation 
practices. As one interviewee stated: 
“The Bribri and Cabécar, we are the ones really managing the park, 
MINAE comes only to do politics and there is no personnel in this 
sector. ADITIBRI and ADITICA do the managing for them. The 
problem is that they do not consult with us when they want to do 
something. When they go and make proposals on how to remedy the 
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problems of the park, they assume what we want, and present 
something back often lacking our point of view” (Neighborhood 
Council Member, interview, 7th November 2014) 
Over the course of several interviews, trust became a major topic of 
discussion as communities and community organizations were often 
fairly critical of conservation mechanisms. In the community of Suretka, 
one participant from ADITIBRI stated that: “If there are conflicts in the park 
is not because of us, but of MINAE. They are the ones that should administer the 
park, but they do not care that much. So, we are the ones that end up managing 
La Amistad International Park, but, the difference is that there is no pay for us. 
Is like we are volunteers. Our quarrel with them (MINAE and SINAC) is that 
even when we do this, they go and give permission to people to take minerals from 
the park, and from our lands.” (former ADITIBRI Vice-President, interview, 
August 12th 2014). Indeed, while the park does rely on indigenous park 
rangers which are paid by ADITIBRI, there is little presence of MINAE in 
the area and participatory mechanisms in decision-making structures of 
the park have not been operative, at least until the development of a new 
management plan for PILA in 2012.  
The new management plan attempted to address some of these 
issues by finally establishing a semi-permanent office for the park 
administrator within the indigenous territory, but said office is often 
closed due to the manager travelling elsewhere continuously. Moreover, 
co-management practices continue to be extremely limited besides the 
park rangers program, which is administered following precise rules 
provided by MINAE and with little intervention or negotiation from the 
local governance mechanisms. Local and traditional knowledge is not 
considered in any way by the state institutions and traditional practices 
often clash with local enforcement activities. During a workshop 
developed with local leaders regarding perceptions about conservation 
approaches towards indigenous peoples, an official from ADITIBRI 
stated: “There is no office, there are no competent people (…). Their 
responsibilities of caring for the park are not being fulfilled. At least, the Bribri do 
know about the importance of medicinal plants and the rest of the resources that 
you can find in the forest.” (former ADITIBRI official responsible for Forests 
and Territorial Management, interview, August 13th 2014). 
Many Bribri are waiting and ready for the co-management plan 
between MINAE and ADITIBRI to be implemented. “Communities are 
affected because they cannot use the materials they once used. Since MINAE 
created the park, it has been very complicated to live here. There have always been 
people there. They want to strike a deal with MINAE in order to let them use the 
resources there. But, then again, they were supposed to do that when they 
discussed the management plan in 2012” (ADITIBRI Park Ranger, interview, 
August 15th 2014). However, it is important to say that there are 
noticeable divergences seen between environmental authorities and 
indigenous leaders regarding not only the authority to determine whom 
should be the one controlling natural resource uses, but also with regards 
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to which are the priorities of control. Indeed, while illegal deforestation is 
considered as a problem for most indigenous leaders, there are 
divergences regarding actual control when traditional uses of the forests 
are involved. In the next sub-section I will discuss on the material effects 
of these policies on the field. 
5.4.2. Local livelihoods and traditional uses 
Historically, some of the aforementioned legal vacuums composing what 
has been dubbed here as the “zone of indistinction”, had been taken 
advantage of by the Costa Rican state in order to mobilize its own 
conservation agenda, often at the expense of indigenous territorialities. In 
the specific case of top-down conservation measures (i.e.: direct 
enforcement of forest, flora and wildlife use limitations), this has been 
done through the introduction of particular forms of administrative rules 
to monitor and determine desirable uses by indigenous people.  
As said earlier in the chapter, since 1995, the Costa Rican state has 
developed a set of Guidelines for Forest Uses in Indigenous Reserves, 
which established a stringent limit to tree felling limiting this practices to 
three trees per hectare per person with no more than 9 trees in total per 
person per year. Moreover, if trees are felled, whichever benefit received, 
whether profitable or not, can only include indigenous peoples and not 
non-indigenous people from outside of the Indigenous Reserves. It is 
relevant to say that the establishment and enactment of these measures 
for forest use control were created without any indigenous mediation 
and/or participation, leading it to quickly become a source of serious 
political conflict in the territory (PGR, 2016).  
Fieldwork on the effects of these top-down measures of forest and 
wildlife conservation was done around the towns of Amubre and 
Kachabri, two towns located near the area in which the Indigenous 
Reserves overlap with PILA, which is locally known as Namawoki. These 
meetings were organized with collaboration of a local organization named 
Talamanca for the Land and the People, whose members are mainly from 
Meleruk, but that have plenty of continuous contact with the people of 
these parts. Most of the information was gathered from individual and 
group interviews and was centered on understanding how does PILA 
regulations influence local livelihoods, particularly regarding those 
economic and cultural activities which require access to the forests. This 
research included the local Consejo de Vecinos and also the then 
Administrator of PILA for the Caribbean sector. Direct work was done 
with 12 community members, with whom I spent some time in order to 
understand their daily lives and everyday activities, particularly with 
regards to forest uses.  
Recurrent negative discussion of these top-down PILA regulations 
was notable during fieldwork and interview evidence was obtained that 
suggests that forestry and hunting bans are having a direct negative effect 
upon natural resource uses in both towns. This is despite the fact that the 
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current PILA Management Plan, the aforementioned forest guidelines and 
the internal environmental guidelines of ADITIBRI claim to recognize 
Bribri cultural access and uses of natural resources in protected forests. 
Indeed, the Management Plan clearly states that indigenous forest 
traditional uses are permitted, while outlining the necessity of park 
authorities of engaging the locals from a perspective based on human 
rights set out by Convention 169 (see SINAC-MINAE, 2012). Of course, 
there are certain exceptions made clear in the Plan, such as the fact that 
the actual area for traditional management is quite small, as most of PILA 
is considered to be for conservation purposes only. But perhaps the most 
relevant of these restrictions is the fact that shifting agriculture is expressly 
prohibited in the forests of the Reserves, be these located within the 
overlapping sections between PILA and the Reserves, at the buffer zone 
or even communal forests under control of ADITIBRI. Only forests located 
in the farms occupied by Bribri or Cabécar families may be subject to some 
form of agriculture, but under express vigilance by SINAC officials. With 
this said, there are no express rules governing harvesting flora from the 
forests for indigenous use. Hunting regulations are also found in the Plan, 
and are permitted, but solely in key specific areas and under very explicit 
qualifications, namely, that hunting may be done for subsistence purposes 
only, using antiquated hunting methods (e.g.: bows and arrows and no 
guns) and be done in the day without the use of dogs (SINAC-MINAET, 
2012). With this said, areas that allow hunting at PILA or at the buffer zone 
are so small that the activity is effectively banned, which is why the local 
radio station tends to reiterate this issue.  
All of these restrictions have been negatively received and have had 
critical impacts upon local livelihoods, particularly in what concerns the 
ongoing bans on shifting agriculture and hunting within the overlapping 
areas of the park and the indigenous reserves. For starters, there is a 
negative effect upon means of subsistence, as indigenous farmers tend to 
use saved seeds from products grown in their farms as genetic material in 
order to grow their own food. Seeds shared amongst the indigenous 
people in Kachabri are considered to be important by the interviewees as 
they guarantee some degree of crop diversity that allows them to 
overcome diseases, something relevant considering that disposable 
income for buying pesticides is extremely limited. Indeed, traditional 
agricultural practices of the Bribri and the Cabécar do entail cultivating 
some areas while others are left resting for various years before being used 
once more, thereby allowing constant processes of reforestation. As one 
interviewee stated:  
“We accept conservation as our way of life. But how can I support it if 
the law endangers the very things that we do that makes us 
indigenous? They (SINAC and ADITIBRI) say that I cannot use forests 
to grow rice, when we have used those lands for so much time for our 
forms of cultivation. We know how to conserve land. Time after time 
we have leave it to rest to look for another, and when we come back, it 
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has plants and trees once more. Aren’t we conserving by doing what 
we do?” (local farmer from Amubre, interview, October 25th, 2014).  
The Bribri have also taken issue with the nature of hunting 
regulations established at LAIP and its buffer zone. Most interviewees 
found that hunting restrictions have had an adverse effect upon access to 
food in two different ways: one is by becoming an obstacle for obtaining 
wild meats. Indeed, as an interview stated: “(b)ecause of what MINAE and 
ADITBRI says no one here wants to sell meat even though, I’m sure that 
everybody eats it. It is like if they (MINAE and ADITIBRI) just wanted us to eat 
farm animals, instead of what we have been eating traditionally for so much years. 
And it is very unhealthy too, those chickens come from the towns where they use 
hormones and who knows what else.” (local farmer of Kachabri, interview, 
October 26th, 2014). Another form of problems has to do with reducing 
local access to wild flora, often obtained by the locals as part of their 
hunting trips. This wild plant life is relevant for producing their own 
medication or as additional foodstuffs of great importance for their 
subsistence. Surely, these practices are not explicitly prohibited by PILA’s 
Management Plan, yet, given their intrinsic relation to hunting, it is 
relevant to point them out.  
Curiously enough, some of the claims gathered around ongoing 
disputes over hunting and shifting agriculture with regards to fortress 
conservation mechanisms imposed in the Bribri and Cabécar territories, 
tend to reflect upon processes of forceful integration of indigenous lives 
into “sikwa” (outsider) culture. Loss of available wild meat sources 
obtained through hunting by ongoing PA-related restrictions, implies a 
higher dependence on meat coming from outside the Indigenous 
Reserves. This in turn, leads to the privileging of centralized township 
structures around the “pulperías” (local stores), as well as other public 
services (e.g.: education, healthcare, etc.), as well as the prevalence of a 
money economy to buy the meat (or medication and other foodstuffs 
obtained in the forests). Dependence on public services becomes also more 
prevalent as lack of hunting sources also means that forests become less 
used for medicine, thereby fostering a more stringent need of public 
health services (see Ibarra et al., 2011; Sylvester et al., 2014). This is very 
interesting considering the prevalent discourse of a few SINAC 
conservation officials in the Indigenous Reserves who blame misguided 
government policies that inadvertently fostered lifestyles and social 
practices at the expense of what they consider conservation-friendly 
traditional culture and uses of land and resources. As the recently 
appointed La Amistad Heritage Site Promotor argues:  
“If you see all of our policies in healthcare and education, they all 
indicate that there must be a school or a healthcare center, obliging 
everybody to settle around this centralized location. That kind of policy 
approaches are the ones provoking problems in the indigenous 
territories. We’re forcing them to do something that they have not been 
accustomed of doing. We as the Costa Rican society, have forced them 
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to settle, to be sedentary, instead of engaging with shifting agriculture, 
that they copied our model of living. And in that contact they have 
learned our good ways, but also our bad ones” (LAHS Promotor and 
current PILA administrator, interview, August 21st 2016). 
As a counterpoint to all of these undeniable negative impacts of PA 
regulations at PILA, it must be said that authorities – both from SINAC 
and from the ADIs – believe that some of these measures are extremely 
important in order to quell forms of illegal extraction of precious woods 
and wildlife from PILA and the indigenous reserves (La Amistad Heritage 
Site Promotor, personal interview, August 21st, 2016). Indeed, there have 
been cases of illegal felling of trees for the purpose of supplying nearby 
local markets (Candela Restrepo, 2007). Though there is no study yet on 
the nature and features of wood-related commodity chains, these markets 
themselves seem to have been growing steadily, and local sources suggest 
that it is probably due to both the expansion of ecotourism in the 
Caribbean coastlines and supply limitations resulting from Costa Rican 
stringent measures put on its forestry sector (Steiner, 2006). But with this 
said, it is also relevant to say that while most interviewees consider that 
controlling illegal wood trading is necessary, those activities are 
completely different from their traditional agricultural or hunting 
interactions, not to mention their uses of lumber for their subsistence 
priorities.  
These numerous adverse impacts regarding the implementation of 
land, forest and wildlife use restrictions due to the establishment of PILA 
have resulted in problems regarding food gathering influence cultural 
identity and quality of life. Indeed, these restrictions are by all intents and 
purposes, one of the most contested forms of government policy in the 
territories. It is no wonder that some of the Bribri and Cabécar inhabitants 
tend to resist this sort of policy implementation, even by taking advantage 
of the noticeable lack of financial resources and personnel of park rangers 
in charge of administering PILA. This has also manifested itself in the 
form of pressures from the indigenous communities and of NGOs 
towards the implementation of other more socially-inclusive mechanisms 
for dealing with conservation. 
5.5. Conclusions 
Often times, state authorities portray the passive frontier thesis as an 
approach centered on promoting synergies between conservation and the 
local Bribri and Cabécar organization. This has been welcomed by the 
Talamancans, whom consider that spaces for political participation are 
necessary for conservation to be adjusted within their own practices. 
Indeed, many of them are pleased that there are attempts towards 
guaranteeing “buy in” by the local indigenous people regarding activities 
of fostering environmental conservation of the buffer zone of RBLA, either 
through co-management of natural resources. Yet, it is clear that, in 
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practice, these new political opportunities are not fulfilling the 
expectations of the Bribri and Cabécar.  
This chapter has shown the presence of conservation bias in 
discussing local development trajectories, as well as, the use of co-
management practices as a means to legitimize SINAC decisions 
regarding forest uses. By actively defining the agenda of collaborative 
bodies of political participation such as the CLFT, defining ADIs 
centralized structures to handle forestry permits, defining stringent limits 
to forest uses by indigenous peoples, limiting disposition to democratize 
the distribution of said permits and deliberately avoiding a political 
discussion on the understanding of what traditional uses my mean, the 
Costa Rican state has offered an extremely loose interpretation on the 
national obligation to address the environmental rights of indigenous 
peoples of Talamanca. In effect, the passive frontier thesis transforms the 
TBIR and TCIR into buffer zones of the park, and also excludes them as 
proactive political agents in park management and decision-making 
processes for defining the best allocation of economic benefits and 
development goals of conservation.  
In some way, these co-management processes seem to develop as a 
continuation of the various territorial projects described earlier, as final 
decision-making is not left to indigenous peoples, but to park authorities. 
The synergies proposed by the passive frontier thesis are almost designed 
to work within existing structures of power within SINAC administration 
and thus consultation is rendered “technical” (Li, 2007), local managers 
gather their input through initiatives like CLFT or the discussion 
processes that surround the Guidelines, in order to meet the objectives of 
consultation requirements, but besides that, all existing decision-making 
authority is presupposed. Indeed, this is the view most indigenous leaders 
interviewed for this chapter tend to offer regarding co-management 
practices and participatory approaches of SINAC with regards to PILA 
governance and natural resource management. Ultimately, the current 
governance approach to PILA tends to facilitate conservation projects that 
seem to benefit the state, with little perceived benefit for the indigenous 
populations, particularly the ones that are dependent of natural resources 
being subjected to control. 
 
 
Notes 
1 The concept of zone of indistinction used here comes from Agamben’s (2005) 
work. Normal understandings of the state of exception tend to refer to 
situations in which the rule of law is suspended by the authorities in order to 
address some imminent risk to the integrity of the state (see Schmitt, 2005). 
However, the concept is interpreted by Agamben as a legal abandonment of 
the individual. In other words, through the state of exception, the individual, 
though subject to the purview of state power, is rendered as ambiguous and 
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incommensurable by the legal system as “a zone of indistinction is opened 
between law and nature, inside and outside, violence and law” (Agamben, 2005: 64), 
thereby allowing the state to rule over the individual by political fiat. 
Moreover, Agamben suggests that these political practices of withdrawal of 
legal protection and entitlement, often considered to be exercised in the direst 
of political situations, are gradually becoming a central working paradigm of 
government practices and intensification of state power more generally. 
Indeed, he relates his concept to Foucault’s (2009) work on biopolitics, in the 
sense that the state of exception becomes a means of reproducing the control 
of the state over population, with the intent of either rendering them 
productive for society, or removing them from it by considering them unruly.  
2 The Alliance for Progress Program was a major economic development 
initiative fostered by the United States in Latin America during the 1960s. The 
state objectives of the program were related to increasing local agricultural 
and industrial output, fostering the formation of democratic governments, 
reducing illiteracy, social inequality and poverty, promoting rural land 
reform and guaranteeing price stability through anti-inflationary policy in the 
region (Gruggel, 1995). Overall, the Program spent over 22 billion US dollars 
in aid in the Latin American countries between 1961 and 1967. Yet, scholars 
suggest that while development was the narrative espoused to justify the 
program, in reality it was meant to solidify anti-communist governments in 
the region as part of a wider strategy of containment developed in the context 
of the Cold War (Smith, 1999). In any case, by the 1970s, the program was 
considered a complete failure as it did not promote stable reforms to 
guarantee higher productivity, land redistribution was minimal, there were 
few social, educational or health benefits for poor populations, economic 
growth was never consistent during the period (except in Mexico and Brazil) 
and a majority of Latin American governments actually shifted to military 
dictatorships or other forms of non-democratic governance during the 
implementation of the project (SmIth, 1991).  
3 During the 1990s and early 2000s, the local ADIs loosely operated as part of 
a wider network of conservation and local organizations in opposition of oil 
exploration projects off the coast of the Southern Caribbean region of Costa 
Rica. The bulk of these efforts were fought against the Costa Rican state and 
two energy transnational corporations: Harken Energy Corporation (the 
precursor to George W. Bush’s Arbusto Corporation) and Mallon Oil. The 
most intense period of the struggle happened in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
after the Costa Rican government gave authorization to these companies to 
explore for oil resources in national waters nearby the coastline. Local 
resistance took place in the form of public protests, the use of legal claims 
against jurisdictional authorities and lobbying with state agencies. The oil 
exploration project was eventually abandoned by the government in 2004.  
4 Information about the early years of implementation of PILA at the 
Talamanca Valley is insufficient. While efforts were made to track down the 
National Park Service officials associated to park management activities forty 
years ago, many of them have either retired and have lost touch with current 
PILA authorities, continue to work but in other lines of work, or have died. 
Moreover, except from the previous PILA administrator – who was 
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reassigned from the central offices of the Park Service to PILA during the 
1990s – the people with firsthand knowledge of the park’s early history were 
often involved with policy-making at the Biolley and Altamira stations 
located in the Pacific side of PILA. This means that they had limited 
experience with the indigenous communities of the Talamanca Valley.  
I can gather from the PILA administrator at the Caribbean side that the 
approach towards indigenous communities early on was somewhat 
neglectful as neither investments were undertaken by the state for developing 
infrastructure nor a permanent government presence was established in the 
area. The former administrator did claim that the decision to create PILA was 
not mediated by consultation with the Bribri and the Cabécar, nor there was 
any effort to harmonize environmental enforcement of the park with 
indigenous demands during his early years of experience in the area (former 
PILA administrator, interview, May 2nd, 2014) This implies the top-down 
approach, but which was not followed through with additional resources 
given the remoteness of the protected area. With that said, further information 
about park management is scarce as the former administrator entered PILA 
at a moment in which state authorities were considering implementing new 
management schemes with which to share some degree of responsibility of 
PILA with local organizations, under some pressure by international NGOs 
and local organizations (Borge, 2004).  
With that said, in the Biolley and Altamira stations, the early implementation 
of the park was much more politically intense. Schelhas and Pfeffer (2008) 
estimate that PILA entailed evictions for over 3.000 hectares of small holdings 
which were located within the park boundaries, with inadequate forms of 
compensation being used to meet that goal. Moreover, enforcement of 
environmental laws outside of the park area were often met with conflicts as 
views over resource uses often contrasted between park rangers and local 
farmers (Candanedo Díaz, 2010). Indeed, at one point it seems that tensions 
rose to the level that farmers were jailed for engaging in forest clearing within 
the park’s boundaries (former Altamira Park Ranger, interview, July 7th, 
2014), leading to violent reactions from the community whom threatened to 
burn down the Altamira offices in return for the strict nature of environmental 
enforcement in the area (Schelhas and Pfeffer, 2008). 
5 This situation has been recently recognized by UNESCO following a 
complaint by an indigenous Naso association in Panama regarding a 
reduction of some species of fish in the lower river basin of the Sixaola. The 
World Heritage Committee of UNESCO organized a mission in coordination 
with the governments of both countries to assess the state of the park. The 
mission demonstrated that there were significant problems of coordination 
between both states, and that it was necessary to allocated more personnel for 
the protection of the park. The mission also highlighted the need of a better 
bio-monitoring process in order to keep track of the state of wildlife. So far, 
the response has been limited (MIDEPLAN, 2011). A new site administrator 
has been named, but the year following the visit, MINAE and ANAM 
developed the new management plans of PILA without coordinating efforts.  
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6 Neoliberal multiculturalism and 
agrarian territorialities in Talamanca 
 
 
“(…) let’s see what happens when the day has come to harvest this 
cacao. If we manage to get it out (to the market) it would be a good 
thing; yet we do not know who is going to buy it from us… that is to be 
seen.” (Bribri farmer discussing the BID-MAG1 Cacao Project, 2014). 
The previous chapter was meant to describe the origins, implementation, 
territorial implications and local resistances to fortress conservation 
practices developed in the Reserves after the formation of PILA. To that 
effect, I concluded that while there has been some degree of coherence 
between state rationalities regarding the maintenance of forest cover and 
indigenous demands for political autonomy, the territoriality of 
conservation priorities also impinged over the reproduction of traditional 
forms of biodiversity uses and cultural conceptualizations, leading to 
resistance and internal conflict in the Reserves. In this chapter, I shift the 
gaze from co-management of natural resources towards sustainable uses 
of resources, by focusing on the implementation of the Cacao Project of 
the Sixaola Binational Watershed Project (BID-MAG). Of course, this is not 
a complete separation with the themes of the previous chapter, as the 
passive frontier thesis discussed there entails a conservation approach 
based on essentializing and “improving” indigenous productive 
practices, including their forms of traditional agriculture as a means of 
guaranteeing their “buy in” of conservation efforts in the RBLA.  
Originally conceived as part of a much larger and internationally-
coordinated integrated watershed resource management project (IWRM) 
to be implemented jointly by Costa Rica and Panama (Alvarez, 2014), the 
BID-MAG was significantly changed during its planning stage, leading to 
the formation of two completely different national initiatives that shared 
the same name, but functioned under radically dissimilar logics.2 This 
chapter concentrates fully on the Costa Rican part of the Program. 
Colloquially dubbed by the locals as the BID-MAG Program the Costa 
Rican project was executed between 2009 and 2016 as an “on-demand” 
integrated conservation development project (ICDP), in order to “improve 
the conditions of living of the populations in the Sixaola River Basin (…) through 
social, economic, environmental and local management interventions that may 
contribute to the implementation of a sustainable development model” (Nessim 
et al., 2004: 1). ICDPs are a result of changes in conservation ideology since 
the 1980s. Indeed, the concept is a moniker used to characterize a project 
that counters the historically-dominant top-down fortress conservation 
thinking, for one hinged on recognizing the productive links between 
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conservation and development, especially in buffer zones, where 
biodiversity-rich landscapes overlap with poor rural people (Adams, 
2004). The overriding logic of ICDPs is fostering alternative livelihoods to 
improve quality of life, development and increase local income, thereby 
reducing social needs towards removing or destroying natural resources 
(Adams and Hutton, 2007) Discursively, ICDPs are often presented as 
win-win solutions, due to its imagined potential for conserving 
biodiversity whilst improving local livelihoods (see Büscher, 2010).  
However, translating the discursive wonderings of ICDPs into 
factual realities has been very challenging. Numerous critics on similar 
projects elsewhere have pointed out difficulties when dealing with 
existing inequalities, not to mention tendencies in ICDPs to distribute 
benefits in an unequal fashion (Igoe and Croucher, 2007). Others have 
argued about problems when trying to foster political participation of the 
locals, leading to criticisms of the ongoing simplification of concepts like 
community and empowerment for the benefit of markets (Büscher et al., 
2012). Some have argued that there are inherent conflicts between poverty 
reduction and environmental conservation, and that these are often 
channeled through dissent on project priorities between local populations 
and conservationist state agencies and NGOs (West and Brockington, 
2006). Indeed, the very quote presented at the beginning of this chapter 
constitutes a form of evidence of the failure of BID-MAG to account for 
one of the most obvious development and income-related concerns (i.e.: 
commercialization) regarding the fostering of forest cover-friendly cacao 
as the sustainable livelihood alternative of Bribri and Cabécar peoples in 
Talamanca. As I will show in the following pages, much of these other 
problems inherent to ICDPs are more than prevalent in the case of the 
implementation of BID-MAG in the two Indigenous Reserves studied 
here.  
With that said, this chapter is not centered exclusively in exploring 
the project trajectory of cacao components of BID-MAG, its 
implementation failures and local politics of resistance and appropriation. 
The main objective of this chapter is to address the structural reasons 
behind the failure of this ICDP in order to showcase the failed articulation 
between the commodification of indigenous cacao production with the 
cultural valuation of cacao through an exploration of the socioecological 
complexities of locally produced natures. I do so by examining the relation 
between discourse, territoriality and materiality in the production of the 
organic cacao commodity, specifically regarding the farm-level enactment 
of land use obligations in the context of international cacao certification. 
This chapter begins by framing BID-MAG within one of the most 
important discursive formations supporting the passive frontier thesis, 
that is, the idea that buy in for conservation in Talamanca could happen 
by reorganizing indigenous cultural practices in a manner that is coherent 
with Westernized forms of agriculture. Indeed, from the perspective of 
conservationist and agricultural state agencies and NGOs sustainable 
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agroforestry (SAF), particularly regarding the production of cacao has 
been viewed as the historical solution to the environmental conundrum 
that characterizes de Bribri and the Cabécar. The solution to the problem 
of growing population and capitalist integration is to offer a more 
intensive commodification of cacao as the solution, thereby resolving the 
issue through the maximization of local economic efficiency.  
With that said, this chapter will explain how the restructuring of 
indigenous agroforestry as a means for capital accumulation and 
conservation buy in is flawed precisely because it fails to capture the 
economic, social and cultural features of the Bribri and Cabécar 
production. This is done by exploring how BID-MAG attempted to 
address the problem of financial support for investments in cacao plants 
and technology, themselves problems generated by the very territorial 
status of indigenous reserves in Costa Rica, as its main objective. At this 
point, I will expand on the ongoing conflicts between project managers 
and local populations for resources, political participation and benefit 
distribution. Afterwards, the attention is shifted to the reality of cacao 
within the reality of Talamancan agriculture, mainly the existence of a 
dual productive system. This will allow me to frame these micropolitical 
struggles within the difficulties and lack of feasible adoption of full-
fledged cacao-based economies, in a context determined by existing 
livelihood strategies and lack of access to markets. 
6.1. The ‘problem with Talamancan agriculture’ and 
the cacao solution 
Historically, for the Talamancan indigenous peoples, cacao has been a key 
agricultural product, with important functions not only as a source of food 
or as a commodity for economic exchange, but also as a central feature of 
their cultural and religious traditions (Bozzoli de Willie, 1979). With that 
said, cacao has also gained notoriety within the various ongoing efforts 
for the conservation of biodiversity and forests at RBLA, not necessarily 
for the produce itself, but the manner in which it is cultivated. Indeed, the 
Bribri and the Cabécar tend to grow cacao within complex and varied 
systems of SAF, which some authors often refer to as “policultivation” (see 
Somarriba, 2004; Borge, 2011; Orcherton, 2003). Generally, these SAF 
entail the presence of considerable forest cover at a superior canopy that 
covers cacao trees at lower levels, though it must be said that there is more 
than just one form of SAF management practices for the Talamancans 
(Orcherton, 2003).  
Indeed, one may not use the concept of policultivation lightly, given 
the considerable variation between SAFs. A clearer account of differences 
will be done later on in this chapter, but for now, suffice to say that these 
SAF present considerable diversity of tree species at the canopy level 
(Dahlquist et al., 2007) and there are substantial differences regarding the 
density in which cacao plants are cultivated at the lower level of 
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vegetation (Deheuvels et al., 2012). The motivation behind these decisions 
has to do with a large variety of factors including but not limited to the 
quality of the soils, features of the terrain, historical economic necessities, 
cultural beliefs, food security concerns, etc. Some authors have argued 
that the presence of flat surfaces and acceptable drainage in the Talamanca 
Valley lowlands makes them more productive for banana (see Borge and 
Castillo, 1997), whereas others argue that customs and beliefs are also 
relevant in justifying these decisions (see Orcherton, 2003). While the 
reasons behind these differences in cultivation are not unimportant for 
agencies and organizations promoting conservation, the most relevant of 
these certainly have to do with the levels of biodiversity present in the 
various forms in which SAFs manifest themselves in the Talamancan 
landscape (see Harvey et al., 2006; Parrish et al., 1999). Indeed, compared 
to banana agroforestry systems, cacao tends to receive less cover from 
commercial types of trees (though, must not be implied that these species 
of trees are not present in cacao SAFs) (Hinojosa, 2002). 
 It must also be added that, despite overwhelming perception 
amongst the Bribri and Cabécar interviewed for this work that cacao has 
a cultural importance due to its uses in various traditions, it is also a crop 
produced to make a profit by some. Indeed, for them the production of 
cacao is guided by a diverse set of criteria including custom, religious 
beliefs and profitability. Some of the interviewees often combined these 
perspectives when discussing the importance of cacao for them, often 
lamenting that one of these aspects took prevalence over the others due to 
the nature of economics in the Reserves. Indeed, the current president of 
the Association of Indigenous Bribri Women of Talamanca (ACOMUITA), 
which is also one of the most successful local producers of cacao in the 
Reserves lamented that: “for us, the Bribri, cacao is extremely important. It is 
our natural beverage and its part of our stories and beliefs. Sadly, these stories 
once told by our elders are not being told that often anymore” (President of 
ACOMUITA, interview, June 11th 2014). On a similar note, Melis Paez, 
the awá3 from the township of Meleruk, and whom was expected to see 
cacao from a completely different perspective than ACOMUITA, argued 
in similar terms: “cacao has changed its way of being (…) it’s more commercial 
now than cultural” (interview, March 18th 2014).  
As I have shown earlier, agrarian development interventions in the 
geographical space occupied by the Talamancan Indigenous Reserves are 
not new in any way. Early in the 20th Century, UFCO took over most of 
the lowlands of the Talamanca Valley and then proceeded to transform its 
landscape radically since 1909 until the 1930s. Plantation production was 
eventually disrupted by the appearance of sigatoka infections,4 leading to 
the loss of considerable parts of the Company’s banana harvests and the 
eventual reduction of UFCO operations by the early 1940s, ending with a 
few and much smaller cacao plantations (Villalobos and Borge, 1998). 
Land was retaken by the indigenous peoples over the following two 
decades, whom lacked any sort of state or NGO technical, financial or 
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productive support, except for a short-lived government-led agricultural 
project in the early 1970s. More often, government projects in the area 
tended to be scarce as the state actively neglected attending these 
populations (Guevara Berger and Chacón Castro, 1992). The Bribri and the 
Cabécar did manage to expand cacao cultivation considerably on their 
own during the process of indigenous retaking of the Talamanca Valley, 
despite the absence of technical assistance, credit programs and 
preexisting commercialization networks (Borge, 2011). Indeed, Talamanca 
county (where both mestizo and indigenous produces live) had achieved 
record levels of cacao production in the late 1970s (Enriquez and Suárez, 
1978), with this production being sold to national processing plants in San 
José, the latter benefiting from import substitution industrialization 
policies sponsored by the Costa Rican state since the early 1950s.  
However, everything changed in 1979 with a major outbreak of 
moniliasis, a fungal disease that rendered inedible most of the cacao 
production of the county, including those located in the Reserves. 
Damages to production were quick and sizeable. While state inspections 
showed that 900 hectares of cacao plantations in the Caribbean seaboard 
had been affected at the end of 1979, by the next year the disease had 
spread to over 7.000. By 1983, Costa Rican cacao production had 
diminished in more than 72% from its 1978 levels, while exports reduced 
in 96% (Phillips, 2003). To this day, cacao production in Costa Rica has not 
recovered to levels seen before the outbreak, and it is feasible that this will 
not happen soon, given early estimation of agricultural damages made 
following the devastation produced by Hurricane Otto in 2016.  
In the Reserves proper, much like in other parts of the country, 
production of cacao grinded to a halt rapidly, leading many indigenous 
farmers to eliminate their cacao trees (Posas, 2001). In turn, the county has 
shifted to the cultivation of plantain following a monoculture pattern. 
Driven initially by national demand (as plantain is part of the Costa Rican 
diet), production began to rise and then intensified transnational 
companies (mainly Del Monte and the Standard Fruit Company) settled 
in the Sixaola Valley which began purchasing for export to the United 
States (Somarriba, 1993). While the cultivated area of plantain production 
in the Talamanca county was estimated at 900 hectares in 1985 
(Rosenboom et al., 1990), by 2001 it had expanded to 3.000 hectares 
producing for the national market, with another 1.600 for export purposes 
(MT, 2003). In other words, the past thirty years have witnessed a major 
change in the regional landscape of Talamanca – and by extension, of the 
Indigenous Reserves – as it has shifted from being devoted to cacao 
production, to becoming the biggest plantain producer region in the 
country. This critical socioeconomic change has been the context of new 
agrarian development interventions in the region – most of them focused 
in the reinsertion of cacao-based SAFs. 
The most prevalent of these interventions entails a new political and 
economic approach. As was mentioned in chapter 2, the dominant 
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perspective on indigenous agriculture since colonial times and well into 
the 20th Century, was that indigenous peoples were at odds with rational 
agricultural production. Spanish chronicles have argued that abundance 
of foodstuffs in the region was a natural facet of the Talamancan 
landscape. Whereas 19th Century accounts – in the forms of Gabb’s 
writing, but also those of Henri Pittier and various other naturalists 
visiting the region over the early 20th Century (see Goebel McDermott, 
2005; Denyer and Soto, 2000) – was that while indigenous agriculture did 
exist, it was inherently unproductive, thereby concluding that 
considerable state intervention was critical for the region to achieve its 
productive potential. This outlook starts to change with new studies being 
produced about the region after the 1950s (see Lansing, 2011), as 
ethnographers begin to develop accounts of patterns of adaptation of 
Bribri and Cabécar agricultural practices to deal with climate concerns, 
their own cultural beliefs and other livelihood issues (see Stone, 1961). 
Whereas others – much more culturally-oriented in focus – delve into 
detailed analysis of the role that agriculture plays within various Bribri 
rituals, thereby offering findings of the presence of cultural rationalities at 
play in their livelihood decisions (see Bozolli de Willie, 1973). This new 
climate in academic research eventually translated into new efforts to 
understand the nature of indigenous land management practices over the 
course of the 1980s.  
There has not been a single stable state or NGO-oriented 
agricultural development project in Talamanca (though there are actors 
sponsoring projects with continuous presence to the point of becoming 
features of the landscape), and consequently, there have been many 
approaches and objectives employed over the past thirty years. Yet, a 
common feature in most of these interventions is the recognition of a dual 
problematique regarding Bribri and Cabécar agriculture. First of all, 
scholars and policy practitioners agree that the Talamancans are gradually 
moving towards plantain monoculture at the expense of other forms of 
agroforestry, including those with more commercial ends, like cacao and 
banana (Orozco et al., 2008). Secondly, rapid population growth in the 
Reserves is quickly becoming a potential and unsustainable threat for the 
regional ecosystems (Borge, 2006). The central concern is that if no 
intervention is made, and indigenous populations continue to grow, the 
most sustainable forms of indigenous agriculture – namely traditional and 
cacao/banana-oriented SAFs – are going to become less able to cope, 
leading to a preference towards more ecologically-unfriendly alternatives 
like plantain monoculture plantations (see Borge and Laforge, 1995; 
Borge, 2006; Somarriba and Harvey, 2003). The logical response then is to, 
first, make cacao economically relevant to the region once more, by 
introducing new and hybrid varieties that could resist to fungal infections 
(including moniliasis), and second, finding a way to enhance the economic 
value of indigenous agriculture, through new channels of 
commercialization of a variety of Bribri and Cabécar farm products (e.g.: 
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cacao, banana, lumber, etc.) or practices related to those (e.g.: 
agroecotourism), within the spaces for traditional agriculture (Parrish et 
al., 1999; Somarriba and Beer, 1999, Beer, 1991).  
In other words, contemporary agrarian interventions in the 
Talamancan Indigenous Reserves have been designed to make changes in 
order to improve indigenous agriculture, no matter if they may be 
oriented towards fruit trees and orchards – like the first interventions 
headed by the New Alchemists Association in the early 1980s – towards 
cacao production – as those defined by the CATIE and more recently by 
MAG within the BID-MAG project – or even those designed to reinterpret 
forests as carbon storage facilities that I will be explaining in the following 
chapters. This overarching logic is present in most projects developed in 
the area, particularly in the larger ones, like NAMASOL in the 1990s, or 
the BID-MAG in the 2010s, though the latter with some key differences 
from the former projects, given the fact that state actors and agendas held 
a much more influential role. Lansing (2009) has offered a fairly detailed 
analysis of NAMASOL (1995-1999) that deserves attention, which is 
complemented by my own, gathered from interviews with the same actors 
involved there, almost twenty years later. The objective of this project was 
to trigger an important change in Talamancan production and the 
producers themselves by fostering a process of technological change that 
could lead to the evolution of Bribri and Cabécar culture (Borge and 
Laforge, 1996). It begins with the presentation of several hypotheses 
regarding the characteristics of indigenous production and of the 
producer himself, the most relevant for the purposes of this chapter being 
that the region presented two different systems of agricultural production: 
the traditional one (or “sköwak”) and an external one (or “sikwa”).  
In appearance, both systems operate in a complementary fashion 
with one another, leading to impressions of them being considered two 
sides of a same indigenous farming rationality. Indeed, this planning 
project claims that both the sköwak and sikwa systems are linked through 
the cultivation of corn. Traditionally, both the Bribri and the Cabécar have 
used work parties as a means to cope with the lack of enough labor for 
farming purposes. These ‘chichadas’ are based around the production of 
chicha (an alcoholic drink made out of fermented corn), which is used for 
payment purposes instead of using cash-based transactions (as the use of 
money is not prevalent everywhere in the Reserves) (Borge and Laforge, 
1996). Both systems seem to be harmonically linked, as sköwak agriculture 
– centered on subsistence production of various things amongst which 
corn is included – is interpreted as the basis for Bribri and Cabécar 
engagement into cash crops, through communal labor. Underpinning this 
conceptualization of indigenous production is, of course, a general 
understanding that Talamancans operate as economically rational actors. 
Indeed, one of the key hypotheses presented by the document implies that 
indigenous peoples tend to maximize the utility of their workforce, 
though labor efficiency. This means that, according to this key document 
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which set forth critical planning assumptions for agrarian development 
interventions in Talamanca, indigenous labor is clearly guided towards 
for-profit productive ends. From there, the main proposal of NAMASOL 
was to elevate productivity through different means, thereby becoming a 
central tenet until now. Indeed, the Strategic Planning of the Territory and 
indigenous Peoples of Talamanca in the mid-2000s, a document designed 
to develop a general consensus for strategic interventions in the Reserves 
clearly concluded that in Talamanca:  
“Development is constructed through new productive processes which 
may offer added value to traditional production, elevating productivity 
and productive quality, creating new forms of employment in new 
economic sectors not necessarily agricultural, such as tourism and 
construction, controlling the mechanisms that guide commercial 
intermediation with the rest of the country and selling environmental 
services, such as protection of biodiversity, protection of river basins, 
landscape conservation and protection of wildlife reserves, etc.” 
(Borge, 2006: 33). 
Both this and the former documents have been developed in ways 
in which to become discursively-friendly to the Bribri and the Cabécar. 
The NAMASOL document presented its arguments within the context of 
an understanding of wellness, somewhat developed out of general 
interpretations of local cosmovision. Land security, guaranteeing the good 
health of the local population and fostering good relations with sikwas and 
with indigenous neighbors at the Reserve are considered some of the 
components of this wellness, while arguing that a productive agricultural 
system is just the means to get there, not the end (Borge and Laforge, 
1996).  
In other words, the argument is that the production for profit is seen 
as a mechanism through which that wellness may be attained. Similar 
discursive choices are made in the Strategic Planning document, which, 
amongst its main propositions, contends that for-profit production could 
be a means towards rescuing Bribri and Cabécar forms of cultural 
production (e.g.: artisanship, traditional medicine, culturally-traditional 
gender roles at local households and politics, etc.) (Borge, 2006). And 
while, it is unquestionable that these holistic linkages are of great 
importance of the authors, as was gathered in subsequent interviews with 
them for this chapter, the main conceptualization present in both 
documents is that the Talamancans are abstractly comprehended as 
rational economic actors, lacking any distinction whatsoever.  
Consequently, for these key planning documents, the main 
argument is that maximization of labor efficiency is the key aspect of 
indigenous productive rationalities, thereby enhancing said productive 
capacities is the appropriate way of helping them and make their 
agriculture function. At interviews with NGO and state officials, there 
were always arguments about the need of taking into account the 
complexities of indigenous subjects, whereby economics is just one facet 
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amongst others such as culture, communal identity, territorial demands, 
etc. Yet, more often than not, all of this talk is abandoned as the problem 
is eventually narrowed to a recognition that the Bribri and the Cabécar are 
just rational economic actors, whose rationality when allocating labor is 
the one responsible of defining the interactions between the modern and 
the traditional within their complex systems of agriculture. Any and all 
recognition of other social, cultural or political facets or potential 
hypothesis regarding the contradictory co-existence of traditional 
livelihood and sikwa agriculture in the Bribri and Cabécar agrarian 
landscape is discarded, as this discourse often takes over the notion that 
sköwak agriculture is just a complementary feature to the modern half of 
their system oriented towards plantain production or cacao and banana 
for-profit production within semi-traditional agroforestry systems.  
Despite the complexities of local indigenous agriculture, the 
conclusion of these documents (and, by extension, the entire discursive 
formation), is actually very simple: the entire dual agricultural system of 
the Bribri and the Cabécar is unsustainable. Modern agriculture is deemed 
incapable of becoming a reasonable means of subsistence for the 
indigenous farmers, whereas the traditional side is argued to be incapable 
to meet projected population requirements in the future (Borge and 
Castillo, 1997; Posas, 2001; Somarriba, 1993; Guiracocha, 2000). In other 
words, while the sikwa part of the system is problematic given its long-
lasting negative environmental effects and historical commercialization 
barriers (e.g.: plantain monoculture), the sköwak part is considered to be 
unable to meet the necessities of the growing population. Indeed, this is 
the main framing device for the problems that development interventions 
in Talamanca seek to resolve. Yet, curiously enough, their involvement 
has not been centered in corn, understood as the lynchpin between 
traditional and modern agriculture, as the NAMASOL document 
suggested in 1996 and the Strategic Planning document reiterated ten 
years later. On the contrary, the focus of interventions in the area has 
shifted between various agricultural products, with the main ones being 
plantain and cacao, both of them produced mainly for profit. Indeed, apart 
from re-conceptualizing the indigenous farmer and his agricultural 
system in an undifferentiated account of economic rationality, this 
discourse has also framed their produces as critical objects of intervention 
in the area. Cacao has been particularly relevant in this regard, as it is 
contemplated as a mechanism with which to tie agricultural development 
policy with measures to reinforce the buffer zone of La Amistad Biosphere 
Reserve.  
Most efforts to promote cacao as the key objective of development 
intervention in Talamanca have been sponsored by CATIE and, more 
recently, by the National Cacao Program at MAG (NCP). Indeed, CATIE 
has been a key historical actor in the region ever since the 1970s, through 
the development of numerous development interventions focused on this 
product, most of them in collaboration with MAG and with the financial 
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support of the IADB. While they did not have a role implementing the 
cacao component of the BID-MAG project regarding this crop, they do 
retain considerable influence in the project in a key advisory role with 
regards to the NCP, as the main provider of genetically-modified cacao 
plants and in devising the scientific basis that supports the cacao 
intervention in the area (Cacao Program director, personal interview, May 
21st 2014). CATIE was also the agency in charge of writing the first 
management plan of PILA in 1981, and held a key role in the elaboration 
of the RBLA plan in 1991, as well. An agricultural higher education center 
and a research facility devoted to the productive sector, CATIE has been 
interested in sponsoring cacao production in Costa Rican since the 1940s 
(Barquero, 1949). Most of their efforts before the outbreak of moniliasis 
countrywide, CATIE was mostly focused on offering support to farmers 
in order for them to maximize their productive yields. Yet, in the 1970s, 
their role shifted towards agroforestry, as this practice became popular 
amongst development practitioners (Somarriba and Beer, 1999). During 
the 1980s, CATIE embraced the notion that agroforestry could be a 
development tool, given its potential to attend problems of 
overpopulation, desertification and conservation in rural areas in the 
tropics (Somarriba and Beer, 1999).  
Put differently, for CATIE and the NCP, cacao agroforestry 
constitutes an optimized environmental and economic solution for rural 
development as it offers the chance to cultivate crops while maintaining 
forests and lumber at the same time. CATIE has had a clear ongoing 
presence in the region. The first major project with Talamancan 
indigenous communities began in 1984, after the outbreak of the 
monialiasis epidemic. It focused on offering the locals with new varieties 
of cacao trees that could withstand infection (Dahlquist et al., 2007). In the 
late 1980s, CATIE designed a second project with support of the German 
GTZ, which was meant to elevate the density of economically-valuable 
shade trees in cacao agroforestry plantations and of black pepper trees in 
order to foster diversification of for-profit crops in indigenous farms. In 
other words, this was a project centered in a long-standing effort of 
introducing more economically-profitable forms of agroforestry in the 
region (Beer, 1991; Somarriba et al., 1994). During the early 2000s, CATIE 
was also involved in a project oriented towards the maximization of cacao 
agroforestry efficiency, in this case, centered on recognizing the value of 
ecologically-important forest species within the indigenous farms, the 
former developed under ongoing efforts for reforming the management 
plan of PILA, within the territorial logic of a biosphere reserve (Harvey et 
al., 2006). Indeed, a great deal of CATIE studies during that decade 
concentrated not only on arguing that agroforestry was an economically 
efficient use of farming space and an inherently sustainable land use, but 
also a farming practice that offers an anthropogenic linkage between 
protected areas, national parks and biological corridors (see Parrish et al., 
1999; Polidoro et al., 2007; Somarriba, 2004; Guiracocha et al., 2001). In this 
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context, enters the cacao component of BID-MAG a 1.5 million-dollar 
project designed to continue on these efforts of fostering cacao 
productivity in the region. 
6.2. The BID-MAG cacao project: objectives and 
failures 
6.2.1. Introducing the BID-MAG  
The BID-MAG was originally conceived as a new stage in the ongoing 
effort in transfrontier development cooperation between Costa Rica and 
Panama. The Program was inscribed in the context of a series of bilateral 
agreements signed by both countries over the course of the 1990s, the most 
important being the 1993 Agreement for Transfrontier Cooperation and 
Development. This agreement set forth a brief, but comprehensive, 
agenda for developing the region, including the establishment of a 
Permanent Binational Commission (CBP), with various subcommittees 
for attending environmental, local governance, security, productive and 
migratory issues of importance to both countries (Matul Romero, 2007). 
The Commission was established featuring some representation of civil 
society, but it functions mainly as a means to organize concerted action 
between state agencies (Matul Romero, 2007). The main civil society actors 
involved in the commission rarely include any local organization – such 
as the indigenous ADIs – and is often limited to CATIE and some 
environmental NGOs, such as International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN), The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF), all of whom have had noticeable influence in the execution 
of certain components of the wider Sixaola Program, given that the area 
“constitutes a priority for conservation issues” (National Coordinator of BID-
MAG, interview, February 23rd, 2014).  
BID-MAG, itself, was devised in 2003 following an IADB donation 
oriented towards the development of the Regional Strategy of Sustainable 
Development of the Sixaola Binational River Basin (ERDS). This Strategy 
was conceived as the starting point for a medium to long-term 
intervention of the region devoted to three main objectives: 1) enhance 
productivity, 2) integrating better management of natural resources and 
3) reducing local vulnerability to natural disasters (MIDEPLAN, 2003). In 
its inception, the ERDS suggested that the best way of achieving these 
goals were through the implementation of a single project to be executed 
in a coordinated fashion by both countries. However, that would end up 
being impossible, due to a combination of factors, but mainly, resistance 
from the national governments and several state agencies (Guillen, 2013).  
Eventually, the project was divided into three different initiatives: 
1) BID-MAG, which was implemented solely for Costa Rica, 2) the 
Sustainable Development Strategy for Bocas del Toro, which was the 
Panamanian counterpart of BID-MAG, and 3) the Integrated Ecosystem 
Management Project of the Sixaola Binational River Basin, that was 
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referred to in chapter 3 and which was implemented jointly by both 
countries. Each one of these projects was executed following differing 
logics of implementation (see Alvarez, 2014; Guillen, 2013), thereby 
making them completely separate from each other, despite having a 
shared origin. 
Originally, BID-MAG was conceptualized as a “typical” IWRM, 
which expectedly included the establishment of various work units in the 
form of river management organisms and a clear overarching focus on 
dealing with key activities with implications to water supply 
sustainability (Nessim et al., 2004). However, the actual execution of the 
project differed considerably. Between the time the first loan proposal was 
sent to the IADB in 2004 and its eventual execution in 2011, the program 
morphed from an IWRM into an “on-demand” ICDP with a rhetorical 
disaster vulnerability component, losing all watershed management 
components and shifting the executory organism from MINAE – which 
had a much clearer environmental conservation bias – to MAG. Of course, 
this meant that the project was eventually executed following a more 
productivity-oriented logic, so while there was some degree of 
internalization of sustainability concerns, the overriding institutional 
objective for sifting between project proposals was undoubtedly fostering 
economic diversification and productivity (external evaluator BID-MAG, 
interview, March 22nd, 2016). This is the main reason why BID-MAG 
ended up using over 30% of the funding for the productive component in 
initiatives for stimulating plantain and palm tree monoculture cultivation, 
despite them being considered as ecologically unsustainable, while also 
investing around 40% in sustainable cacao agroforestry (BID-MAG, 2015). 
Having said this, the wider emphasis of the intervention was consistent 
with the historical objective of “improving” Bribri and Cabécar 
agriculture, as have many other development interventions done over the 
past thirty years. As the ERDS states:  
“(…) the fostering of organic production, productive diversification, 
the development of an industry that transforms local traditional 
production, an improvement in commercialization mechanisms and 
tourism are the best and most sustainable possibilities for 
implementing the Strategy” (MIDEPLAN, 2003: 10).  
Yet, again, the most noticeable differences and tensions that 
underline this project relate to the prerogative of MAG of financing any 
types of productive endeavors, in spite of their environmental effects, 
whereas, other NGO practitioners, CATIE included, would have 
preferred to center the modernization process within the context of cacao 
agroforestry and other sustainable practices alone.  
The Cacao Project was but one of various projects that formed the 
“Productive Diversification Component” of BID-MAG. Though it was 
executed in the form of 24 different smaller projects with as many Bribri 
and Cabécar communities in the Reserve, all of them were managed 
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directly by the NCP, with the support of CATIE. Overall, these projects 
were primarily oriented to address vulnerability to natural disasters by 
promoting forest cover and recovering “the (cacao) agroecological system that 
existed in the Sixaola and Talamanca Valleys, and which was destroyed in favor 
of plantain monoculture, leading the area to a high level of vulnerability” (Fallas 
Solano, 2012: 6). Hydrogeologically, the Talamanca Valley is first and 
foremost a flood plain, which has historically shown to be susceptible to 
pronounced weather events (such as seasonal rains and tropical storms), 
leading to negative destructive effects upon indigenous communities, 
which are often located near the riverbanks of the Sixaola and its 
tributaries. The operating assumption of the Cacao Project is that forest 
loss due to the expansion of productive land uses – especially plantain 
monoculture – lead to the sedimentation of the local rivers making them 
prone for more destructive flash floods (MIDEPLAN, 2003). Forest cover 
should be maintained to avoid any future natural event. Therefore, 
expanding cacao agroforestry becomes a means of increasing the income 
of local indigenous farms, which in turn (following the perceived 
rationality described in the previous section), would make the Bribri and 
Cabécar attach a greater value at conserving forests and biodiversity and 
adverting potential calamities produced from enhanced weather events.  
The Cacao Project proposal nominally recognizes the history of 
Talamanca with cacao by acknowledging the presence of over 1.800 
hectares cultivated with this produce, though almost no references are 
made with regards to cultural practices, meanings or territorialities 
attached to said cultivation (see Fallas Solano, 2012).  On the contrary, the 
proposal clearly states that the problem that demands intervention in the 
Bribri and Cabécar farmlands is that of lack of productivity. Indeed, as a 
member of the Project Coordinating Unit of BID-MAG stated: “our priority 
consists in guaranteeing that technical assistance reaches the producer and that 
this translates into an improvement of productivity. Our objective is to surpass 
the current levels of production of the area, that, in average, are of about 100 
kilograms per hectare (per year), and take them over 1.000 kilograms per hectare, 
given that the genetic material used permits that.” (interview, August 10th, 
2015). The main project proposal argues that most of these problems are 
due to mismanagement of indigenous farms, given that cacao plants being 
used are extremely old, prone to be affected by monilia and are cultivated 
under low densities, thereby hindering productivity and potential 
profitability (Fallas Solano, 2012). Consequently, the project proposal 
concludes that the intervention should be made for augmenting 
productivity of indigenous farms, by offering technical assistance for 
them to cultivate cacao, in agroforestry systems, using densities of about 
630 new plants (themselves genetically-modified grafts provided by 
CATIE) per hectare (Fallas Solano, 2012). 
To support indigenous farmers, the Cacao Project focused on 
promoting cacao through two different actions. On one hand, the project 
was oriented to address one of the main perceived entry barriers by NCP, 
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which has to do with initial investment (Salazar, 2014). Indeed: “the true 
barrier for cacao farming in Talamanca is the initial costs regarding genetic 
material. If people want to plant in a pattern of 4x4 (meters between plants), that 
would entail over 600 different plants, which means an investment of over almost 
one million colones (about 2.000 U.S. dollars), which is a sum of money that very 
few indigenous farmers can give away” (NCP Official, interview, May 21st, 
2014). This is without mentioning the fact that since the monilia crisis of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, financial credit opportunities were shut 
down by banks (Rosenboom et al., 1990; NCP official, interview, May 21st 
2014) or that, even if these forms of funding were present, they could not 
possibly loan to a Bribri or Cabécar landholders, given that the land is not 
formally theirs, but by the ADIs. Consequently, the Cacao Project meant 
to deal with these initial expenditures by giving away the cacao plants 
freely to local producers alongside farming tools and materials to the 
recipients whom required it, had lands ready and prepared for cultivation 
and also given proof of taking care of their former cacao cultivated plots, 
following the land management guidelines devised by the NCP (Fallas 
Solano, 2012). The Project also provided on-farm technical assistance to 
indigenous farmers and engaged in verification tours in order to 
guarantee that cacao plants were being trimmed down, grafted, cleaned 
and taken care of, following the dispositions of the aforementioned 
guidelines. 
In other words, the cacao component of BID-MAG was based on the 
presumption of improving the sustainable production of cacao farms of 
the Bribri and the Cabécar, while also fostering biodiversity conservation 
and dealing with vulnerabilities to climate change. To do so the objective 
was – as in plenty other projects before it – to increase the viability, both 
economic and ecological, of cacao as a key produce in the complex dual 
agricultural system of the Reserves. In particular, this new project was 
based on a discourse that has historically linked cacao with wider 
ecological benefits. The main claim being made is that if there is need for 
sustainable land use and economically efficient management of space, 
then cacao agroforestry is the best choice. Indeed, the argument has been 
that this type of systems – unquestionably oriented towards deepening 
Bribri and Cabécar integration into national and global markets – is the 
best solution for solving the contradictions in the indigenous productive 
system (Somarriba et al., 2004). Moreover, according to the Sustainable 
Development Strategy, cacao agroforestry is also a key alternative for 
reducing vulnerability of local ecosystems, by providing anthropogenic 
links between farmlands, parks and biological corridors (see Harvey et al., 
2006). Yet, despite these benefits, positive achievements of the Cacao 
Project have been difficult to identify. 
6.2.2. The difficulties of cacao commercialization 
The BID-MAG program lacked a formal evaluation system during the 
entirety of its implementation, leading to a planning mechanism that was 
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centered on activity completion instead of achieving objective-oriented 
results. Indeed, this is perhaps the reason why most of the implementation 
and progress reports of the various projects that constituted BID-MAG 
lack a narrative analysis and only refer to degrees of physical or financial 
execution of the allotted resources for each project portfolio. The Cacao 
Project is a clear example of this as the key progress indicators utilized in 
the various follow-up documents produced between 2011 and 2015 tend 
to consist of the quantity of cacao plants or tools offered to beneficiaries, 
the number of workshops done with the local counterparts or of fieldwork 
tours of NPC officials to indigenous farms. And while these indicators are 
certainly relevant for financial management purposes, the ironical part is 
that they say very little about the actual effectiveness and efficiency of a 
development project center on promoting productive efficiency.  
Key concerns, such as the degree of appropriation of the Bribri and 
Cabécar, the immediate or short-term effects on household income or the 
success of these communities at commercializing cacao have remained 
unanswered, despite being elemental to ascertain the results of the project. 
Indeed, all of these are preoccupations shared amongst the indigenous 
and NCP informants interviewed for this work that were not captured by 
the final reports submitted by the UCP. Commercialization was a common 
feature in interviews made for this dissertation, with plenty of claims in a 
similar line as the quote presented at the beginning of this chapter, 
whereby serious doubts existed amongst the beneficiaries regarding the 
potential buyers for the cacao planted as part of the project. Indeed, if 
there were positive claims amongst the locals about the commercialization 
potential of cacao it was to be seen much later in the future, or as a 
beneficiary said: “(…) I am too old now, and for that I tell them (her children) 
not to be sad and continue, so they can feed their children with whatever this land 
will offer us, because I will not see that for sure” (Bribri Cacao Project 
beneficiary from Amubre, interview, October 15th 2014).  
Such concerns regarding the inherent problems of agricultural 
commercialization are well justified, given the profound influence that 
certification bodies for organic production and plantain intermediaries 
have with regard to the asymmetrical rules of the game regarding the 
entrance of indigenous farmers to the organic cacao and plantain markets. 
Indeed, when the locals speak about their decision to cultivate one or both 
of these for-profit crops, they often cite perceived advantages or 
disadvantages regarding the manner in which payments are made or 
requisites for their product be acceptable for commercial intermediaries.  
Plantain is by far the most criticized product for most of the Bribri 
and Cabécar interviewed for this dissertation. The main reason for this 
reaction is probably the “computado” system of commercialization that is 
used by intermediaries to buy the product. According to this system, the 
full price can only be paid to the producer if the plantain bunch contains 
a minimum of 30 fruits (or “fingers”). If it fulfills this expectation, then the 
farmer is paid in full, but if the bunch has less than 30 fruits, then it is 
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considered to be incomplete and its price is computed to acknowledge for 
failing to reach this expectation. Depending on the buying price of the 
intermediaries coming to the Reserve, this may often mean that two 
“incomplete” bunches of say, 25 plantains, may end up be sold by the 
price of a single bunch of 30 fruit, meaning a substantial net loss for the 
indigenous farmer and his or her household. Even so, what produces such 
resentment towards the system is that once the intermediaries take the 
plantain away and commercializes it in the national market (at the major 
cities of the Central Valley) they often sell the plantains individually, 
thereby reaping a profit at the expense of the indigenous producers. 
Considering that there are just a few buyers of the product, Bribri and 
Cabécar farmers often suspect that there is collusion between them, 
leading to price arrangement that benefit intermediaries at their expense, 
with little else to be done as no other potential buyers enter the Reserve.  
It must be added that this is not a problem for all plantain 
producers. Certain households, particularly in Shiroles and Suretka, have 
managed to organize themselves and by-pass the commercial 
intermediaries in order to sell directly to exporters, such as Dole or 
Chiquita. Both pay higher prices and with less fluctuation than 
intermediaries, thereby allowing these farmers to obtain better terms of 
trade. Also, with these companies, the price on plantains is set by weight 
and not under the “computado” system, thereby becoming another 
advantage. Of course, access to this market is not possible for all plantain 
producers, as selling requirements entail the implementation of costly 
farming practices, such as regular fertilization and continuous 
management of sigatoka. The absence of sufficient financial resources and 
labor becomes a serious barrier for entering this market, thereby only 
becoming accessible for households with sufficient clan support or with 
enough financial resources. Indeed only 20% of plantain-producing 
households of Shiroles and Suretka commercialize their product through 
Dole, and only one in the intermediate zones at Sepecue does it there (NCP 
officials, interview, May 21st, 2014).  
With all of these commercialization problems recognized, cacao is 
not necessarily a better alternative, given the existing rules regarding 
access to the organic market and turnover, and the inherent weakness of 
the market itself. For example, several farmers interviewed from Suretka 
and Shiroles, claimed that they favored organic cacao or banana 
cultivation, but decided to produce plantain instead. The reason for doing 
this was that nearby farms were already growing plantains and using 
agrochemicals in the process. As organic certification bodies and MAG 
regulations on the matter define requisites regarding distances from farms 
using chemicals, these farms were incapable of attaining the necessary 
certification to sell organic cacao to the main buyers (i.e.: a local 
Association of Small Producers of Talamanca, or APPTA; and a company 
from San José called TROBANEX), whom cater exclusively for the organic 
market. In other words, while interested in the organic market, these 
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producers had little choice but to produce plantains. An issue which is 
aggravated by the fact that, in spite of espousing a sustainable 
development discourse arguing on the contrary, BID-MAG spent a 
considerable amount of resources attempting to expand plantain markets 
through two seriously mismanaged projects related to plantain processing 
plants for the production of flour5 and toasted plantain chips,6 that 
nevertheless, have become somewhat viable alternatives to selling the 
product fresh.  Indeed, interviewees from this area and some from 
Amubre claimed that land use changes are limited due to these territorial 
dispositions regarding organic production and agrochemical uses.  
Another perceived problem has to do with turnover, as it is much 
easier to sell plantain than to sell cacao, thereby becoming an attractive 
factor for cultivation. Plantain can be sold each week in the Reserves and 
profits are obtained immediately from the intermediaries, whereas the 
process with cacao is more complicated. For example, being a small 
association with limited processing capacity and a stable capital flow, 
APPTA often times lacks the money to pay cacao farmers right away for 
their product, whom are obliged to wait for a month to receive payment 
on their produce. This delayed payment is particularly problematic for 
households that require to buy staples at the local stores at credit (such as 
the ones of Shiroles and Suretka), or that require investment in their farms, 
thereby giving a competitive advantage to plantain, in spite of all of the 
aforementioned problems commercializing that product. Besides this, 
selling to APPTA entails local farmers to pay an annual membership fee, 
without guarantees for them to actually obtain an organic certificate on 
their farms yearly. A final key issue regarding turnover has also to do with 
the lack of road infrastructure to move production around the Reserves. 
Indeed, the absence of reliable roads going up to the highland areas 
explains the reliance in agricultural production for self-consumption. 
While plantain, bananas and cacao can be harvested year-round, to bring 
production to the intermediaries for sale is difficult at some times, 
particularly during the rainy season (May to November), given that roads 
get seriously affected by the constant floods of the nearby rivers (Whelan, 
2005). This implies the need of having some part of production always 
devoted to self-consumption in order to face any type of eventualities over 
the course of the year. 
Finally, recurrent market shocks are also relevant for the local 
Talamancan economy, especially regarding their appropriation of 
productive endeavors like the Cacao Project. More so, if one considers (as 
many other do) that this is a region that is well-known for its 
susceptibilities to the comings and goings of an unfair system of 
commercial exchange (see Borges, 2006; Whelan, 2005; Orcherton, 2003; 
Hinojosa, 2002). Surely, there have been major economic effects produced 
by serious biophysical events (such as the floods of 1991 and 2005, the 
earthquake of 1991, or the 1978 monilia epidemic), all of which reduced 
productivity of for-profit farming significantly, but there are also the 
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inherent instabilities present in all of these cash crop markets. For 
example, cacao prices were stable during 2014, when I did my fieldwork 
research in Talamanca, but dropped dramatically during 2015 and 2016 
losing most of the value they gained over the course of 2014 
(CANACACAO, 2016). Likewise, plantain prices often present significant 
variations over the course of a single year, as production tends to rise over 
the course of the later months of the year, leading to significant reductions 
(NCP official, interview, May 21st, 2015).  
It is justifiable that the Bribri and Cabécar people often make explicit 
their mistrust regarding these new market opportunities and resist 
interventions in some way; or even revert back to dual agricultural 
production. Indeed, as some NCP officials recognized, that some of the 
problems of the project is that there was little faith on its results, which 
manifested in the form of failure to comply with the initial terms of their 
involvement in the program: “(o)ne goes to some of the farms and finds out 
that they have not removed the plants that are infected with monilia, even though 
they knew that they had to cut them down to produce healthy pods. But they 
become sloppy, put on excuses, and end up doing nothing. And please notice that 
it is very simple, it is just trimming the plants. But they do not do it adequately, 
nor in the adequate time” (NCP official, interview, May 21st, 2014). Again, 
the project lacked any form of effectiveness indicators, making it difficult 
to see if there is future for cacao amongst these beneficiaries. With that 
said, interviews do suggest that many of them were not as receptive as 
others. While the previous discussion offers an economic dimension for 
understanding the mistrust towards cacao production, up next I will 
discuss on the political and cultural basis for that attitude. 
6.2.3. Political and cultural failings of BID-MAG 
Overall, the BID-MAG program exhibited a very limited political 
participation in formulation and planning stages from local organizations, 
including both the indigenous ADIs and other Bribri and Cabécar 
grassroots organizations. There are plenty of indicators that justify this 
claim, but this chapter will refer to the two most critical. First, the Program 
lacked any rational foundation that would explain the manner in which 
project funds were to be distributed and allocated to each component. 
Indeed, according to the external review of the project (financed by IADB), 
MAG and the Coordinating Unit designed the initial budget distribution 
separately from all actors (Alvarez, 2014). Consequently, it is reasonable 
to argue that while the project was presented rhetorically as a on-demand 
ICDP, the on-demand part was not realized in practice as budget amounts 
for each project were assigned before any local organization had a chance 
to propose their specific projects. If there was any form of coordination 
between MAG and any other political actor, it probably was with the 
Municipality of Talamanca, and most likely this was due to the legal 
requirements of taking into account the local government for coordination 
with regards to investment in the infrastructure components of BID-MAG.  
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Second, there was a considerable absence of communication and 
feedback mechanisms in the project as a whole. As said earlier, BID-MAG 
lacked any form of indicators to measure program effectiveness and 
progress report design was basically centered on demonstrating 
expenditure distribution (see Fallas Solano, 2012). No project document 
integrated reports of noticeable articulation of local feedback regarding or 
changing project goals, indicators, or even on-the-ground evaluations of 
capacities of beneficiary organizations to engage with the component 
regarding productive diversification. Indeed, while the Program 
contemplated the creation of some local assemblies in order to integrate 
local political actors (Nessim et al., 2004; also see Law 8639, which 
regulated the Program), no follow up was made on the operation of these, 
evidencing that this issue was at the bottom of actual project priorities. 
Indeed, the actual functions of the assembly were never clearly defined 
within project operation. It existed, but BID-MAG never gave any 
attention to actually defining what its role within the program would be 
(Nessim et al., 2004). On the contrary, a common feature in the interviews 
with indigenous participants at these assemblies is that they functioned 
more as an informal instance, whereby agenda was “validated”, despite 
being exclusively in control of the technical coordinators of the UCP 
(Bratsi Assembly member, October 14th, 2014). It is no wonder why 
absenteeism of the indigenous representatives to the Assembly and the 
rest of smaller local gatherings was noticeable. There were indigenous 
leaders whom decided to miss more than half of the meetings of the River 
Basin Council (the key political intermediary with the UCP), arguing that 
their presence there was not needed to make any decision (Guillen, 2013).  
This gross lack of political involvement manifested differently 
depending on which of the productive diversification projects one looks 
at, but, in the specific case of cacao it presented itself in the form of the 
lack of rigorous recognition of anthropological elements of the Bribri and 
Cabécar cosmovision. Talamancan culture assigns sacred and religious 
attributes to certain types of soils, as well as many types of seeds in 
general, and cacao in particular (see Borge and Castillo, 1997). Indeed, 
according to tradition, Sibö (the Bribri-Cabécar equivalent with a deity of 
creation) created the world with the intention of the ditsewö (the people, 
meaning Talamancan peoples) to harvest and cultivate the land, which 
would, in turn, give daily sustenance to the indigenous family for it not to 
go hungry. More precisely, Sibö is responsible for promoting and 
organizing the natural agents and processes that produce germination, 
thereby becoming the provider of food for the Bribri and the Cabécar (awá 
from Meleruk, interview, March 18th, 2014). Of course, in a region that is 
increasingly intervened by the forces of markets, state politics and sikwa 
culture and Christian ideologies, not all Bribri and Cabecar live by these 
precepts anymore (particularly those living in the Talamanca Valley floor 
in or around Suretka and Shiroles). Nevertheless, these beliefs are of 
considerable importance for understanding Talamancan indigenous 
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identities, and for the purposes of this chapter, are critical for interpreting 
everyday agricultural practices, especially in the intermediate zones of 
Amubre and Sepecue and the highlands of the Valley.  
This has to do with the debate regarding which are the actual 
species to be cultivated within agroforestry systems in Talamanca. Many 
scholarly pieces on the Talamancan economy tend to center on the 
distinction between sköwak (traditional and for subsistence) and sikwa 
agriculture (for profit), which co-exist together within the discretely 
limited spaces of many Bribri and Cabécar farms (see Borge and Castillo, 
1997; Borge and Laforge, 1995; Guiracocha et al., 2001). While the 
importance of this distinction must not be diminished in any way as it is 
undoubtedly important for understanding the historical-geographical 
trajectories development of these peoples, this dual classification does 
tend to minimize the fact that there seems to be a complex variety of both 
sikwa and sköwak agroforestry systems in the region around which 
cultural meanings and worldviews have been constructed (Ocherton, 
2003). While this thesis did not set out doing an 
anthropological/agronomical study of local indigenous knowledges and 
their implementation of agriculture, it did gather some information on 
how these knowledges were relevant for explaining the failure or success 
of these development interventions. Take cacao as an example: while it is 
clear that indigenous farmers consider that cacao has become a cash crop 
over time, with one of them actually claiming that “it has changed its way 
of being, by becoming more commercial now”, almost all farmers interviewed 
also agreed that it is a sacred plant.  
“(…) cacao is for us, the Bribri, of the outmost importance. It is our 
natural beverage, and it is also part of our beliefs and stories. Sadly, 
these stories that the elders used to tell are not being told anymore, or 
are told very rarely” (awá from Meleruk, interview, March 18th, 2014).  
One way in which this cultural valuation can be witnessed is with 
regards to the species that they believe should be used. According to 
interviews, there is a local preference towards indigenous or traditional 
cacao (Theobroma bicolor, locally known as saló) and pataste (another local 
species), instead of commercial cacao (Theobroma cacao). This preference 
can be explained in many different ways. From a subsistence or livelihood 
point of view, the Bribri and Cabécar tend to prefer the cultivation of crops 
that could have different potential uses. Traditional cacao – particularly 
pataste – is known to be a seed that local fauna (e.g.: lowland paca or 
“tepezcuintle”, peccary or “saino” and peccaries or “chancho de monte”) 
seems to be attracted to, thereby allowing these agroforestry systems to be 
complemented by hunting practices for subsistence, which remain very 
much prevalent in Bribri livelihood practices, especially in the 
intermediate zones and in the highlands of the Valley (awá from Kachabri, 
interview, March 20th, 2014). Another obvious and culturally-relevant use 
of traditional cacao is to produce beverages which are used with 
ceremonial ends (Bozzoli de Willie, 1979; Borge and Castillo, 1997; 
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Orcherton, 2005). The symbolic dimension of cacao is critical to local 
indigenous identity as a resource of great prestige, valued due to its 
spiritual perspective, as it is considered to be directly linked to the origin 
of the Talamancans, its relevant use for medicinal purposes and also 
because it used in plenty of local ceremonies, such as funerals, birth and 
marriages.  
Another critical livelihood aspect of indigenous cacao agroforestry 
systems has to do with the other species of flora which make up the 
system. It is customary not to cultivate one single type of tree around 
cacao, but various ones, each with different particular uses. For example, 
they use lumber-producing trees such as “laurel” (Cordia alliodora) and 
“cedro” (Cedrela odorata), as they are useful for building houses; 
“guanacaste” (Enterolobium cyclocarpum) and “jabillo” (Hura crepitanis), 
given that its sap is useful for killing insects and driving birds away; and 
“guabo” (Inga edulis), “jaboncillo” (Sapindus saponaria) and “guarumo” 
(Cecropia peltata) have uses as organic compost and medicinal purposes. 
Guarumo leaves are often used as a cure for constipation, from the sap of 
the “higuerón” (Ficus aurea), awapas (plural for spiritual healers) produce a 
medicine for intestinal worms, the juice made out of the boiled peel of 
“indio pelado” (Bursera simaruba) is useful for treating pimples and the 
infusion of “tabacón” (Triplaris melaenodendron) is used to deal with 
stomach aches (awá from Meleruk, interview, March 18th, 2014). In other 
words, these agroforestry systems are meant to have an immense amount 
of uses and advantages for indigenous livelihoods, while also having an 
intrinsic cultural value for their own everyday traditions and religious 
practices.  
This is also a reason why some degree of resistance from the local 
farmers was to be expected if the intention was to make them change their 
practices, as the Cacao Project attempted to do. As said, the project 
entailed the introduction of new varieties of genetic material – provided 
by CATIE – that could be useful to withstand the effects of monilia. 
Moreover, the Project also entailed a systematic change of the local cacao 
fields, including the replacement of old cacao plants in favor of new ones, 
cultivated in a sikwa fashion. While both these practices did not explicitly 
entail the elimination of existing forest cover in the fields, it did imply 
some of these plants to be removed in order to acquiesce with a cultivating 
structure proper of a more sikwa (non-traditional) agroforestry system, 
whereby density should be larger in order to guarantee higher levels of 
productivity (Fallas Solano, 2012). Given that little of these cultural and 
livelihood practices was actually internalized by the Project, it ended up 
being confronted by some of the Bribri and Cabécar farmers, especially in 
the intermediate regions and the highlands, where these cultural practices 
are more prevalent. Indeed, this was recognized late by one of the UCP 
project officials which was interviewed for this thesis:  
“(…) there were two different fronts: on one side, there is Low 
Talamanca (i.e.: the Sixaola and Talamanca Valley lowlands) and on the 
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other, High Talamanca (i.e.: the area beyond the Teribe River and the 
highlands). There (referring to High Talamanca) the indigenous 
population is more accustomed to traditional cacao. It is difficult to go 
over there and talk to them about trimming and cleaning. There is a 
cultural attachment to cacao, and therefore, work had to be more 
intelligent. There is some kind of affection to the plant (…) and so, in 
the issue about trimming, there are significant sensibilities. In the 
lowlands, there was not so much trouble, probably because there is not 
that much traditional cacao being planted there as it is on the 
indigenous part.” (UCP Official, interview, February 25th, 2014). 
However, other NCP officials did not grasp the importance of these 
features of indigenous agriculture, often times interpreting this resistance 
as neglect on the part of the locals, or even as lack of faith on the product 
on their part. Some even argued that productivity “is not the priority for 
many of them, which is why we had to make a more emphatic claim towards them 
just making use of the resources that we had available” (NCP official, interview, 
25th February, 2014). While this argument may have convinced some of 
the beneficiaries, many of them resisted implementation of the project or 
eventually failed to engage in continuous follow-up of the agricultural 
practices suggested by the Cacao Project. Moreover, it is very unlikely that 
these beneficiaries would re-engage with cacao in the terms disposed by 
BID-MAG, as with the finalization of the program in late 2014, any form 
of technical assistance of the NCP was interrupted, with a complete lack 
of commitment of MAG regarding further support in the future (Alvarez, 
2014). 
6.3. Conclusions 
In the previous chapter, a discussion was presented on the inherent 
problems of the “passive frontier” approach used by environmental 
authorities regarding the implementation of governance systems for the 
regulation of natural resource uses in the Indigenous Reserves. There I 
discussed the disconnect between state goals centered on fortress 
conservation practices and indigenous livelihood imperatives of the Bribri 
and Cabécar; and also of how state dispositions to render said imperatives 
invisible have historically led to failures in the implementation of co-
management practices at PILA. I bring this up because it is ironic how 
ICDPs (themselves tools for countering top-down decision-making of 
conservation-as-development interventions) implemented in Talamanca, 
have featured the same level of disconnect as well.  
The current chapter has pointed out the failings of the Cacao Project, 
itself a component of BID-MAG, a self-proclaimed “on-demand” 
conservation-development program. Perhaps the key problem here has 
been the lack of alignment between what project administrators assume 
to be the desirable trajectories of development for local indigenous 
populations with regards to the needs of the participants, especially with 
regards to non-economic components of improving livelihoods and 
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activities and their roles regarding their appropriation of project goals. In 
absence of such an alignment, as I have shown here, there is potential for 
increased tension, contestation and even abandonment of the participants, 
and therefore, the lack of successful implementation of development and 
conservation goals. This disconnect has been shown with considerable 
detail regarding the Cacao Project failings to truly integrate key concerns 
of the locals with regards to cacao commercialization within project 
considerations. Certainly, the project has attempted to promed buy in to 
conservation by discursively recomposing and appropriating indigenous 
culture and livelihoods, yet the cacao agroforestry production sponsored 
by the state and NGOs through BID-MAG have not actually included 
politically-viable spaces for participation for the locals to give their inputs 
with regards to project management and planning, nor have 
acknowledged the complex interplay of cacao with other forms of 
production and consumption of forest resources.  
Indeed, there is also a notable disconnect with regards to how these 
conservation and development projects are being evaluated. Despite 
being a highly complex project, operating in a highly complex 
environment where integration of cultural, economic, political, social and 
environmental factors is critical to influence behavior and decision-
making changes, the Cacao Project in particular, and BID-MAG in general 
lacked any form of integration of most of these features. Indeed, the 
project was itself completely different in execution from what it looked 
originally during its inception, an issue which translated into a total lack 
of effectiveness and efficiency indicators of progress. Effectively, the 
project was promoted under the goals of promoting conservation of 
natural resources, reducing vulnerability to natural disasters and 
reducing poverty through the generation of income through 
diversification of production in the Indigenous Reserves, and in all of 
those accounts lacked a single indicator that could allow the measuring of 
success.  
But more than just centering on the managerial failings of the 
project, this chapter also made an effort to contextualize its goals within a 
long history of agrarian territorial interventions of the Talamancan region, 
in order to showcase the failed articulation between the commodification 
of indigenous cacao production and cultural valuation and the 
socioecological complexities of locally produced nature. The Cacao 
Project, attempted to improve production in the Bribri and Cabécar cacao 
farms, while also attempting to promote buy in and reduce vulnerability 
and foster forest and biodiversity conservation. To do so, it did what many 
other projects have done over the course of the past thirty years: increase 
the economic and biological viability of cacao trees within these SAFs. 
According to CATIE, agroforestry is both an economically efficient use of 
space and an ecologically sustainable form of land-use, and these two 
features are relevant because together they position agroforestry as a 
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solution to overpopulation and desertification in rural areas such as this 
one. 
Yet, as has happened with plenty of the previous interventions, 
Talamanca cacao remains economically impractical. Its vulnerability to 
monilia requires the introduction of very expensive resistant varieties of 
cacao and new cultivation practices, which are not easily accepted by the 
locals on cultural and livelihood grounds. While this economic 
impracticality has been the motivation for efforts to make cacao 
agroforestry more profitable, either through greater market exposure to 
niche markets, in effect, it is very difficult to access these if there are no 
considerable investment made in the region. This is without mentioning 
the need of engaging in a structural change that would provoke a 
reduction in the use of pesticides in the nearby monoculture areas 
(Hinojosa 2002) or, alternatively by increasing the value of cacao plots, 
including the intensified planting of valuable trees for felling (Beer 1991; 
Borge and Laforge 1996). In short, cacao agroforestry is an ecologically 
friendly use of space, but with specific biological and economic 
constraints that require never-ending development interventions for it to 
spread in Talamanca.  
To conclude, while state territorial interventions have shifted over 
time from a more command-and-control oriented policy to a market 
oriented one, it still uses periodic territorial interventions in order to verify 
accomplishment of the objectives of maintaining forest and forest cover 
by indigenous counterparts. One of the oldest and most important 
conservation/rural development programs in the Talamanca Valley has 
to do with how to make sustainable cacao production a more attractive 
cash crop in the area, vis-à-vis other less sustainable and greatly expanded 
crop alternative in the Valley, such as commercial banana and plantain. 
CATIE and various state agricultural agencies (mainly the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Institute of Agricultural Technology, the Institute of 
Rural Development and the Ministry of Environment) consider 
overwhelmingly that cacao is the most environmentally comprehensive 
cash crop possibility in the area. Indeed, cacao can grow with little use of 
agrochemicals and underneath considerable forest cover, which 
theoretically allows the fulfillment of two critical objectives: 1) to promote 
a feasible economic alternative for the population, while 2) protecting 
forest cover and local biodiversity. Some authors, such as Borge (2011) 
consider that it is also the soundest ‘cultural’ economic alternative, as 
cacao is a crop with considerable cultural significance within the Bribri 
and Cabecar (specifically in the context of policultivation systems, 
whereas plantain is, exclusively, a monoculture).  
In so doing, the introduction of cacao has invented a powerful 
discourse by which indigenous peoples are understood with regards to 
their agricultural productivity, and which now works as a form of 
disciplining, i towards the creation of incentive structures meant to make 
individuals into self-interest actors bounded by economic rationality (see 
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Fletcher, 2010: 173). Neoliberal governance here has developed a 
discourse that has contemplated the compatibility of one feature of 
Talamancan culture with self-regulating markets. Accordingly, it has 
push forwards this form of agricultural practices in order “to inculcate 
ethical norms vis-a-vis the environment, within neoliberal framework 
conservationists would simply endeavor to provide incentives sufficient to 
motivate individuals to choose to behave in conservation-friendly ways” (Ibid: 
176). 
It is within this conservation-development puzzle that indigenous 
people and its agricultural system become key pieces. While indigenous 
agriculture follows a particular cultural rationale, its current dependence 
on modern monoculture crops makes it unsustainable (Harvey et al. 2006; 
Polidoro et al. 2008). Discursively, cacao agroforestry is posited as a 
solution, yet for it to work, this crop requires a surge in its market value. 
The key assumption here is that indigenous farmers are rational, and 
therefore utility maximizers, which means that they will favor the crop 
that allows for the best margin of profitability. Put differently, from the 
perspective of this discourse, the solution to the problems of agriculture 
at the indigenous reserves entails making their already ecologically-
friendly forms of agroforestry compatible with capital accumulation. Yet, 
the biggest obstacle for this project is reality itself, namely, the 
economically questioned cacao tree. 
 
 
Notes 
1 The acronym BID-MAG is used as a popular short-hand in the Indigenous 
Reserves to refer to the Sustainable Development Program of the Sixaola River 
Basin. This term originates in the fact that the program was executed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG), with resources loaned by the 
Inter American Development Bank (BID). 
2 The Panamanian version of the project was called Bocas del Toro Sustainable 
Development Program. While originally thought as an ICDP, much like BID-
MAG, this program was much more oriented toward the development side 
of the equation, concentrating on productive diversification and the building 
of infrastructure and primary services. With a total funding of 46,9 million 
USD, the project was executed in two stages. The first stage was concerned 
with “strengthening institutions and civil society encouraging the design of decision-
making and decentralized management tools” (Lamay and Coloane, 2007: 14). 
Attention was directed towards bolstering the budgets of local government 
institutions in the province, ANAM in particular. The second stage was 
allotted the bulk of the budget (30,0 million USD) and was designed with the 
objective of strengthening of productive diversification and infrastructure. 
This was done through programs meant to diversify agricultural crops 
different than banana, such as cacao; while improving road access to certain 
villages. It is important to say that a great deal of the finance ended up being 
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spent on projects all over the province, particularly in communities around 
Bahía Almirante, and not precisely on the border region (Guillén, 2013).  
3 An “awá” holds a social position, which is roughly equivalent to that of the 
shaman in other Latin American indigenous cultures. The role of the shaman 
differs from culture to culture, but, broadly speaking, they often hold a role 
as “healers” or “advisors” within the community, thereby holding 
considerable social prestige within the local communities (see Taussig, 1987; 
Velásquez, 1987; Halifax, 1979). For the Bribri proper, the awá holds at least 
three critical social roles: advisor, healer and historian. The awapa (plural for 
awá in Bribri) are individuals with considerable knowledge about the Bribri 
myths about the origins of the Earth and the cosmos, and are considered to 
have a great capacity to commune with spirits and, in some way, with Sibö. 
This implies a critical social role as a respected advisor for the Bribri 
communities or the specific clans of which the awá is part of (Rojas Conejo, 
2009). Generally, the awapa knows a great deal about the qualities and uses 
of local plant and animal life, thereby allowing them to use this knowledge as 
part of traditional healing practices such as seképeyok (healing chants and 
diets) and kömanéuk (a more psychosomatic approach towards healing) 
(Bozzoli de Willie, 1979). Awapa approach these healing practices in different 
ways depending on the place, with significant differences between the 
Talamanca Valley and the highlands (Jara Murillo and García Segura, 2011). 
Of significant importance for this thesis is the role of the awá as a historian of 
the Bribri people. They continuously gather the various stories behind the 
mythological origins of the world, which then pass on to their children and to 
the awapa (Rojas Conejo, 2009). One means of doing this is by using these 
knowledges as a means of interpreting their current realities, thereby 
allowing this knowledge to maintain continuous usage. For this reason, the 
practices of the awapa could be understood as a form of political resistance 
towards changes in the modern world. In some way, they contribute to the 
Bribri reality by bringing a different form to approach and know the world, 
by unifying the material reality of projects and interventions and the 
mythological reality upon which their identity is partially based upon. 
4 Black sigatoka is a fungal disease that affects banana plants and that is 
provoked by the ascomycete fungus. When infected, productivity of banana 
plants affected by sigatoka can be reduced in more than half, with fungicidal 
control to prevent or counter outbreaks requiring more than a year (Jones, 
2000).  
5 The BID-MAG project included other components different that the Cacao 
Program that is studied in this chapter. One of these projects involved the 
establishment of a small agro industrial plant for producing plantain flour, 
using the local plantain production from the indigenous territories and their 
surroundings. One obvious critique of this project was its bias towards 
plantain production in a manner that runs counter to the overall objectives of 
BID-MAG goals of promoting sustainable development in the region. As said 
in the document, perception amongst NGOs and MINAE is that the 
monoculture cultivation of plantains hinders ecosystems in the Talamanca 
Valley (Somarriba, 1993; Borge, 2011). But besides this major contradiction in 
the BID-MAG Project, this sub-component failed due to considerable 
mismanagement and failure to account for local demands. Indeed, the project 
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local appropriation of the initiative was minimal as the local counterpart of 
the project – the Talamancan County Agricultural Center (CACTA) – did not 
want to produce plantain flour and was more interested instead in building a 
factory for producing plantain chips, which was the first idea with which they 
were approached originally (President of CACTA, interview June 1st  2014). 
As a result, the plantain flour factory was accepted passively by CACTA and 
with considerable doubts regarding the potential profitability that could be 
obtained from the project. This was heightened by more critical analysis of 
the market studies that supported the decision of the governing bodies of BID-
MAG of fostering this initiative. Effectively, the market study holds as a key 
premise of their analysis of demand and cost-effectiveness that plantain flour 
could effectively substitute the more commonly used wheat flour within the 
national market (MAG, 2012). This is argued despite the fact that plantain 
flour is a product rarely known by Costa Ricans and that it costs six or seven 
times more than wheat flour. This and other faulty premises, led CATCA to 
express serious doubts to the Ministry of Agriculture and the governing body 
of BID-MAG regarding the potential profitability and financial sustainability 
of the project. Indeed, to this day, while the plantain flour factory has been 
built, it remains unused by local producers. 
6 A second agro-industrial project included in BID-MAG was the 
establishment of a factory for producing toasted plantain chips. This project 
was implemented without any type of technical study that could support 
specifications for the factory, nor even a market study that could offer a clear 
account of the potential demand for the product (COOPETISOLA and MAG, 
2010). Indeed, a visit to the factory proves serious contrast between the project 
on paper and the final result, as the initial profile document states that the 
factory would make 19.485 kilograms of plantain chips a year 
(COOPETISOLA and MAG, 2010), but a visit to the factory in June 2014 
showed that its actual productive capacity would have been of 180 kilograms 
a month. This is without mentioning that the project did not involve capacity-
building for the local association in charge of managing the factory in key 
areas such as commercialization and distribution. At the time of my visit, 
COOPETISOLA, the organization in charge of the factory, was dealing with 
problems for addressing important commercialization issues such as printing 
bar codes on their products, labeling and branding, with little to no assistance 
on the part of the governing bodies of BID-MAG (President of 
COOPETISOLA, interview, June 4th 2014). This shows that the local 
organization lacked any sort of commercialization strategy beforehand, 
meaning that even if they manage to produce a single bag of plantain chips, 
it is more likely that they would not have someone to sell that to. 
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7 Neoliberal multiculturalism and PES 
in the Talamanca Valley 
 
 
“The PSA has helped us plenty, the indigenous people cannot say that 
they have not understood that. But if we do not fight for what is ours 
today, tomorrow we will have nothing with which to fight” (former 
ADITIBRI president, interview, May 16th 2014). 
This chapter studies the politics of appropriation and resistance related to 
the implementation of payments of environmental services (PES) in the 
Talamancan Bribri and Cabécar Indigenous Reserves. To do so, it 
addresses the perceptions of indigenous leaders regarding the local 
impacts of the Costa Rican state-led PES program – the Programa de Pago 
por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) and follows-up on their negotiation with 
the Costa Rican state regarding the inclusion of new “indigenous-
minded” features in the context of the re-designing the PSA for 
implementation in these territories. The case of the PSA program and the 
ongoing REDD+ negotiations (next chapter) exemplify how indigenous 
policy-making in Costa Rica functions as a form of neoliberal 
multiculturalism. The argument of this chapter is that the PSA has 
attempted to integrate some forms of indigenous cultural, economic and 
political demands into its design, albeit also marginalizing, suppressing 
and eroding other aspects of indigenous demands, due to the neoliberal 
imperatives behind the program.  
The PSA program has been deployed in the Bribri and Cabécar 
Indigenous Reserves since 1999. Discursively, this program has been 
designed to be a territorial strategy designed to transform the evanescent 
characteristics of forests – such as their scenic beauty, carbon 
sequestration processes and their protection of biodiversity and 
watersheds – into commodities, which are then privatized by the National 
Forestry Financing Fund for them to be traded in markets. In practice, 
concrete commodification of environmental services remains doubtful as 
the PSA program has not enthralled the national and international private 
sector into constituting a true market of environmental services. Indeed, 
in the Bribri and Cabécar territories, the program has been re-designed 
more as an effort to promote buy-in to conservation than a form of 
capitalist accumulation. Yet, this does not mean that there are no 
ramifications from the ongoing processes of commodification and 
privatization that constitute the main institutional features of the PSA.  
While being presented to the Bribri and Cabécar as a financial 
means to support indigenous demands for political autonomy, the PES 
program has been accompanied by obligations for the Bribri and Cabécar 
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to adopt practices that run counter to their cultural, economic and political 
uses of the forests. The rationale behind this contradiction between 
discourse and practice of the PSA, is the result of PES being framed as a 
solution to perceived local problems of economic efficiency maximization 
of the Bribri and Cabécar agriculture, by the Costa Rican state and 
conservationist NGOs. Green economy measures, like PES, are considered 
by these actors, to have more far-reaching impacts than cacao agroforestry 
since, it is supposed that the main beneficiaries of the program – the 
Indigenous Development Associations (ADI) – will reinvest these 
resources into expenditures on human and social capital, leading to 
poverty reduction.  
Using information collected from the financial statements of the 
Bribri ADI and about 25 interviews done with the local leadership of both 
ADIs, local grassroots organizations and regional indigenous platforms, 
this chapter argues that the PSA has favored autochthonous efforts 
towards territorial autonomy and self-governance to a point. Indeed, the 
program has allowed the ADIs to obtain critically-needed funding that is 
used to reinforce local alternative development programs and local 
governance capabilities. Yet, it has also undermined this political 
autonomy by demanding the use of this funds to locally finance 
conservation actions imposed by the state, as well. This is exemplified by 
the fact that it entails Bribri and Cabécar governance to accept forms of 
conservation and resource uses that are incompatible to their own cultural 
uses of forests. It is relevant to note that this lack of recognition in the PSA 
program has become a major issue in current negotiations between the 
Costa Rican state and indigenous organizations for the development of an 
indigenous agenda within the National REDD+ Strategy. 
The chapter is structured in five sections. The first two deal with the 
configuration of the PSA as a territorial strategy for the Talamancan 
Indigenous Reserves. It explores how the neoliberal objectives of 
commodification and privatization that are inherent to the PSA program 
have been made discursively viable in Talamanca, despite the lack of 
legible and verifiable property rights in the indigenous territories. 
Attention is given to how the solution to this conundrum has sponsored a 
framing of the PES as a financing tool for the indigenous “local 
governments” (i.e.: the ADIs). The following two sections characterize the 
perceived effects of the PSA programs for promoting forms of local 
governance of natural resources. Emphasis is put on whether these 
resources have been used to foster autochthonous forms of resource 
management and on their impingement on cultural uses. The final section 
will bring all these issues together around my discussion on neoliberal 
conservation and territorial and political exclusion through neoliberal 
multiculturalism. 
 139 
7.1. Neoliberal mindsets and the barrier to entry to the 
PSA program 
The incorporation of the Talamancan Indigenous Reserves into the Green 
Economy has been an important goal of recent NGO- and IFO-led 
sustainable development interventions since the implementation of the 
NAMASOL project in the 1990s. Indeed, that project openly argued that: 
“(b)oth the agroforestry system and the forests have an immense value as carbon 
sinks for the global industry” (Borge and Laforge, 1996: 72). The project 
recommended incorporating the entirety of the Bribri and Cabécar 
territories within implementation programs for the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), given that: “(t)he 
money (received from these payments) could then be used to consolidate the 
sustainable development model that Talamanca has managed to create (…) and 
to guarantee the biodiversity of the Talamanca National Park” (Ibid: 72). This 
vision has been also shared by other NGOs supporting sustainable 
development interventions in the area, such as CATIE, which decided to 
link PES with their own efforts towards cacao agroforestry in the early 
2000s (see Lansing, 2007 for more information on this PES project).  
With that said, actual incorporation of the Bribri and Cabécar 
indigenous territories to the renowned Costa Rican PSA program, was 
faced with considerable political resistance from FONAFIFO during the 
early years of implementation. Indeed, between 1998 and 2003, only a 
handful of indigenous territories participated in the program, and the 
ones that did only managed to incorporate a very small fraction of their 
lands (see the following table 5.1). This happened despite FONAFIFO 
recognizing the considerable extension of well-conserved forests that 
these territories could offer the PSA (FONAFIFO, 2001) and ongoing 
pressures by NGOs – like IUCN, CATIE and TNC – to integrate these 
lands into the program (Borge and Martínez, 2009).  
It was not until after 2004, and because of the implementation of the 
Ecomercados project,1 that the PSA began exhibiting a major territorial 
expansion in the indigenous reserves. It matters to know why did 
FONAFIFO resisted to include these territories in the PSA and how does 
these resistances were subsided (partly through indigenous mobilization), 
because that answer is critical to understand the way this PES scheme has 
functioned discursively and practically over the past thirteen years. The 
argument here is that FONAFIFO’s resistance to the inclusion of 
indigenous territories in the PSA reflects a contradiction between the 
neoliberal mindset of the PSA program and the material and ideational 
realities of indigenous territories and cultures. This claim can be argued 
by looking at the bureaucratic and discursive barriers to entry raised by 
the institution to the ADIs over the first years of implementation. 
Perhaps the most noticeable barrier had to do with the lack of 
differentiated rules regarding program enrollment for forest landowners 
trying to enter the program. Indeed, as a former Talamancan Bribri ADI 
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president recalled: “at the beginning, everything was hard because the rules 
were the same for all the people entering FONAFIFO, which resulted in rules that 
could not be fulfilled by the ADIs, and therefore, entry was denied for us” (ADI 
President, interview, May 8th, 2014) Enrollment in the PSA is a 
complicated and, often, frustrating affair that demands numerous 
interactions with different forms of state bureaucracy.  
Table	4.	Contracts	signed	and	hectares	included	by	the	Costa	Rican	Indigenous	
Reserves	in	the	PSA	program.	1997-2015	
Year	 PSA	Protection	 PSA	Reforestation	 PSA-Regeneration	
Hectares	 Payment	 Hectares	 Payment	 Hectares	 Payment	
1997	 1,118.00	 259,678.28	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
1998	 1,308.00	 363,481.50	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
1999	 1,142.00	 320,060.76	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
2000	 3,723.00	 844,941.28	 50.00	 90,120.43	 0.00	 0.00	
2001	 4,199.00	 931,540.66	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
2002	 2,550.00	 542,021.59	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
2003	 6.888.00	 1,465,907.70	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
2004	 7,014.00	 1,501,607.20	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
2005	 6,600.00	 2,112,000.00	 40.00	 32,640.00	 0.00	 0.00	
2006	 2,900.00	 928,000.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
2007	 6,555.60	 2,097,792.00	 0.00	 0.00	 150.00	 32,160.00	
2008	 12,400.60	 3,968,192.00	 0.00	 0.00	 252.50	 53,065.00	
2009	 8,930.20	 2,577,664.00	 0.00	 0.00	 600.00	 130,440.00	
2010	 9,049.80	 2,919,936.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
2011	 10,506.70	 3,362,144.00	 0.00	 0.00	 500.00	 102,500.00	
2012	 12,442.20	 7,963,008.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
2013	 12,282.30	 7,860,672.00	 0.00	 0.00	 155.70	 63,837.00	
2014	 12,421.00	 3,732,515.38	 100.40	 107,032.59	 434.00	 98,318.10	
2015	 10,547.00	 3,279,109.10	 0.00	 0.00	 1,000.00	 279,611.20	
Source:	Elaboration	of	the	author	with	data	provided	by	FONAFIFO.	
For example, a landowner must give proof of having no standing 
debts with social security payments, must hold a formal land title 
accompanied by a legalized and formalized cadastral map including the 
exact geographical data of his land, and hand in a forest management plan 
previously prepared and accepted by a forestry regent (whom will also 
need to oversee field verification and contract monitoring at the behest of 
FONAFIFO) (FONAFIFO, 2015). Each one of these requirements carry an 
economic cost for potential beneficiaries, often making enrollment a very 
onerous affair (Bosselmann and Lund, 2013). Indeed, forest regents alone 
can charge up to 18% of the total payments received by the beneficiaries. 
So, it is no surprise that some poor beneficiaries find the PSA program 
unaffordable, despite owning lands in forested areas deemed critical for 
conservation by SINAC and FONAFIFO (Porras, 2010). 
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While many of these requisites for enrollment have become cost-
related entry barriers for many indigenous beneficiaries over time (see 
Borges and Martinez, 2009), the most relevant limitations have been faced 
regarding the complicated legibility of property rights at indigenous 
reserves. This problem has two different manifestations. On the one hand, 
the ADIs – which are considered the legal owners of the entirety of the 
reserves, in representation of the indigenous communities – often face 
limitations for producing proper land documentation. Historical 
institutional separations between the state agencies in charge of handling 
land titling processes and those doing survey and cadastral work causes 
situations in which ADIs may have slightly contradicting data in both 
documents required for enrolling in the program (Acuña, 2007). Fixing 
these incongruities is a very costly endeavor, given that it sometimes 
requires protracted legal and cadastral measures involving lawyers and 
copious administrative fees. Moreover, these problems with land 
documentation also need to consider the troubling fact that all ADIs are 
not in possession of all the entirety of the lands assigned to them by law 
(Guevara Berger et al., 1996). The Talamancan Bribri and Cabécar 
Reserves have remained incapable of attaining possession of at least 10% 
of the land assigned to them by the state since 1977 (Herrera and 
Benavides, 2016). In some cases, non-indigenous people holding land 
reserved for indigenous uses have the proper land documentation 
proving ownership thereby resulting in contradicting claims and 
considerable land tenure insecurities for both parties. 
On the other hand, property rights within the reserves are 
extremely difficult to track down. In the Talamancan Bribri and Cabécar 
territories proper, land is distributed in many ways. Individual farms 
have small plots of land to be used for their own subsistence and 
commercialization. Yet, different families often share “trabajaderos” (or 
communal working lands) to develop agricultural endeavors with 
members of their extended family or clan structures. While forests may 
exist within these two types of land tenure, other forests are often also 
owned by the different clans (kinship-based structures) in which the Bribri 
and Cabécar organize themselves while still others are under the control 
of the ADIs themselves either as part of their own conservation objectives 
(e.g.: protection of forests and mountains with sacred, cultural or water-
production values) or as unclaimed lands to be redistributed amongst 
poor indigenous families. There may be some small degree of legibility as 
individual family farms sometimes use green fences or barbwire (if they 
can afford it) to close off their plots (or part of them) to avoid livestock 
wandering to cultivation areas or those located in neighboring farms 
(which is a continuous source of conflict between the Bribri and the 
Cabécar). Yet, overall, this veritable mosaic of land tenures completely 
lacks formal legibility as the ADIs have never developed a cadastral map 
or a land survey, not to mention that there may be resistances to doing so 
from some of the locals whom may use resources located at forests owned 
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by the ADIs or the clans (political leader of Talamanca por la Vida y por 
la Tierra, interview, April 20th, 2014). 
All these problems can be considered as obstacles to the neoliberal 
mindset in which the PSA program is based. PES schemes are neoliberal 
policy tools that highlight the commodification and privatization of 
environmental services. Yet, to fulfill this objective, these instruments 
require the prior existence of certain forms of property enclosure that 
could assure the actual and demonstrable transfer of rights over said 
ecosystem services (Castree, 2003). For example, the 1996 Forestry Law – 
which created the PSA – clearly states that FONAFIFO offers 
compensation to the legal proprietors of the land to obtain the rights over 
the environmental services offered. After this, only this government 
agency is permitted to trade these rights with third parties, whether in the 
shape of biodiversity or carbon offsets (Navarro, 2010).  Put differently, 
through the payments made, FONAFIFO is essentially obtaining 
possession of a good, formerly retained by the landowner, thereby 
involving the creation of a new arrangement of property rights (McAfee, 
2012). So, if the service is ill-defined, or there is a lack of clear land rights 
that may hinder a clear transfer of property rights over the environmental 
services provided, then the offsets become goods with uncertain market 
value (Muradian et al., 2010).  
Moreover, seen from the perspective of the landowner, the lack of 
clear and secure property rights may also end up complicating the 
straightforwardness of the payment transference as well. Ideally, a PES 
scheme should operate as an easy exchange involving the fewest number 
of go-betweens and coordination tools as possible, thereby limiting the 
thinning of the payment. Otherwise, the payment will be incapable to 
mirror a well-defined market price structure. Yet, in the case of the Bribri 
and the Cabécar, where land ownership may often involve different actors 
(individual families, clans, ADIs, private owners, contesting neighbors, 
etc.), the risk of dilution is high and therefore the directedness of the 
payment could be compromised, leading to the people owning the land to 
be ineffectively or inadequately recompensed for the services (Muradian 
and Rival, 2012).  
Besides these bureaucratic and property-related barriers, there have 
been others that merit some attention. For example, Borge (2003) notes 
that part of FONAFIFO’s lukewarm approach to indigenous peoples 
reflects the opposition of economic sectors with vested interests in the 
distribution of PSA moneys, an issue that is reflected in the current low-
level participation of indigenous territories in the program, despite having 
the best conserved forests outside of state-owned protected areas (Corbera 
et al., 2011, see also the following graph). This claim was supported by 
many indigenous and mestizo peasant leaders as well (RIBCA 
coordinator, personal interview, August 4th, 2014; UNAFOR coordinator, 
interview, September 23rd, 2014). Documentation on this issue is scarce 
and there have not been many studies exploring the power struggles that 
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take place within the higher institutional levels of FONAFIFO (see 
Fletcher and Breitling, 2012). 
Graph	1.	Comparison	of	hectares	under	PES	in	indigenous	territories	with	non-
indigenous	lands.	1997-2015	
	
Source:	Elaboration	by	the	author	with	data	provided	by	FONAFIFO.	
Even though a department of MINAE, FONAFIFO functions with a 
significant level of independence, being governed by an Executive Board 
that not only includes government officials, but also delegates of the forest 
industry and the financial sector, with no representation offered to other 
forest landowners (e.g.: indigenous peoples and mestizo peasants). 
Therefore some authors often label the entity as a quasi-state institution, 
as its decision-making level tends to function more as a political arena 
between for state and private sector interests (Lansing, 2014). So, 
FONAFIFO’s lukewarm inclusion of indigenous peoples from the PSA, 
some authors argue, could have originated in the unwillingness from 
some groups of beneficiaries in the private forestry sector to allow 
portions of the payments to become available for indigenous peoples (see 
Borges, 2003; Borge and Martínez, 2009; Vaas, 2013; Daniels et al., 2010).  
Some other interviewees, including an interviewed FONAFIFO 
official also point out to preoccupations amongst NGO and PSA officials 
regarding the potential misuse of payments by indigenous peoples as a 
reason for institutional resistance. (FONAFIFO REDD+ official, interview, 
28th April 2014). Indeed, the issue of accountability features prominently 
in discussions about potential changes required by the PSA in order to 
facilitate access by indigenous peoples in the early 2000s. One potential 
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reason may have to do with claims of corruption in the use of said 
resources, an issue that gained some notoriety in the early 2000s when a 
local TV news crew made an exposé on inconsistencies in the expenditure 
of PSA resources by the Talamancan Bribri ADI  (FONAFIFO Regional 
Manager, interview, August 19th, 2014; former ADI president 2003-2004, 
interview, August 15th,  2014). 
7.2. Breaching institutional resistance 
Over the course of the early 2000s, FONAFIFO was coming under 
increased pressures to resolve the access problems faced not only by the 
indigenous territories, but by other non-indigenous small landowners 
failing to access the program, as well. Most of these pressures came either 
from NGOs, which found a lucrative business operating as intermediaries 
for the negotiation of PSA contracts in bulk, on behalf of small landowners 
(Vaas, 2013); OFIs, which had been sponsoring the narrative of PES 
schemes as tools for poverty reduction in rural areas, that was clearly not 
being materialized in Costa Rica; and indigenous organizations and 
national platforms (including the ADIs) which saw the PSA as a 
reasonable alternative for supporting their own forms of governance (see 
Pagiola, 2002).  
In that context, the Ecomercados project was launched through a 
grant of 8 million dollars financed by GEF and designed as a 
comprehensive administrative reform of the PSA that also included a 
considerable expansion of its geographical coverage. Originally designed 
as a tool for re-orienting the PSA to fill perceived gaps in the national 
system of protected areas, the project was influenced by these continuous 
criticisms regarding low level of enrollment of poor farmers. Expectedly, 
the project included a 50% expansion in the number of contracts with 
small landowners until 2009 as one of its main objectives (Borge and 
Martínez, 2009) Attention was quickly granted to the Talamancan 
indigenous Reserves, being not only a poor region, but also towards key 
conservation gaps for the consolidation of the buffer zone of PILA, the 
Costa Rican lynchpin of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. 
Of course, to overcome the contradiction between neoliberal goals 
of the PSA and the territorial realities of the Talamancans, Ecomercados 
did require the elaboration of an informed political and discursive 
strategy to justify their intervention. Such policy strategy was published 
by FONAFIFO in 2003, with the objective of “delineate the (administrative) 
changes required for the three traditional modalities (of the PSA) – Protection, 
Reforestation and (Forest) Management), according to the Bribri-Cabécar 
rationality” (Borge, 2003: 4). It is a lengthy document that resulted from 
negotiations between FONAFIFO and various indigenous organizations, 
including the ADIs. The document focuses on two main goals: 1) appease 
concerns over Bribri and Cabécar misuse of the payments by reframing 
their land management decision-making as being coherent with the PSA 
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mindset; and 2) define the specific modalities with which FONAFIFO was 
to intervene the indigenous reserves, to guarantee the additionality and 
directedness of the payment, efficient ecosystem service commodification, 
poverty reduction goals and as little misuse of resources as possible.  
Regarding the first goal, the strategy basically argues that Bribri and 
Cabécar rationalities fall neatly within the neoliberal economic logic that 
support the PSA. Beginning with a description of Talamancan farming 
practices (that is also bereft of any attention towards the cultural or 
political determinants of these practices), the strategy explains that the 
Bribri and Cabécar dual agricultural system is the result of an economic 
rational choice to maximize labor efficiency, guarantee lower farming 
maintenance costs and maximize farm utility in a wider economic context 
of vulnerable and unstable commodity markets. The argument is then that 
the Talamancans choose to cultivate different plant species at different 
distances and with different uses as a risk management strategy, whereby 
they are meant to guarantee productive and stable harvests to fulfill a goal 
centered on income generation, but without abandoning some forms of 
subsistence production for when markets are not viable. Put plainly, the 
FONAFIFO strategy frames indigenous farmers as marginal utility 
maximizers by default. Their choice of what to produce, when and how is 
determined by the recognition of inefficient markets and the imperative 
to reduce costs to reap high benefits. Conservation is part of this goal as 
maintaining some biological diversity is paramount for reducing farming 
costs regarding plague control.  
However, the perceived problem with this system is that it is 
becoming increasingly vulnerable to population growth. Subsistence 
agriculture is considered here to be incapable of supporting the ongoing 
population burst faced by the Bribri and the Cabécar in the future, at least 
without also leading to some form of colonization of the forests. However, 
for-profit agriculture is deemed incapable of providing enough income to 
the locals to live of these products, given unstable commodity markets. 
So, the FONAFIFO strategy states the necessity of developing new 
alternative forms of production and income generation. 
These perceived assumptions about cultural rationalities of the 
Talamancan indigenous peoples could be logical recipients of neoliberal-
minded PES schemes. Indeed, the actual effectiveness of these programs 
is directly dependent on the role of money transfers at steering land 
management behaviors towards the desired land uses defined by the 
buyers of said ecosystem services, in this case, conservation of forest cover 
(Muradian et al., 2010). This of course, also implies the susceptibility of 
potential users to re-conceptualize nature as a potential subsystem of the 
economy. Indeed, the strategy does further the idea that Bribri and 
Cabécar people already conceptualize Talamancan forests as a form of 
investment and capitalization, but without monetary components. 
Indeed, one of the theses brought back from NAMASOL here, is that while 
much of the Talamancan economy exhibited extremely low levels of 
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monetization, savings or financial investments, Bribri and Cabécar had 
internalized these economic processes within their own land management 
practices, particularly with regards to husbandry animals and forests 
(Borge and Laforge, 1996)  
Of course, while the strategy affirms that the necessary mindset 
exists, attention must be offered to how the PSA is going to be 
implemented without compromising additionality, payment directedness 
and commodification. While the PSA program offers different contract 
modalities – with some oriented towards reforesting pastures and other 
devoted to different forms of forest management that allow a sustainable 
extraction of lumber for productive purpose. The FONAFIFO strategy put 
emphasis on the PSA using contracts centered on conservation of forests 
belonging exclusively to the ADIs. This is not to say that interaction 
between FONAFIFO and the indigenous territories should exclusively 
focus in this modality, implying that this could be the most effective and 
the less conflictive option.  
This conclusion was perhaps the main result of the negotiation 
process between FONAFIFO and the indigenous organizations, according 
to both FONAFIFO officials, the consultant in charge of developing the 
strategy and the indigenous leaders themselves. From FONAFIFO’s point 
of view, forest management and reforestation contracts would require 
various institutional arrangements that would be extremely difficult to 
afford or control by the farmers, the forestry regents or the ADIs 
themselves. For example, forest management contracts would have 
required every individual beneficiary to develop expensive management 
plans and implied new obligations for continuous control of the ADI 
regarding domestic consumption of lumber, that these organizations 
could not possibly afford. Whereas, for a reforestation contract 
FONAFIFO, the regents and the ADI also needed to create a control 
system to avoid farmers from cutting down already existing agroforestry 
systems and to demand an even more costly management plan 
determining which specific tree species were to be planted and following 
specific forest densities (Borge, 2003). Furthermore, and even more 
important, this would have required an intensive intervention of the 
territories in order to clarify land rights over individual patches of land, 
which, according to Bribri leaders interviewed, was bound to generate 
internal conflict. While the idea of an indigenous-minded PSA program 
was certainly put on the table by the indigenous organizations it was 
discarded by FONAFIFO given that it would entail the development of 
complicated institutional arrangements, it would entail the same 
problems and costs as the other options and it would fail to guarantee 
additionality and conditionality of the PSA program. As somebody 
involved in the negotiations said recently: “if someone were to 
demonstrate that there is hunting and cutting down of forest in these 
places then there will be trouble, how could you value biodiversity 
services in that way?” (SINAC Official, interview, August 13th, 2014).  
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On the contrary, the use of a PSA Forest Protection modality on 
forests under control of the local ADIs was a much cheaper and politically 
feasible option for all parts. Instead of a bunch of individual contracts, the 
indigenous territories would only require developing a couple each year, 
thereby reducing forestry regency and forest management costs 
significantly. Moreover, the program could have the chance of focusing 
on bundles of ecosystem services, as ADI forests often include areas with 
great religious and archeological value, with high levels of biodiversity, 
critical to water production, and often in mountainous areas with great 
terrain inclination. Given that these lands have only one owner (the ADI) 
and are considerably large, it is easier for forest regents and PSA officials 
to delimit specific plot sizes for the contracts without overlapping with 
plots from other indigenous peoples. In other words, these are specific 
lands in the territories that are much more susceptible to be bounded and 
put under some form of control for exclusive forms of environmental 
conservation. In other words, the solution was the enclosure of the lands 
with greatest collective social and cultural meaning for the Bribri and the 
Cabécar, with the objective of imposing a conservation-minded financial 
mechanism.  
While this decision to use the PSA at culturally-relevant forests has 
spurred periodic opposition from some sectors of the Bribri and the 
Cabécar, many indigenous leaders interviewed considered it to be the best 
tool for attaining poverty reduction and guaranteeing political autonomy 
and strong institutions to govern the territories:  
“What are we going to conserve if we are losing our lands? No, the first 
thing is the institutional strengthening. Many institutions come here 
and do their investing in building things that we have no use for. For 
example, there is a community center that was built recently and 
nobody is using it, and that’s not fine. We didn’t want that back then. 
For us the priority is to organize ourselves.” (Former ADITIBRI 
President, interview, August 15th, 2014). 
Indeed, this ‘social capital solution’ to the PSA property legibility 
problem was framed as a collective solution for poverty and development 
problems for the entire community in the FONAFIFO strategy:  
“What is looked for (by these projects and interventions) is the visibility 
of the project, a way of proving that budget goals are being met and to 
fulfill the aspirations of the recipient populations, but only for a short 
period of time, of about five years, which is the expected lifespan of 
these endeavors. The indigenous organizations have been making 
these criticisms for more than ten years (…) and on the contrary, they 
point towards efficiency, to serve as leverage for autochthonous 
economic initiatives, support for the political development of the local 
political and entrepreneurial leadership, support for education 
projects, means to collaborate with the defense of natural resources and 
to improve land tenure as a way to stop the threat of potentially 
harmful extractivist tendencies” (Borge, 2003: 68). 
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In other words, what seems to be lacking in the territories is the 
presence of a strong institutional framework that may reorient these 
much-needed interventions and financial investments made from abroad, 
towards supporting a local and autochthonous project of development, or 
as it is argued earlier in the document: “(t)he tasks required to combat poverty 
cannot be continued if not previous sustained by strengthened local institutions. 
Whatever bridge, food distribution process, road or school that may be built will 
not have positive and irreversible results if the institutions that have to deal with 
these affairs are not strengthened as well” (Borge, 2003: 35). In other words, 
for the PSA program to combat poverty in the territories, its focus must be 
re-oriented towards fostering a strong territorial governance (mainly 
through continuous investment on the local ADIs as the informal local 
governments of the territories) and other forms of social capital formation, 
to guarantee a strong indigenous position when approached by NGO and 
state interventions and development projects in the future.  
To summarize, indigenous involvement with the PSA program was 
faced with a complicated problem of how to make the neoliberal 
objectives of commodification and privatization viable in Talamanca, a 
place where the lack of necessary and pre-existent legible and verifiable 
private property rights is noticeable and prevalent and where the cultural 
forms of resources uses were deemed incoherent with the rationale 
needed of potential beneficiaries. Under pressures by NGOs, indigenous 
communities and IFOs, FONAFIFO was forced to deal with this issue and 
the best possible choice was to enclose the lands of the ADIs that were 
deemed to protect particularly important sites for Talamancan culture, 
water provision and cultural uses of resources. The rationale behind this 
choice included a reconceptualization of the Bribri and Cabécar as 
inherently rational economic subjects, and of the PSA becoming a tool for 
fostering autochthonous development, political autonomy and self-
determination. In the following section, I will examine the effects of the 
PSA regarding these latter issues. 
7.3. The benefits of the PSA program 
The Talamanca Bribri and Cabécar Indigenous Reserves were chosen as 
the first indigenous territories to be enrolled in the PSA program. This 
choice was informed by different reasons. First, unlike most indigenous 
reserves in the country, almost all of the land of the TBIR and TCIR is in 
indigenous hands, thereby leading to a higher capability of the ADIs to 
exercise higher levels of control of land use decision-making. Indeed, 
second, despite the numerous administrative, organizational and political 
problems faced by the local ADIs (see chapter 5), governance in these two 
territories is much stronger compared to other indigenous reserves 
(Borges, 2003). Finally, the TBIR and TCIR had previous experience with 
performance-based payment programs in the past, which facilitated 
enrollment procedures to some level (Borge and Martínez, 2009).2 Of 
course, it was not until 2003 that the PSA was significantly expanded due 
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to a higher availability of funding through the Ecomercados project. So, 
while the PSA program was one intervention amongst many before 2003, 
afterwards, FONAFIFO’s PES became one of the most relevant programs 
ever established in the Talamancan indigenous territories. 
The changes implemented to the PSA in 2003 were twofold. On the 
one hand, attention was given to raising the overall coverage of the 
program for indigenous territories. With additional funding coming from 
Ecomercados, FONAFIFO had the resources needed to duplicate the land 
area that indigenous reserves were allowed to include in the PSA contract 
from 300 to 600 hectares yearly. This amount was raised even further to 
1.000 hectares in 2009, due to the additional financial support to the PSA 
offered by Ecomercados II – a much larger Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF)-financed project devoted to the continuation of the overall 
objectives of its predecessor (FONAFIFO Regional Manager, interview, 
August 19th, 2014). On the other, the interaction between FONAFIFO and 
the ADIs was subjected to a flurry of new administrative changes to make 
the PSA much easier to access. Amongst the most important changes, 
FONAFIFO eliminated the requisite of presenting formal cadastral maps 
as part of enrollment requisites for ADIs (though a topographical study 
was still required, in order to ascertain the precise coordinates of forests 
included in the PSA contract) and limits were imposed to charges made 
by forest regents on PSA contracts involving indigenous territories.   
Through these measures, the PSA was rendered more attractive for 
ADIs, given that the new conditions offered were significantly better than 
the ones reserved for private forest owners, whom are limited to sign up 
to 300 hectares yearly and have to pay up to 18% in regency fees, 
compared to the 600 hectares and 8% rates offered to indigenous 
territories. Though these privileges have been questioned by some 
interviewed private sector representatives (Forestry Chamber President, 
interview, September 22nd, 2014), these are staunchly defended by 
FONAFIFO officials noticing the value added to the performance of the 
program well with respect to potential donors and international 
organisms:   
“There is a lot of pressure from the international organisms regarding 
the participation of minorities, especially the indigenous peoples. They 
basically function as spearheads for many funding projects, given these 
specifications. So, for FONAFIFO, and the government in general, to 
support them in this way (easy access to the PSA) has been like to ‘show 
to have done something really well.’ From the perspective of 
international organisms that offer money to FONAFIFO, it is politically 
useful that some of the funds be invested in the indigenous territories.” 
(FONAFIFO Regional Manager, interview, 19th August, 2014).  
Of course, these officials also point to various benefits received by 
the ADIs themselves that merit some discussion and contrast with some 
other drawbacks identified. Perhaps the biggest benefit identified by 
FONAFIFO officials has been the payments themselves. As chapters 3 and 
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5 discussed, ADIs lack any sort of permanent forms of revenue that could 
help finance their functions as the “de facto local governments” of the 
indigenous reserves. Sure, there are potential sources of funding in the 
Integral Development Fund managed by the DINADECO or in other 
direct transfers made by state agencies to the ADIs. Yet, both sources of 
funding cannot be possibly considered as viable alternatives to develop 
autochthonous projects. On one the hand, DINADECO is a political 
organization which overall funding agenda is partly determined by the 
party-in-government, thereby any sort of project developed through there 
would definitely reflect some of the government’s rural development 
objectives. On the other, direct state transfers are also attuned to those 
agencies’ objectives in the territories. Even in the extremely rare case in 
which these projects may consider some degree of political involvement 
of indigenous peoples in planning and design stages, these forms of 
funding have limited lifespans and are often subject to the inner workings 
of political and electoral cycles. This situation is one amongst other 
structural impediments for ADIs to actually engage in a truly autonomous 
form of governance.  
Compared to this, PSA payments offer two perceived benefits. 
These payments are both constant and stable, thereby allowing some 
room to local ADIs to administer resources under short- or medium-term 
expenditure plans, a possibility that is almost non-existent with many 
other sources of revenue. When signed, PSA contracts entail fairly clear 
clauses determining the rate of distribution of the payments within the 
five years during which these contracts are generally active. So, if an ADI 
has managed to put 1.000 hectares yearly in the PSA program, this means 
that at any given point, the association can count with up to five different 
payments disbursed over the course of each year, and with expectations 
of receiving money from the PSA over the course of the following five 
years. Elected political leaders of the ADI during the time of this research 
have argued that the stable disbursement of these resources has certainly 
allowed for expenditures to be effectively administered under investment 
plans (ADITIBRI President, interview, May 8th, 2014). They also pointed 
out the possibility that this entails for developing multi-year 
engagements, such as the development of scholarship programs or for 
paying administrative wages or personnel training – which were 
extremely difficult to finance before the program was established (Former 
ADITIBRI President, interview, 15th August 2014).  
As part of this research, I was permitted an opportunity to look at 
the financial statements of ADITIBRI. It is relevant to say that this was not 
an unfettered access to the accounting books of the association, given that 
many of these documents are considered to be confidential and subject to 
accountability processes organized by the Bribri themselves. However, 
they did offer some evidence that is fairly meaningful to discuss here. 
Regarding overall benefits, these statements do justify claims of the PSA 
payments having become a strategically-important form of revenue for 
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the territories. Indeed, between 2010 and 2013, the roughly 510 million 
colones (about 910.000 US dollars) received from five separate PSA 
contracts constituted an 80% of the total financial resources obtained by 
ADITIBRI. It is worth adding that about 75% of the other sources of 
revenue that the ADI received in that period of time came from non-
permanent sources of money, such as payments from DINADECO, 
resources obtained from the Sixaola Binational River Basin Project and 
others coming from the Mixt Institute of Social Assistance (IMAS) and the 
Housing and Mortgage Bank (BANHVI) related to both targeted poor 
assistance payments and housing bonds, all of which are not only defined 
to be spent in specific obligations, but are also non-permanent forms of 
revenue (see graph 5.2.).  
Graph	2.	Distribution	of	ADITIBRI	budget	by	source	of	income.	2010-2013	(in	
hundreds	of	U.S.	dollars)	
	
Source:	 Elaboration	 by	 the	 author	 made	 with	 data	 obtained	 from	 ADITIBRI	
financial	statements.	
A second perceived benefit has to do with the relative lack of 
political obligations accompanying these resources. Different from most 
other forms of revenue of the ADIs and in particular those coming from 
the state, PSA payments are “free” from obligations for the ADI regarding 
were to invest them. Whereas the Ecomercados strategy contemplated the 
possibility of demanding a local investment plan as a requisite for making 
payments available for indigenous reserves,3 these payments are now 
visualized by the FONAFIFO officials as profit received for a provided 
service, and therefore are not subject to further inquiry or auditing on the 
part of the state agency (FONAFIFO Regional Manager, interview, 
August 19th 2014). This “financial freedom” allows the ADI to decide how 
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to spend the money more effectively, thereby allowing it to concentrate 
on various agendas that are often not contemplated in state- or NGO-led 
projects being executed in the territories. For example, in the past, 
ADITIBRI has used some of these funds in activities that go from 
communal works (e.g.: building and repairing bridges, roads, schools, 
community halls, etc.) to buying lands for guaranteeing the territorial 
integrity of the reserve and financing study scholarships for poor families 
(see Borge and Martínez, 2009). The same goes for the ADITICA as well 
(ADITICA President, interview, August 20th 2014). 
It is relevant to say that most of the money obtained by ADITIBRI 
through the PSA program has been actually spent in administrative costs 
related to the day-to-day operations of this organization. About 236 
million colones (roughly 438.000 US dollars, or 40%) of the money 
obtained from the PSA program has been channeled towards paying 
wages and administrative costs (e.g.: public services, furnishing, facility 
maintenance, etc.) of the indigenous association itself. One must also add 
another 88,5 million colones (roughly 164.000 US dollars, or 15%) which 
have been used to pay ADITIBRI’s legal department or external legal aid 
used for various objectives, including the process of purchasing new lands 
in order to guarantee the territorial integrity of the reserves. In other 
words, with these moneys, the ADITIBRI has managed to develop an 
administrative structure that, as previous presidents argued, was 
previously non-existent. This new structure includes a lawyer and a 
permanent accountant, which seem to have strengthened the legal and 
financial planning of the organization. Besides that, the Association has 
also managed to use PSA funds in order to improve its administrative 
departments and improve on the negotiation capacities of its leadership, 
whether through scholarships or covering various administrative 
expenses required for the organization to have a more noticeable presence 
in the territory. The resources obtained by the ADIs from FONAFIFO have 
certainly constituted a clear advance in the Bribri and Cabécar project of 
guaranteeing political autonomy and autochthonous forms of 
development. 
7.4. The drawbacks of the PSA 
However, there have also been noticeable drawbacks that merit attention. 
One obvious drawback has to do with the financial and territorial 
compromises that the PSA forces upon the Bribri and the Cabécar. 
FONAFIFO – based on conservation priorities defined by SINAC and the 
Ecomercados projects – has deemed that the Talamancan indigenous 
reserves are best approached through the use of contracts under the Forest 
Protection modality. As a result, most of the contacts signed by the Bribri 
and Cabécar ADIs have been designed under this modality over the past 
decade (see following graph). While other modalities may consider 
alternative (though, not indigenous) forest uses, Forest Protection PSA 
contracts emphasize exclusively on the implementation of strict forms of 
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forest conservation, leaving absolutely no ground for alternative or 
cultural uses of the resources being protected (FONAFIFO, 2014). This 
obviously means that the beneficiaries are not allowed to extract trees, 
bushes or other forms of plant life from these lands, which in turn result 
in problems for the communities located nearby. Moreover, hunting and 
fishing are also prohibited in forests under this type of contract modality, 
given that biodiversity protection is one of the ecosystem services being 
paid through the PSA.  
Obviously, these measures contradict with the manner in which the 
Bribri and the Cabécar interpret and use natural resources, and has 
become a continuous source of conflict. At the most far away communities 
located nearby the forests that are currently being put under conservation, 
signs have been raised prohibiting cultural uses of resources, thereby 
provoking the anger of some of the Bribri and Cabécar inhabitants (see 
following figure). This has led some of them to voice their concerns about 
the PSA contract modalities used at the territories not being the best 
alternative. Indeed, one Bribri Community Council leader from San 
Miguel stated in interview that: “(…) according to the International 
Convention 169, they (FONAFIFO) have to adapt to our communal and cultural 
characteristics, not the other way around. We cannot ignore the culture of our 
people, or adapt to their idea of protection” (interview, October 26th, 2014).  
Similar complaints were raised by other community leaders whom 
question that the PSA program does not contemplate indigenous forms of 
conservation or different alternatives of approaching these populations. 
For example, a Cabécar communal leader from Gavilán Canta argued that 
while the PSA program is undoubtfully important for ADITICA and 
ADITIBRI, PSA could fulfill its goals though other alternative modalities 
more consistent with indigenous practices, “(…) because when the PSA is 
inserted here, then you cannot touch anything, and sure, that is very romantic. 
But, in our cultural context, we engage in a sustainable use of the forests, they 
give us food and housing, etc. If they say to us that we cannot use forests any 
longer, then they should offer us an alternative” (interview, October 19th, 
2014). Some others have also expressed their concern regarding the use of 
communal ADITIBRI lands within these contracts, given that some of 
them do hold a significant cultural or religious meaning. Indeed, 
FONAFIFO has actively suggested the ADIs to include forests with 
cultural or religious value within the PSA with the purpose of reducing 
operative costs and avoiding any form of potential conflicts regarding the 
distribution of moneys or the imposition of unwanted obligations 
between clans or individuals. Yet for some Bribri and Cabécar leaders 
interviewed, this is a problematic measure as these lands do serve a 
cultural purpose and their commodification is seen with serious 
preoccupation. To synthesize, while there are clear benefits being 
obtained for the purpose of solidifying indigenous governance over the 
territories and promoting political and territorial autonomy, the PSA 
contract do require the Talamancan indigenous peoples to relinquish their 
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control over patches of their lands, negatively affecting cultural access and 
use over natural resources. 
Map.	5.	Location	of	PSA	contracts	at	the	Talamanca	Bribri	and	Talamanca	
Cabécar	Indigenous	Reserves.	2010-2015	
	
Source:	 Elaboration	 by	 the	 author	 with	 data	 from	 FONAFIFO	 and	 the	
Development	Observatory	of	the	University	of	Costa	Rica	
For some of the local, and more radical, Bribri leaders that counter 
the current configuration of the PSA, this contradiction is further 
aggravated by their impression that a great part of the resources obtained 
by the ADIs through PSA does not get channeled towards indigenous 
agendas. Their view is that these resources are either used to finance the 
very same conservation obligations acquired by the ADIs or misused 
(political leader of Talamanca por la Vida y por la Tierra, interview, April 
15th 2014). These claims are not entirely untrue, but neither are 
undeniable facts. Regarding the first one, it is true that some of the money 
gets spent on administrative costs related to the PSA contract. Indeed, 
ADITIBRI has been obliged to hire two indigenous park rangers (Dualok-
Kimu) for various environmental monitoring purposes including 
enforcing prohibitions on the use of natural resources at the PSA-
protected forests. Moreover, it is also clear that part of the money obtained 
from the contract gets spent in paying the forest regent, per FONAFIFO’s 
contract obligations. Yet, the actual money spent on these activities does 
not equal a majority of the PSA-related disbursements, but only about 
20%, which is a high percentage, but not as controversial as some of these 
leaders suggests. 
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Now, regarding the second part of the claim, there have been cases 
of misuse of PSA resources in the past. Interviewees spoke of at least two 
major controversies regarding the misuse or mishandling of the PSA 
contracts by the Talamancan Bribri ADI. One related to the decision of the 
Executive Board to allocate part of the PSA contract to the farm of one of 
its members, thereby diverting a percentage of resources for his own 
benefit. Another case entailed disputes regarding the allocation of these 
resources between rival political groups represented at the Association. 
That specific case did gain public attention as a result of an exposé done 
by one of the major national TV networks. Though the incident provoked 
a temporary halt in PSA disbursements to the ADITIBRI, while the CGR 
audited the records, this investigation ended up finding no evidence of 
misuse of resources whatsoever (CGR, 2004).   
It is relevant to say that these problems took place early on the 
implementation of the PSA in the territories, and similar cases of misuse 
or mishandling have not been presented in such magnitudes ever since. 
As a result, it is extremely difficult to generalize such cases as a form of 
widespread corruption. This is without mentioning that, as one ex-
president of ADITIBRI argued, could be to make the case for external 
actors whom would like some say on the usage of PSA resources at the 
expense of Talamancan indigenous autonomy. Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of this dissertation, what needs to be taken away from these 
accusations is not the veracity of these claims, but the fact that the PSA has 
the potential of becoming a source of internal political conflict amongst 
the Bribri and Cabécar, specifically regarding different and contesting 
views on what should be the best means for the Talamancans to attain 
their cherished political autonomy.  
Indeed, though arguments both in favor and against the PSA 
contract tend to agree on the importance of the payments for 
strengthening the finances and administrative capabilities of ADITIBRI, 
the main issue of divergence has to do with how its current configuration 
entails preoccupying similarities with other problematic forms of state 
intervention and the impacts of these over the goal of attaining political 
autonomy and autochthonous development. In this context, a great deal 
of the Bribri and Cabécar groups holding leadership positions have 
contemplated a moderated position hinging on the possibility of reform 
of the PSA contract modalities to acquiesce to the needs of indigenous 
populations and their cultural uses. Whereas, the more radical groups 
have engaged with the issue with growing concern about the actual 
potential of the PSA to fulfill on promises for local political autonomy, 
considering the entire program as benefitting not the Bribri or the Cabécar, 
but FONAFIFO, intermediary NGOs and the businesses that could 
eventually pay for carbon abatement certificates in the future. Indeed, as 
one of these leaders said in interview:  
“(t)he PSA are the sale of the most important product of Great 
Talamanca, the big intermediaries are the ones that are pushing that 
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agenda onto us, and the investment of those resources often leaves us 
wondering because objectives are not being fulfilled. We should not be 
going around begging for resources, because we should be the first 
benefitted, yet we are the last. The indigenous communities should 
have been the first in benefitting from biodiversity, and I do not know 
why we are running behind the government, when it is them that 
should be behind us. We are the only culture that have conserved these 
resources, so when are they going to pay us back for what they taken 
from us? Why do they want the mountain if they don’t even work it? 
(political leader Talamanca por la Vida y por la Tierra, interview, April 
15th, 2014). 
It is quite noticeable that while some Bribri and Cabécar leaders may 
be prone to consider approaches to political autonomy that contemplate 
negotiation with state institutions, there is a general sense of criticism with 
regards to how the PSA program has operated in the territories. Such 
criticisms, particularly in what regards to the ongoing costs of the PSA, it 
is incompatibility with indigenous uses of the forests and the 
relinquishing of territorial autonomy over patches of indigenous land 
need to be sorted out. REDD+ negotiation offered an opportunity for 
renegotiating their incorporation to the PSA program, and by extension of 
their interaction with the state in these terms.  
To summarize, while it is clear that the PSA contract has been an 
extremely useful policy for developing an autochthonous form of 
governance, and a stepping stone towards political autonomy, it has 
externally-imposed boundaries to what it can truly accomplish. The 
instrument entails indigenous people to relinquish their political and 
territorial control of considerable patches of their land in order to 
accommodate conservation agendas and mindsets which are definitely 
not coherent with their own. Moreover, it is a tool that also entails 
considerable costs of operation which reduce its own potential as a means 
for attaining true political autonomy and it has become a conflictive issue 
for internal politics, which also aggravates the problem. 
7.5. Conclusions 
As I have shown, the PSA has provided a chance for developing a new 
type of relationship between Bribri and Cabécar indigenous communities 
and the Costa Rican state in the Talamanca region. It is also an image of 
the complex ways in which current indigenous activism takes place in this 
country, as the Bribri and the Cabécar have decided to organize their 
demands through the establishment of institutional tools and new 
political spaces of participation inside the state and not utilizing open 
mobilization. Of course, the PSA is not a novel instance of participation in 
any way as the country has engaged with forest conservation subsidies 
and semi-market tools since the 1980s. Yet, neoliberal multiculturalism 
has made the PSA an important device to accommodate for indigenous 
demands.  
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For the communities involved, the goal of attaining control over the 
territories they inhabit becomes a more tangible possibility under the 
financial resources provided by the PSA thereby leading to a greater 
development of indigenous territorial governance capabilities. The PSA 
program has become a key source of revenue for the local ADIs to solidify 
their jurisdiction over the indigenous territories of Talamanca, and has 
also transformed into a very important tool for mustering resources for an 
improved administration of some public services, building local 
infrastructure and strengthening the political acumen of the indigenous 
leadership. These results were not part of the principles that sustain the 
PSA program. On the contrary, its main goal, at least discursively, is the 
commodification and privatization of indigenous forests. Yet, in order to 
do so in the Talamancan Indigenous Reserves, it has been obliged to 
acclimatize to these institutions and develop a critically important 
political tissue that has helped indigenous peoples to get near to their 
objectives of political and territorial autonomy and self-governance.  
For the majority of indigenous leaders, the PSA program constitutes 
an occasion to overcome the disappointments of past government 
initiatives to ease self-governance and indigenous participation. By 
negotiating the PSA in order to suit the political demands of the territories, 
indigenous ADIs have managed to reach a pertinent role in the 
autochthonous development of the territories. For some Bribri and 
Cabécar leaders, through the PSA, the idea is that they are now in a 
position of exercising their right to define the conditions under which 
development in their territories is envisaged. An issue that they prove 
through the fact that the ADITIBRI has managed to develop budgets for 
social programs, infrastructure and local political organization.  
Yet, it is also clear that the PSA – even though seen favorably – is, in 
the end, an imperfect approach to attain their objectives of territorial self-
government. In practice, the PSA program provides an insufficient 
amount of money to the territories compared to most other municipalities 
in the country, an important amount of the money received gets spent on 
activities related to the maintenance of the PSA, and there is a consistent 
potential of the program to provoke internal conflicts. This is without 
stating that the PSA also involves the ADIs to renounce their political 
control over parts of the territories for the duration of the contracts and 
that it implies acknowledging forms of conservation and resource uses 
that are completely alien to the cultural uses of indigenous communities 
in Talamanca. PSA may be a pertinent tool for aiding political autonomy, 
but it does not go beyond a shallow level and it is not a mechanism for 
safeguarding their collective possession over the land. Its goal is clear and 
simple: protect buffer zones, and protected areas through the active 
commodification and privatization of these resources. 
Neoliberal multiculturalism entails the implementation of new 
spaces for political participation by the state in order to make headway in 
achieving development or conservation goals which are also defined by 
 158 
the state. In the context of neoliberal governance, this means the allocation 
of obligations to civil society and the decentralizing of state 
responsibilities to the markets. Bribri and Cabécar activists have 
acknowledged this by observing the limitations of the PSA program. The 
institutional resistances towards the recognition of indigenous cultural 
uses of resources is a clear indication that the PSA is limited and non-
conducive towards territorial autonomy, because it does not give them the 
tools to consolidate their control over the territories inhabited. Though the 
successes of the PSA for supporting indigenous governance must not be 
undervalued, it is clear that its promise as a tool for consolidating political 
autonomy in insufficient.  
In conclusion, the PSA program has provided an opportunity for 
Bribri and Cabécar organizations to negotiate with the state, in spite of 
obstacles still in its implementation. Aware of these boundaries and the 
neoliberal mindsets inherent to these mechanisms, activists use these new 
political spaces because they provide a chance to engage in discussions 
with the state through demands of territorial autonomy. Because of these 
obstacles, the Bribri and the Cabécar have sought to reframe their 
demands around the notion of an indigenous-minded PSA program and 
their own notion of Bribri and Cabécar environmental governance in the 
context of the recently finalized REDD+ negotiations. The idea of a 
Talamancan governance implies the restitution of protected areas and the 
reorientation of PSA contracts to the communities that inhabit them and 
their institutions. In short, this idea of governance is based on a notion of 
self-government of indigenous territories, requiring the recognition of 
territorial rights and cultural uses of resources, as well as some form of 
representation in decision-making regarding these instruments. The 
following chapter will discuss this and will reinforce the point made here 
that these new opportunities for participation do not necessarily translate 
into significant policy changes by the state on territorial autonomy or 
towards indigenous peoples.   
 
 
Notes 
1 Ecomercados was a two-stage project implemented by FONAFIFO between 
2000 and 2016. The main objective of the project was to expand the coverage 
of the PSA program by introducing 200.000 additional hectares. This 
expansion was directly oriented by at least two main objectives: harmonizing 
the goals of the PSA with those of the national conservation policies and 
democratizing access to the program in order to deal with inequalities 
regarding access of poor forest owners into the PSA. The first goal was 
achieved by guaranteeing that new forested areas included were located in 
priority zones for the consolidation of the Costa Rican section of the 
Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. The second goal was meant to be achieved 
by expanding participation of a greater percentage of women and indigenous 
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territories into the PSA (Borge and Martínez, 2009). The project was also 
meant to develop considerable reforms within the administrative structure of 
FONAFIFO in order to accommodate to the necessities of new PSA users and 
to facilitate access for the most vulnerable sectors. The first stage of the 
Ecomercados Project was financed with an 8 million dollar-grant from the 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF), and a 11,2 millon dollar-donation from 
the German Development Bank (KfW). Perceived success of the initial project 
justified a continuation of the Ecomercados project in 2008 through a 30 
million dollar-loan with the World Bank and another 10 million dollar-
donation from GEF (FONAFIFO, 2012). Over the course of this second 
iteration of the project, FONAFIFO committed to expand PSA coverage by 
including an additional 288.000 hectares (190.000 of these located within 
buffer zones for protected areas and connecting biological corridors) with an 
additional increase of 50% in the number of small forest owners. 
2 Before the creation of the PSA, the two reserves had been part of small 
government initiatives to diminish deforestation through the use of forest 
credits that private companies could later exchange for tax exemptions in the 
Forest Certificate Program (a predecessor to the PSA) (Ortiz et al., 2003). Some 
NGOs, like the Small Grants Fund (SGF) – a funding platform for grassroots 
organizations financed by GEF and administered by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) – had also financed very small PES-like 
programs since the early 1990s (Borges and Martínez, 2009). Indeed, it was 
with support of GEF, that ADITIBRI and ADITICA (the Bribri and Cabécar 
associations, respectively) managed to fulfill with the onerous requirements 
to enter the PSA in 1998. 
3 As said earlier in this chapter, FONAFIFO officials were concerned of 
potential misusage of PSA resources by indigenous territories. In this context, 
they contemplated the possibility of asking the indigenous territories to 
present an investment plan in order to audit their uses of the resources 
obtained. However, this possibility was quickly opposed by the Bribri and 
Cabécar at the time and continues to be resisted at this point. When prompted 
by the question of their disposition to hand in an investment plan for the PSA 
if that was proposed at the REDD+ negotiation, a former ADITIBRI president 
argued that: “(i)f they do not ask this requisite of whomever John Doe (translated 
from Spanish: “fulano de tal”) from Puerto Viejo, whom is a foreigner and has 300 
hectares of PSA, then I don’t know why they should be asking for this to us. We could 
provide something like that to FONAFIFO, but only as a small detail, a courtesy if 
you will, and never because we’re obliged legally to do so” (former ADITIBRI 
President, interview, May 18th, 2014). 
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8 Neoliberal multiculturalism and 
REDD+ in the Talamanca Valley 
 
“We are realists, for us REDD+ is just a pretext for putting our agenda 
at the government’s table. (…) If they manage to sell carbon or not, we 
do not care. We are concentrated in defining and negotiating an agenda 
that should offer the bases in which REDD+ or whichever project that 
comes later should operate upon when entering in our land. That’s our 
first priority. The second is to develop an indigenous-minded PSA.” 
(RIBCA representative, interview, August 4th, 2014). 
This chapter follows-up on the politics of payments of ecosystem services 
in the Talamancan Bribri and Cabécar Indigenous Reserves, from the 
perspective of neoliberal multiculturalism. With that purpose in mind, it 
explores the negotiation about the conditions of indigenous incorporation 
into de PSA program between indigenous organizations and the Costa 
Rican state, in the context of REDD+. Since 2010, FONAFIFO has been 
designing the country’s main policy commitments and adjustments to be 
made to the PSA as part of their contribution to the global REDD+ 
initiative. In return, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) has 
proposed a 64 million dollar-disbursement in exchange of rights over 
prevented carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. So 
far, the Costa Rican REDD+ Strategy entails expanding the coverage of the 
PSA program, partly by increasing carbon sequestration practices through 
the sustainable production and consumption of lumber and the 
improvement of government capabilities for controlling illegal 
deforestation (MINAET and FONAFIFO, 2011). If approved, the Strategy 
will be implemented nationwide, with substantial effects on the 
Talamancan Bribri and Cabécar Indigenous Reserves, given the well-
conserved nature of their forests and biodiversity and their strategic 
location as buffer zones of RBLA. 
For indigenous activists at these negotiations, REDD+ constitute an 
opportunity for enacting various necessary adjustments for the PSA 
program that they perceive are required to suit their cultural and 
livelihood needs. Yet, there has been considerable resistance from 
FONAFIFO officials whom are preoccupied with the potential effects of 
such changes in the program’s conditionality, verification and 
monitoring. All of these technical aspects are perceived to be more 
relevant for FONAFIFO, given that REDD+ is much more focused on 
adequate carbon sequestration accounting than the PSA program before 
it. With information collected from official REDD+ documentation, the 
aforementioned sources and 10 interviews with officials from FONAFIFO 
and the MINAE involved in the National REDD+ negotiations, I conclude 
that these negotiations have offered some room for designing a more 
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culturally-adjusted PSA modality. With REDD+, the PSA does not counter 
the existing state governance oriented towards institutionalizing 
conservation practices involving preservationist approaches, private 
property regimes and resource commodification at the expense of 
indigenous claims over land and territorial autonomy. Indeed, much like 
in the case of the PSA, REDD+ seems as a “mirage” of fulfillment of long-
standing claims of indigenous autonomy and self-determination, and 
therefore, can be considered to be a continuation of neoliberal 
multiculturalism.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first one 
contextualizes and describes the main tendencies regarding the global and 
national design of REDD+. The international negotiation process is 
characterized by focusing on several conflictive issues that are relevant for 
understanding the Costa Rican case. Specifically, the chapter follows up 
on the political tensions that have appeared after the implementation of 
market-based conservation measures in this country (as shown in chapter 
4). Current forestry framework in Costa Rica is determined by the tension 
between a market- and an interventionist-oriented forest policy agendas, 
both of which are dominant vis-à-vis other forest narratives, such as the 
ones coming from the indigenous territories. The second section describes 
how these narratives were capable of taking over the discussion of 
REDD+, thereby delineating the policy arena and the major policy goals 
of administrative reform of the PSA. The third section centers on the 
political mobilization of the indigenous territories and how it has been 
able to open up spaces for participation in the REDD+ process. Attention 
is also given to how these opportunities for participation have fared for 
indigenous platforms like the Bribri-Cabécar Indigenous Network 
(RIBCA), and the internal conflicts produced with other indigenous 
organizations. The fourth section delineates the main conclusions reached 
throughout the chapter.  
8.1. Contextualizing REDD+ in Costa Rican forests 
8.1.1. The international context 
Much of the literature about REDD+ harbors a very optimistic notion of 
the future of this policy. Articles abound regarding its recognition as an 
“opportunity” to obtain a mutually beneficial agreement between all 
relevant actors involved in climate change negotiations (Skutsch and 
McCall, 2010). Plainly put, REDD+1 is an international financial 
mechanism based on environmental performance that would use a 
combination of market and non-market incentives as a means of 
promoting the effective reduction of carbon emissions produced by 
deforestation and forest degradation.2 The logical base of this program is 
that productive activities may be oriented towards leaving forest 
resources intact or towards forest renewal processes as long as the 
adequate economic incentive is provided to them beforehand (Baez, 2011).  
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Discursively, REDD+ is presented as a win-win solution, as it will 
simultaneously contribute to climate change mitigation, promoting the 
conservation of vital ecosystems yet also fomenting alternative and 
profitable sustainable land uses and economic activities that could help 
relieve rural poverty (Di Gregorio et al., 2013). Surely, put in these terms, 
REDD+ is a very attractive policy, but one cannot deny that such 
narratives tend to lose sight of the fact that conservation and development 
are highly politicized social constructions, thereby subjected to the 
complicated nature of environmental politics, where grey areas abound 
along with uneven compensations for efforts made, and logically, also 
winners and losers (Büscher, 2010). This is why it is necessary to 
comprehend the manner in which the political context in which REDD+ 
is being developed and how the agreements reached are also defined by 
political conflict and asymmetries between the actors involved.  
There have been numerous inflexion points in the development of 
the REDD+ initiative. A relevant one for the purposes of this dissertation 
has to do with the distribution of social and environmental benefits and 
drawbacks of its implementation for indigenous peoples. There are fears 
amongst transnational indigenous platforms that REDD+ financial 
mechanism may lead to larger income dependence on forests for both the 
public and the private sector due to the potential profitability of the 
carbon stock market. These new political and economic incentives could 
eventually lead private companies and state conservation agencies to 
engage in a more centralized, restrictive and top-down control of the 
forested lands from where these rights over carbon stocks originate, at the 
expense of forest uses of more vulnerable actors, such as indigenous 
peoples, threats of displacement, food security concerns and serious 
hindrances to indigenous cultures and traditions (Sandbrook et al., 2010; 
Griffiths, 2007).  
This is the main reason why indigenous peoples have expressed 
serious concerns regarding the policy design of REDD+, particularly with 
regards to how benefits are going to be distributed and which kinds of 
environmental and social safeguards and grievance mechanisms are 
going to be considered and implemented (Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011). An 
overall consensus on some of these matters was achieved in the context of 
COP-16 in Cancun in 2010, given the recognition by the parties that, first, 
each country has to guarantee the presence of the necessary 
environmental and social safeguards for defining the rights of indigenous 
people to the forest; and second, that whatever the choice regarding the 
nature of the national REDD+ design at each country, it would require 
considerable consultation with local counterparts in order to assure some 
form of recognition of identities, demands and uses of the forest 
(Schroeder, 2010). Moreover, other parties also agree that REDD+ must be 
implemented under the rubric of strengthening forest and land rights of 
indigenous peoples by shifting ownership to these groups and designing 
national programs to include these processes (Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011). 
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Having said that, the question remains regarding the manner of 
implementation of all of these ideas. Surely, the idea of strengthening land 
rights may be contemplated from the perspective of historical demands to 
political autonomy, self-determination and autochthonous development, 
but it can also be interpreted from the perspective of promoting private 
property rights and the elimination of communal properties that are of 
critical importance to some indigenous communities (Larson, 2011).  
The scale of implementation of REDD+ constitutes a second and 
also relevant inflexion point to consider. Literature on this particular issue 
often concentrates in how is REDD+ negotiated at a national and regional 
level leading to considerable variety in implementation mechanisms and 
how does this variegation translates into future problems for 
additionality, conditionality and carbon stock and emission accountability 
(see Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Schroeder, 2010; Verchot and Petkova, 
2010). Effectively, a major debate considered has to do with the “plus” in 
REDD+ as the mechanism has been widened to include plenty of other 
agendas going well beyond avoided deforestation and forest degradation, 
transforming REDD+ into an agenda that, as one interviewee put it: “is 
everything and nothing at the same time” (FONAFIFO consultant, interview, 
March 31st, 2014). All of these issues are of great importance, though I 
believe that we need to concentrate on how this variegation could affect 
the political ecology of REDD+, especially regarding indigenous rights to 
and uses of the forest. 
The characteristics of REDD+ programs at each national level are 
significantly diverse, constituting a reflection of the various combinations 
of measures and policy instruments derived from each one country’s 
particular economic, political, cultural, historical and environmental 
contexts (Corbera et al., 2011).  This is why it is feasible to think that 
national REDD+ programs would undoubtedly reflect the various 
interests with regards to access and use of forests from promoting a much 
insidious use of market-oriented conservation strategies, to expanding 
and augmenting the state-mandated areas devised for conservation 
purposes. To contemplate national REDD+ programs working side-by-
side with some forms of sustainable uses of forests in the context of 
agriculture, agroforestry or even energy production, is not a far-fetched 
scenario.  
8.1.2. The national context 
The current rural landscape in Costa Rica has been determined by 
important processes of land use change over the past decades. While there 
are economic and cultural factors that are relevant to understand, what 
has happened during this time, the role of policy changes regarding forest 
governance should be noted as one of the most important ones. Until the 
1970s, Costa Rican forest governance regime was based in a “laissez faire” 
approach, whereby existing rules allowed and even promoted the 
colonization of the agricultural frontier through the transformation of 
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forest into pasture, whether for grazing or agricultural practices (de 
Camino et al., 2000). This regime was based on the development of various 
economic incentives that included credit systems and fiscal subsidies 
designed to promote land titling based on the occupation of lands and 
their “improvement” through productive uses (Brockett and Gottfried, 
2002).  
The approval of the 1969 Forestry Law constituted a critical moment 
in the development of the forestry regime in Costa Rica. Legitimized by 
academic and environmental concerns regarding a potential natural 
resource security crisis due to the massive deforestation exhibited by the 
country between the 1940s and the 1960s, the new law defined a new 
approach to forest policy centered on command-and-control, 
hierarchically-based and top-down instruments for forest conservation. It 
was a multifaceted agenda based on three distinct measures: first, the 
creation and expansion of a system of protected areas under direct 
administration of the state. This system was based on a mandate oriented 
towards a fences-and-fines approach emphasized on the strict 
preservation of natural resources (Campbell, 2002). A second measure 
was the implementation of a new legal framework for forest 
administration in privately-owned lands. While on paper the objective 
was to promote sustainable uses of forests, in practice the effect was the 
elevation of transaction costs for activities of forest exploitation, though 
the inclusion of new taxes, tariffs and administrative fees (Brockett and 
Gottfried, 2002). Finally, there was a third, albeit less relevant measure 
imposed regarding the use of fiscal subsidies as an incentive for 
reforestation.  
While one may not diminish the accomplishments of command-
and-control instruments applied since the 1970s, these measures were 
ineffective to curb deforestation, not to mention that these were strongly 
opposed by various actors of the Costa Rican rural landscape. By the mid-
1980s, the system of protected areas had not achieved the necessary 
popular support given the high social costs of its initial establishment. 
Meanwhile, forest exploitation restrictions were harsh and constantly 
opposed by the forest industry, which occasionally tried to evade 
enforcement obtaining permits through corruption. These restrictions 
were also difficult to monitor and verify by the state. Finally, the fiscal 
subsidies were only accessible to large owners of forested lands (see 
Campbell, 2002; Carriere, 1991). Moreover, the forestry policy sector as a 
whole was undermanned and underfunded, leading to evident difficulties 
to respond to the many changes been faced by the country’s forests as a 
result of the Debt Crisis of the early 1980s and the subsequent structural 
adjustment (Borges-Mendez, 2008). 
In this context, and as I have shown in chapter 4, a new policy 
narrative appeared reforming the forestry sector in view of the perceived 
deficiencies of the command-and-control approach to attend 
deforestation, specifically regarding private forests. The most evident 
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aspect of this narrative has been the notion that forests conservation 
cannot be done through continuous efforts to isolate forests from 
economic production. Early on, IFIs, alongside externally-funded 
academic institutions (e.g.: CATIE and the Agricultural School of the 
Humid Tropics, EARTH) and international NGOs, began pushing for 
policy changes in favor of devolved forest management and 
harmonization of state action with private forestry interests, while 
espousing a discourse of public choice and government failure (Carriere, 
1991). One of the main efforts has been focused on developing forest uses 
that may dissuade owners to deforest their lands, by allowing to recognize 
the inherent financial and commodity value of forests. This focus is 
somewhat reflected in the inclusion of a new economic language in the 
1986 Reform to the Forestry Law, but more notably, in the passing of the 
1996 Forestry Law and the 1998 Biodiversity Law, which amongst other 
changes: 1) decentralized decision-making and the administrative 
operation of the state forest management and 2) created FONAFIFO and 
the PSA program.  
While chapter 4 concentrated on the use of PES as one of the most 
emblematic green economy measures implemented in the country, since 
1996, other measures were taken in order to neoliberalize the Costa Rican 
environmental policy sector. For example, state forest management has 
been restructured and decentralized considerably as a result of the 
creation of the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC), leading 
to the formation of a structure of territorially-based offices working with 
considerable financial and administrative autonomy. This was 
accompanied by the establishment of several democratization 
mechanisms, which included new spaces for political consultation that 
have raised the influence of IFIs, international donors and NGOs 
regarding the decision-making process at each conservation area (without 
necessarily improving relations of the state with less influential political 
groups like indigenous peoples or peasant farmers) (Isla, 2015). Parallel to 
this, and as shown in previous chapters, the PSA is a mechanism devoted 
to the commodification and privatization of forest rights as a means of 
developing an ecosystem services market that could regulate forest-
related decision-making processes in the privately-owned forests. Indeed, 
it was created as a replacement of existing subsidies in response to 
demands by the IFIs that forest policy be based on market self-regulation 
rather than state intervention (Lansing, 2014b). These two changes are 
oriented towards defining new and more efficient financial mechanisms 
for supporting environmental management and dealing with 
deforestation (Honey, 1999). 
This new forestry governance regime does not imply the dissolution 
of what preceded it. Indeed, in a country like Costa Rica were neoliberal 
reform has been greatly countered by political resistance (even from some 
of its elites), there exist contradictions that reflect the tensions and difficult 
compromises made by political actors seeking to implement market-
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oriented approaches and the ones which recognized the importance of a 
robust state-centered model of forest conservation. A great deal of the 
literature on the matter talks about a “hybrid forest governance”, as a 
means of referring to the internally contradictory result of this 
compromise in policy-making (see Brockett and Gottfried, 2002; 
Campbell, 2002; Fletcher and Breitling, 2012; Vaas, 2013). This hybrid 
governance features aspects of each approach simultaneously, with new 
market-oriented measures accompanying a set of still relevant 
hierarchically-based interventionist policies of the previous regime. For 
example, the PSA follows this tendency being, on paper, a mostly market-
oriented approach to ecosystem services; while also exhibiting a 
considerably relevant role of the state. Indeed, as Fletcher and Breitling 
(2012) argue, the state does feature prominently in the PSA, as the 
program is being financed almost exclusively by taxes and public 
revenues obtained from IFI donations and credits, with little input from 
private sector companies. These authors do not doubt the claim that the 
PSA is a neoliberal conservation mechanism, but they also consider that it 
is important to acknowledge and study these internal contradictions. 
Effectively, stimuli for voluntary carbon markets have not led to the actual 
formation of local or international ecosystem services markets since the 
creation of the PSA. Moreover, the state also holds a critical role defining 
conservation priorities of the program by fiat, with little to no role of 
markets on the decision (Vaas, 2013).  
Like Fletcher and Breitling (2012), I am not arguing that the PSA 
program is no less neoliberal in any way. The fact that the state plays a 
significant role is not unusual, nor inconsistent with other forms of 
neoliberalization, as the state is always a key actor in establishing the 
necessary institutions for markets to actually be established (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002). Neither is it highly unusual that the state plays an important 
role in PES (see McAfee and Shapiro, 2010). Moreover, the PSA it is 
evidently based in a discourse emphasizing the commodification and 
privatization of environmental services, and functions through the 
effective appropriation of rights over these ecosystem services for sale in 
the international carbon market, as commodities. Even if the program 
does feature some form of hierarchical governance, it retains sufficient 
neoliberal characteristics through this discursive basis, as well as clear 
capabilities to potentially produce deleterious results (Matulis, 2012). My 
point is that attention must be given to the interplay of these policy 
narratives as both influences are extremely relevant when looking at the 
opportunities and obstacles to participation for the indigenous 
communities in the PSA, and now, in REDD+. 
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8.2. REDD+ negotiations in Costa Rica 
8.2.1. A “limited” playfield: dominant narratives and the 
REDD+ negotiations 
The Costa Rican preparation to REDD+ began in 2008. With the approval 
of the Bali Action Plan at COP-13, various international platforms were 
created in order to finance the various arrangements for developing 
countries to get ready for the implementation of REDD+. The readiness 
process in Costa Rica has been mostly funded by the FCPF (a REDD+ 
readiness platform established by the World Bank), though there has also 
been some additional financial support coming from the German 
Development Agency (GiZ), the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD), the United Nations’ REDD platform (UN-REDD) 
and the State Department of the United States (through USAID). Each of 
these platforms has concentrated in particular aspects of the readiness 
process (such as political consultation, the development of the safeguards 
information and monitoring and verification systems), meaning that the 
process can best be characterized as a fairly complex institutional and 
organizational arrangement whereby it sometimes feels that there is not 
one single REDD+ readiness process going on in Costa Rica, but several 
at once. While FONAFIFO has attempted to centralize decision-making 
processes around a National REDD+ Secretariat (i.e.: a department within 
FONAFIFO’s administrative structure) and a REDD+ Commission 
composed of all interested parties, it is undeniable that the convergence of 
so many funding agencies and organization has led to a messy negotiation 
process.  
As said, FCPF is the main funding organization in the Costa Rican 
REDD+ readiness process, and also the actor that fired the starting shot to 
the process, by selecting Costa Rica as a participant country of their 
Preparation Fund for REDD+, and committing to the future purchase of 
carbon emissions for up to 63 million U.S. dollars, once a National REDD+ 
Strategy and a Emissions Reduction Program be designed by the local 
authorities (FCPF, 2008; 2014).This purchase of carbon emissions is seen 
by FONAFIFO as a critical source of funding for the PSA (director, 
National REDD+ Secretariat, interview, September 28th, 2014). According 
to officials of the Secretariat, the FCPF constituted the logical alternative 
for financial support, given that the World Bank had developed a strong 
relationship with FONAFIFO through the Ecomercados I and II projects, 
both of which have provided about one third of the PSA funding between 
1997 and 2009 (MINAET and FONAFIFO, 2011). Moreover, since 
Ecomercados II is nearing its end of implementation and expectations of 
obtaining more resources through the fuel and water taxes (or any other 
fiscal revenue) was not a viable option in a context defined by growing 
tensions over the country’s fiscal deficit,3 the potential funds received 
from the FCPF would become extremely necessary for the continuation 
and further expansion of the PSA program.  
 168 
The REDD+ readiness process has been organized following the 
guidelines of the FCPF and consists of a multi-stage dynamic supported 
by the development of key documents and components oriented towards 
detailing the main actions to be developed as part of the Emissions 
Reduction Program, upon which future carbon purchases would be made. 
This process entails the design of several specific components that are of 
key importance for guaranteeing the economic value of the carbon rights 
to be transacted between FONAFIFO and the FCPF, such as: 1) defining 
the baselines that will be used to measure the actual carbon abatements to 
be realized through the PSA, 2) determining an acceptable methodology 
for measuring said abatements, 3) establishing a verification and 
monitoring mechanism to be used to guarantee compliance with carbon 
abatements from the original carbon owners (i.e.: the actual land owners), 
4) determining potential land owners to be enrolled in the program, as 
well as defining the plan for distributing benefits amongst these in order 
to guarantee and acceptable level of additionality and conditionality, and 
5) designing  a safeguards mechanism to protect the benefits and rights of 
these enrolled parties (FCPF, 2008). In theory, the process should be 
participatory from the start, allowing for a gradual development of each 
of these components, as the different actors are offered a chance to weigh 
in from their different economic and social context and necessities.  
In practice, the high level of disconnection and overlapping of the 
different REDD+ readiness processes happening in Costa Rica and the 
overbearing forest policy consensus between the state and the private 
sector have led the first stages of the process to exclude subaltern 
narratives from being integrated. The first delineation of the various 
components of the Costa Rican REDD+ strategy happened through the 
Readiness Program Idea Note (R-PIN), the Readiness Preparation Paper 
(R-PP), and the Emissions Reduction Program Idea Note (ER-PIN), three 
key documents in the process that were presented by FONAFIFO in 2008, 
2011 and 2013, respectively. The R-PIN and the R-PP are extremely 
important stages for the REDD+ readiness process as both of them 
determine the main characteristics of the eventual configuration of the 
Emissions Reduction Program.  
Through the R-PIN, it was decided that the national REDD+ 
program would be established within the existing programmatic ideas, 
administrative platform and contract modalities of FONAFIFO’s PSA 
program, with some minor components executed through SINAC and the 
National Forestry Office (a para-state agency representing the interests of 
the industrial forestry sector). In other words, it was decided that the 
Costa Rican REDD+ program would operate on a national basis and 
under the venue of the state. The R-PIN also decided which were to be the 
main areas of intervention of the program, namely, that; 1) most of the 
funding received from carbon sales through REDD+ would be oriented 
towards expanding PSA coverage under Forest Conservation modalities, 
2) that some of the funding would be directed to projects for combating 
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forest fires and strengthening existing protected areas, while, 3) another 
part would be used for designing a more business-minded PSA 
alternative oriented towards fostering a sustainable forestry sector 
(FONAFIFO and MINAE, 2008). Indeed, when looked comparatively 
between the R-PIN and the final draft of the Emissions Reduction 
Program Document (ER-PD) presented in 2016, these key areas of 
intervention have barely changed throughout the eight years of the 
REDD+ readiness process. 
Ironically, while the FCPF demands considerable and meaningful 
participation in the readiness process, both the R-PIN and the R-PP were 
actually the work of a small policy group that represented state and 
private sector interests, with absolutely no involvement by indigenous or 
peasant organizations. Indeed, both documents were produced by 
representatives from SINAC, FONAFIFO, the National Forestry Office 
(ONF, a para-state agency that represents the interests of the forest 
industry), three national and international environmental NGOs with 
historical ties to the PSA program (namely FUNDECOR, TNC and IUCN), 
a few members of the academic sector whom also worked as key 
consultants of the readiness process (mainly from forestry schools at 
CATIE, the Costa Rican Technology Institute – ITCR – and the EARTH), 
the Costa Rican Forestry Chamber (CCF, a pro-forestry industry political 
platform) and consultants hired by FONAFIFO to develop the document. 
In other words, the delineation of REDD+ resulted from the work of a 
small, albeit fairly knowledgeable, policy network, which represented the 
two dominant policy narratives described in the previous section. Other 
policy narratives remained without representation, an issue that was duly 
recognized by the FCPF in its external evaluations of both documents 
(FCPF, 2008; 2011). Given that both documents were developed and 
published before the political consultation process began, the market and 
interventionist narratives are the only ones reflected there.  
The market narrative pushes for a harmonization of forest 
conservation policy with the economic interests of the private forestry 
sector. Specifically, these groups, headed by the CCF, have used REDD+ 
to question the low level of openness of the PSA with regards to more 
lucrative forest business models. From their point of view, the PSA, 
though a well-intentioned policy, has been historically more akin to the 
preservation of standing forests than other forestry-based activities such 
as forest plantations, reforestation and agroforestry. From their 
perspective, the REDD+ program could be reoriented towards a greater 
integration of the PSA to forestry business models and as a result, help 
them counter the ongoing economic crisis affecting the sector. REDD+ was 
therefore interpreted by them as an alternative for linking forest 
conservation to highly lucrative forest business models based on the 
exploitation and reforestation of high-value woods. These preoccupations 
are duly reflected in key strategic options identified in the R-PIN which 
consider the expansion of the PSA program centering on modalities 
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different than Forest Protection and allowing much more contracts for 
forest plantations, and 2) the development of policies that could allow for 
local market shifts from using high carbon footprint materials in favor of 
sustainable wood produced in plantations supported by the PSA 
(MINAET and FONAFIFO, 2011).  
In turn, the second narrative focused more on interventionist 
instruments. Attention in REDD+ has mostly centered in developing new 
institutions and resolving enforcement problems regarding already-
existing conservation policies. Indeed, actors like SINAC have perceived 
REDD+ as an alternative for improving institutional capabilities and 
mobilizing existing plans to strengthen command-and-control 
mechanisms for conservation. Indeed, this has been reflected in strategic 
options oriented towards: 1) augmenting the PSA contracts for Forest 
Protection in 300.000 hectares, emphasizing in key biological corridors 
and PA buffer zones, 2) financing currently underfunded strategies such 
as the Plan for Controlling Illegal Wood-Cutting and Forest Fire 
Management in Protected Areas, or 3) reinforcing the verification and 
monitoring mechanisms used in the regency system with the funding of 
new controls through the National College of Agronomical Engineers 
(CIAGRO). In other words, within the existing hybrid policy framework 
determining Costa Rican forestry governance, REDD+ has been defined 
by the interaction of the two main policy narratives, thereby exhibiting 
both market- and state-oriented agendas of approaching the deforestation 
problem. While this means that other forest use narratives were obliged 
to face a negotiation, whereby key issues had already been delimited by 
the state and business interests, some room existed for indigenous peoples 
to introduce some aspects of their political agenda.  
In other words, by 2011, the Costa Rican state had presented is R-
PP and defined the key strategic options and identified the associated 
risks that would eventually define the National REDD+ Strategy 
presented in 2015. This happened without actually finishing the 
preparation phase determined by FCPF, and in absence of a wide 
consultation process involving other political actors with high stakes on 
national forest policy-making – such as the indigenous peoples. Indeed, 
the Social and Environmental Strategic Assessment process had not 
actually begun at this point, with its first workshop taking place until later 
on in 2011. Moreover, this consultation process did not have an actual 
working plan to develop further group-specific consultation workshops 
until late-2013, several months after the publication of the ER-PIN. It is 
reasonable to conclude that eventual involvement by subaltern narratives 
took place in the context of a limited negotiation arena, whereby certain 
key elements of the REDD+ strategy had been previously developed. This 
is not to say that there was no room for indigenous people to maneuver, 
but that the main configuration of the program was already decided 
before they got to sit at the negotiating table.  
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8.2.2. Enter subaltern narratives: demands for an indigenous 
REDD+ 
The integration of non-dominant forest narratives has been the result of 
the political capabilities of indigenous and peasant organizations. Yet, this 
integration has undoubtedly taken advantage of the fact that FCPF has 
obliged FONAFIFO to develop extensive validation and legitimation 
practices as part of the readiness process, in particular, with regards to 
indigenous peoples. FCPF procedure demands that all REDD+ readiness 
processes financed by them should be organized following the World 
Bank participation safeguards, which, in the case of indigenous peoples, 
include a demonstrable wide political support of their policies resulting 
from a prior, free and informed consultation of the measures to be 
implemented (WB, 2006).  Though, to reiterate, while it is undeniable that 
these obligations have led to the integration of new subaltern narratives 
in the negotiation process, including the formulation of specific measures 
addressing their particular demands, it is also clear that these openings 
have taken place within the established neoliberal mentality of the PSA 
program. 
The first instance to actually integrate political participation from 
various different political actors in the REDD+ readiness process was the 
Social and Environmental Strategic Assessment (SESA) that took place in 
San José in may 2011 (FONAFIFO consultant, interview, September 2nd, 
2014). This activity began the SESA process, which was conceived as a 
mechanism for identifying potential risks and defining key environmental 
and social considerations to the REDD+ preparation process in order for 
these issues to be managed during implementation, thereby mitigating 
any potentially-adverse effects of the strategic measures determined by 
the National REDD+ Strategy. SESA is conceived as a participative 
process involving all key actors to the readiness process, and is meant to 
function as an opportunity to promote extensive participation of 
interested parties (FCPF, 2011). According to the World Bank, the SESA 
process should fulfill all participatory standards indicated in the national 
legislation of each country and in the case of indigenous peoples, all the 
obligations defined by Convention 169 (which Costa Rica ratified in 1993). 
Curiously enough and in spite of the considerable discursive 
importance given to SESA, in Costa Rica, this process began in 2011, three 
years after the readiness process was initiated. Moreover, it seems that the 
SESA process without enough planning, given that the workshops with 
the various interested parties (e.g.: indigenous peoples, state 
organizations, environmental NGOs, peasant farmers and the forest 
industry) that are supposed to accompany this larger meeting were not 
programmed until late 2013. Indeed, the bulk of the consultation process 
has happened between 2014 and 2015, three years after SESA took place. 
While it is difficult to determine if there were political pressures pushing 
FONAFIFO to begin the SESA process in this manner, it is clear that 
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concerns over the lack of participation were coming from indigenous 
groups, hired consultants and the FCPF itself, whom commented 
extensively on the lack of consultation exhibited by the R-PIN and the R-
PP (ex-FONAFIFO consultant, interview, March 31st, 2014; RIBCA Bribri 
representative, interview, August 4th 2014). Indeed, FCPF reviews of the 
R-PIN concluded that “(c)onsultations with the private sector, indigenous 
peoples and institutions of the civil society seems to have been limited or non-
existent altogether.” (FCFP, 2008: 2).  
With this said, RIBCA leaders did claim to have been approached 
however briefly, by FONAFIFO to attend two meetings regarding REDD+ 
in early 2008 and late 2010, which seems to concur with the elaboration of 
a consultant work oriented towards identifying organizations 
representative for the potential interested parties (Borge, 2011). The 
National SESA Workshop was assisted by representatives of all key 
organizations identified by FONAFIFO, including indigenous peoples, 
peasant farmers, the academic sector, the private forestry sector, 
international organisms and NGOs. While the activity was not met with 
stringent resistance on the part of indigenous organizations, they did 
express their annoyance with their late integration to the process and the 
lack of a clear representation of their interests within the R-PP (which was 
used by FONAFIFO as the basis of the discussion at SESA). Indeed, one 
perceived weakness by the indigenous leadership was the lack of 
integration of their demands in the REDD+ readiness process: 
“(…) the consultants arrived in 2008 and they did not come back until 
2011, almost three years after. That was one of the weaknesses that the 
leaders saw, that each time they met the consultants, they said one 
thing, but the documents ended up saying something different. That is 
why, before the first SESA workshop, we organized ourselves and 
established a Technical Commission (at RIBCA) and began discussing 
the issue at different levels (…) in order to negotiate with FONAFIFO 
from our own position” (RIBCA director, interview, 4th August, 2014).  
Effectively, the SESA workshop was used by RIBCA and the 
Talamancan ADIs as an opportunity to fulfill two key objectives: first, to 
demand a separate negotiation process with FONAFIFO, and second, to 
integrate a set of five new issues to be discussed as part of the negotiation 
of this indigenous-centered REDD+ readiness process. These “special 
issues”, as these are referred to by interviewed indigenous leaders consist 
of: 1) the design and implementation of an indigenous-minded PSA 
modality, 2) the development of a strategy for resolving territorial 
disputes and guaranteeing legal control of ADIs over these lands, 3) the 
inclusion of indigenous cosmovision within rules regarding forest 
management and regeneration policy, 4) the definition of a strategy to 
improve the relationship between indigenous people and protected area 
authorities, and 5) the inclusion of a new participatory monitoring 
mechanism for conservation policy implementation at the indigenous 
territories. 
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These five special issues are a clear reflection of long-standing 
tensions between the Costa Rican indigenous communities (including the 
Talamancan) with regards to issues related to political autonomy and self-
determination in the context of conservation policy-making. As has been 
explained in chapters 5 and 7, while there is a formal acknowledgement 
of conservation authorities with regards to the importance of indigenous 
peoples and territories for securing conservation goals, this is not easily 
translated into tangible and equitable policies. They are recognized as 
having a “special relationship” with the territories they use and inhabit, 
and are expected to defend conservation efforts, even though 
conservation agencies exhibit resistance with regards to recognizing 
cultural uses of resources under conservation and new culturally-based 
management practices.  
So, by integrating the notion of an indigenous PSA, claiming the 
inclusion of Bribri and Cabécar cosmovision into forest policy and 
demanding improvements in the relationship with top-down forms of 
conservation, RIBCA and the ADIs are actually attempting to re-negotiate 
the terms of their incorporation with the green economy promoted by the 
Costa Rican state. For these indigenous leaders, the integration of these 
measures is considered to be an opportunity to hold some political 
influence over their territories, understood not solely as the discretely-
bounded pieces of land given to them by the state, but their cultural lands, 
which, in the case of PILA, overlap almost entirely with their most sacred 
mountains and forests.  As the then ADI president stated:  
“What is new about these five proposals is that they are supposed to be 
accompanied by a new legal framework for the defense of our rights at 
each special issue. We are proposing a legal framework for those issues. 
For example, take protected areas: we are saying that we want a decree 
that gives those lands in co-management and co-responsibility with the 
government, and that indigenous peoples have the right to manage 
these lands. It is all founded upon our cosmovision, because those are 
our sacred lands, where those protected areas were imposed upon us. 
Our idea is not to eliminate those areas, but more about how, us, 
together with the government, could give them a more adequate 
treatment; and for that we need a framework, otherwise it will be 
impossible” (ADI President, interview, August 5th, 2014).  
The decision to change the historical interaction with the state with 
regards to protected area management, environmental monitoring and 
forest policy-making has also to do with the need of addressing pressures 
faced by the territories with regards to extractive activities nearby 
(Grandia, 2007; Brockington et al., 2009). This is not precisely the case for 
the territories of the Bribri and the Cabécar in Talamanca given that these 
tensions are not so immediate (though there is heightened vigilance 
amongst the various organizations and populace which is often channeled 
to mobilize political action), but is certainly the situation of the Bribri, 
Cabécar and Ngöbe-Buglé peoples living in the indigenous territories of 
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the Southern Pacific region, where the expansion of agrarian plantations 
is pushing peasant farmers up against the reserves (Llaguno Thomas, 
2013). Nevertheless, indigenous peoples from both seaboards do express 
an urgent need to develop and secure the spaces of political participation 
that could allow them to have their participation and input in policy-
making recognized, and by extension its governance reflected upon the 
territories vis-à-vis these threats.  
Likewise, the inclusion of goals related to what they call the 
“cleansing” of the territories, i.e.: the formalization and defense of legally-
acquired land rights of the indigenous peoples to the territories given to 
them by the state, is also completely coherent with this conceptualization 
of REDD+ as a negotiation upon the terms of incorporation to the state. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, while the Costa Rican state did 
legally-dispose the creation of discretely-bounded patches of land for 
indigenous people to occupy, in reality it has not fulfilled this obligation, 
leading to indigenous communities owning a fraction of the land that is 
legally supposed to be theirs (Guevara Berger et al., 1999). To a large 
degree, this inability of the state to fulfill this obligation is the product of 
conflicting goals between an agrarian policy set on colonization and 
capitalist development vis-à-vis a policy of recognition of indigenous 
rights and uses of land (Chacón Castro and Guevara Berger, 1992, see also 
chapter 3). So, by conditioning their support for REDD+ to these 
obligations, indigenous peoples are attempting to renegotiate some key 
aspects of their own incorporation to the state.  
What I find curious about this is that while it is evident that there 
are political demands for recognition, self-determination and political 
autonomy behind each special issue, the discursive framing used by these 
subaltern narratives attempts to make itself relevant through finding a 
common ground with the neoliberal mindset behind REDD+. In 
particular, indigenous leaders present their demands as critically 
important for the commodification, privatization and accountability of the 
carbon emissions themselves. As said earlier, the PSA program operates 
through the explicit bounding of forested lands to be conserved in 
exchange of payment for the owner. This exchange implicates the transfer 
of rights upon carbon emissions abated, which then become property of 
FONAFIFO, whom can dispose of them in the international market at will 
(Matulis, 2012). In this scheme, the key issue is the existence of secure 
property rights at the level of the landowner. If land rights are secured, 
then there would not be any problems regarding the additionality and 
conditionality of the contract. Indigenous leaders have recognized this 
issue and claim that not only their demands for territorial cleansing and 
indigenous PSA fall within their own agenda, but that it is also in the 
interest of FONAFIFO, who requires indigenous land rights to be secured 
in order to verify the value of carbon emissions abated through REDD+. 
As the current ADITICA president argued:  
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“The implementation of the PSA in the territories often times require 
FONAFIFO to look the other way with regards to some things. The 
legal threat is always there, of course. See, if someone from the 
government comes here and says ‘I will apply the PSA law by the 
book’, then it would not work, it would be dysfunctional. Not only it 
will restrict our right to traditional uses, but it would be impossible to 
have PSAs at the territories. This is because, when you ask for a PSA, 
you have to put an annotation in the Public Registry for that land, that 
the land is under the PSA and if you fail to fulfill the contract, then 
FONAFIFO can use the value of the land as collateral for you to pay the 
money they have given to you, right? But that is also illegal with 
indigenous territories, because these lands are unalienable. That is why 
FONAFIFO officials need to help us with these issues, and that is also 
why we are proposing a different form of PSA” (interview, August, 5th, 
2014).  
In summary, as Bribri and Cabécar activists see it, the 
institutionalization of these five special issues are the means of 
legitimizing their struggles around territorial autonomy. In their views, 
the new spaces of participation created amidst the structures of the 
conservationist state could serve to bring the Talamancans closer to their 
goals of exercising effective control over the territories that they use and 
inhabit. This is perhaps the main reason why it has been so important that 
these groups emphasize the necessity that FONAFIFO and SINAC 
recognize their cosmovision and their cultural conception of territory not 
only as a cultural feature, but as a legal element. It has been extremely 
important for these leaders that the authorities recognize their 
relationship with the environment as something equally useful for them 
given the complex institutional requirements for carbon emissions to be 
considered as commodities. This reflects the realities of neoliberal 
multiculturalism, that in order to accommodate indigenous mobilization 
some acceptance of the neoliberal order must take place. For the 
indigenous organizations involved in REDD+, the actual sale of carbon is 
unimportant compared to the goal of gaining control over the territories 
they use and inhabit, yet for this to become a concrete possibility, they 
would need to accept their involvement in carbon markets nonetheless. 
Under neoliberal multiculturalism, these spaces of participation are 
implemented to advance state development goals, and while there is 
opportunity to be seized, there is also political cost and a need for 
compromise.  
8.2.3. Obstacles to accommodation: state and indigenous 
challenges to the indigenous REDD+ 
The negotiation for an indigenous-minded REDD+ has not moved 
forward unchallenged or without obstacles. Indeed, there has been some 
opposition from state authorities and other indigenous organizations, 
including some of the very people that proposed the five special issues for 
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consideration at the SESA. These various forms of opposition originate in 
different sources of conflict, given the high level of complexity of the 
negotiation. Yet, my argument here is that all of these problems point 
towards the limitations of neoliberal multiculturalism to acquiesce a true 
recognition of political autonomy and self-determination, in view of the 
requirement of accommodating state- and market-oriented interests. 
While neoliberal multiculturalism has indeed offered these groups spaces 
for participation, it does not offer the appropriate tools to consolidate self-
representation and control over the territories that these indigenous 
parties inhabit, given the contradiction that doing this would entail to the 
wider development agendas orbiting Talamanca, consolidation of 
efficient carbon markets and promoting indigenous buy in to conservation 
being a fairly relevant one. 
Take the integration of the REDD+ readiness process as a first 
example. As said, in Costa Rica there are not one, but many simultaneous 
REDD+ processes functioning concurrently. So, while the SESA is 
financed by the FCPF, the National Consultation Plan of both the 
indigenous peoples and the peasant sector is handled by GiZ and the 
development of the Safeguards Information System (SIS) is administered 
by UN-REDD. Even though there is a centralized structure attempting to 
organize everything, each specific project has its own leadership and 
timeframes. In turn, this leads to programs being executed at different 
rhythms, which then provoke failures in articulating the process 
effectively. One of the main aspects affected by this is political 
participation. As each process moves at its own time, discussions that 
should have come after a detailed discussion of SESA or that were 
expected to involve intense negotiation between the parties tend to take 
place before all of that to the detriment of political postures of the various 
interested parties.  
This situation has had important impacts on the indigenous parties 
involved in the negotiation, as well as for their standing vis-à-vis the 
wider indigenous community. For example, the development of the SIS, 
which is meant to define the main mechanisms for avoiding or mitigating 
potentially deleterious effects upon rights and uses of natural resources 
by forest-dwellers, was moving faster than the SESA, were such measures 
where to be initially negotiated. This is without mentioning that the SIS 
actually preceded the very consultation process, where the wider 
indigenous community was supposed to weigh in to provide feedback to 
SESA and SIS. At the time in which a final workshop on the SIS was called 
in 2014, most indigenous leaders came unprepared and uninformed about 
the objective of the meeting, leading to the elaboration of a SIS without 
their knowledge and input.  
This situation produced preoccupation amongst interviewed 
indigenous leaders, one of whom claimed that: “(t)here was no room for 
other important safeguards that we wished to negotiate with the government” 
(ADITIBRI president, interview, August 5th, 2014), such as the 
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development of a clear state protocol regarding prior and informed 
consent for state projects with indigenous territories, demands related to 
recognition of cultural rights and discussions regarding the procedures to 
claim back indigenous lands under control of non-indigenous people. 
While FONAFIFO organized a series of meetings afterwards to inform the 
indigenous communities, it is clear that the SIS was not designed 
according to the preferences of the indigenous organizations. In other 
words, decentralization and the importance of organizations providing 
financial support within the readiness process were to the detriment of the 
indigenous position there.    
This situation has also resulted in even more negative results 
amongst the wider indigenous communities, specially with organized 
groups that have not taken part of the process. One Talamancan group 
called Talamanca por la Vida y por la Tierra has been particularly active 
throughout the REDD+ negotiation stating their concerns regarding the 
considerable delay exhibited with the beginning of the political 
consultation process and the potential of REDD+ of becoming a 
mechanism that could produce serious risks to the Talamancan forests. As 
one Bribri leader of the organization said during a public speech held in 
Sepecue:   
“The people that defended the territory fifteen years ago are the same 
ones selling the forest to conservation, and they are the ones that 
allowed that payment of environmental services to take place within 
the indigenous territory. Without anyone being consulted! And, these 
big actors from those times, defending conservation and the indigenous 
cosmovision left and right, are the ones that promoted the PSA and 
now REDD+ with the government, going behind our backs.” (Leader 
of Local Forest Community Council, interview, June 6th, 2014) 
There is considerable fear among this and other organizations that 
REDD+ will lead to the privatization of indigenous lands in favor of 
carbon plantations by private companies at the expense of cultural uses of 
the forests. While many other political organizations dispute the extent of 
these claims, there is some degree of uncertainty regarding what is being 
negotiated at REDD+, which can then be used to create rifts between the 
various indigenous communities. Indeed, this organization has been very 
successful at organizing numerous collective actions including protests 
during visits by key FONAFIFO and MINAE officials to the Talamancan 
territories, demonstrations in front of the Office of the President and a 
declaration of “No REDD+” in the Talamanca Bribri territory between 
2014 and 2016 (see figure 1). While the REDD+ readiness process has 
moved forward in spite of these demonstrations, it is clear that there is 
considerable concern with regards to the transparency of the process 
amongst the indigenous people in the territories that could eventually 
lead to delegitimizing the entire endeavor.  
Internal divisions between the indigenous communities is not 
unheard of between the different territories over time (Guevara Berger et 
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al., 1999), nor it is unusual with regards to REDD+ processes, as 
neighboring Panama had to halt the advance of its inclusion into REDD+ 
precisely due to conflicts between indigenous groups, and between them 
and the state (PRISMA, 2013). In Costa Rica, another reason of the conflict 
has to do with the different political contexts from which each indigenous 
territory negotiate from. Whereas the Talamancan territories perceive 
REDD+ as a priority, given their successful experiences with the PSA and 
the lack of an immediate territorial threat in the form of agrarian or 
energy-oriented megaprojects, the ones in the Southern Pacific region face 
a completely different situation with a great deal of their lands under non-
indigenous control and the imminent threat of continuous agrarian 
plantation expansion and the construction of the Diquís Hydropower 
Facility nearby. Their decision not to participate in the existing 
consultation process for REDD+ has led to some degree of conflict 
between the indigenous leaderships and fueled the de-legitimization of 
the entire strategy amongst the most reticent sectors of the indigenous 
community. For the Talamancan ADIs and RIBCA, though, this situation 
has certainly led to a weaker political position to mobilize their agenda as 
other territories follow different and often more conflictive interests vis-à-
vis FONAFIFO, aggravating the progress of the negotiation.  
Picture	1.	Indigenous	organizations	manifest	their	rejection	of	REDD+	during	a	
meeting	with	authorities	from	FONAFIFO	and	the	Minister	of	Environment..	
Suretka,	August	29th,	2014	
	
Source:	Kioskos	Ambientales	Program	of	the	University	of	Costa	Rica.	
This is further aggravated by the fact that there has been little 
success in mobilizing the two key issues of the five-point agenda 
presented in the context of SESA, namely with the cleansing of the 
territories and the indigenous-minded PSA. With regards to the former, it 
is clear that there seems to be different expectations to the length of the 
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support that would have been obtained by indigenous leaders though 
FONAFIFO regarding the re-claiming indigenous lands. While RIBCA 
officials were expecting the design of a comprehensive plan for the 
government to address the problem of indigenous territories under non-
indigenous hands, FONAFIFO was only able to offer a brief land survey 
determining whom are the legal owners of the land and potential 
mechanisms for advancing claims for that land (Benavides Galindo and 
Herrera Zeledón, 2015), with little to no indication of whether the 
government was going to go through enacting the re-claiming process. 
Indeed, it is clear that FONAFIFO will not handle that issue by itself, given 
that they consider that it is not under their legal purview and that if 
engaged by the PSA it would imply a serious divertion of funding 
required for conservation. Overall, indigenous leaders interviewed 
during a brief return to the field in 2016, expressed a clear dissatisfaction 
with the lack of support from the government regarding the solution to 
these historical problems. It is clear that REDD+ was not flexible enough 
tool to be used as leverage for dealing with land right conflicts.  
I also consider that while there have certainly been important 
improvements in the negotiation of an indigenous-minded PSA modality, 
expectations should be moderated regarding the future impact of the 
program at indigenous territories. For starters, it is clear from the recently 
published Emissions Reduction Program Document, that indigenous 
lands are not the objective of the program. Surely, the document argues 
that FONAFIFO will allocate roughly 20.000 additional hectares to all 
indigenous communities, a significant area, but only a fraction of lands 
currently under their control (about 329.000 hectares). Moreover, the ER-
PD clearly states that REDD+ will be implemented in “lands under private 
property (…) and in a smaller measure, in communal forms of property (i.e.: 
indigenous lands)” (MINAE and FONAFIFO, 2016: 56). Besides that, the 
three priority regions defined by the ER-PD do not include Talamanca, 
which is where most of the indigenous territories are located. While the 
negotiation between the Talamancans and FONAFIFO continues in order 
to better define the features of the indigenous PSA, the Secretariat has 
made it extensively clear that “the current priorities for distribution of the 
funds of the current PSA or the ones used for the REDD+ with the Carbon Fund 
are not up for negotiation” (Director of National REDD+ Secretariat, 
interview, September 28th 2014).  
Besides these obstacles, FONAFIFO has also raised concerns with 
regards to the specifics of the indigenous proposal on the features of this 
PSA modality. In 2015, RIBCA – with the financial support of GiZ – 
developed an initial proposal of potential changes to PSA modalities in 
order to be implemented in the indigenous territories. The proposal 
suggested the need of re-directing the PSA in order to recognize the 
cultural value that the Bribri and the Cabécar assign to the Talamancan 
forests, by allowing them to “use forests either for cultural purposes or for the 
sustenance of indigenous families, albeit, without diminishing its conservation 
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objective” (Morales Pita, 2015: 36), and establishing legal guarantees in 
order to defend these cultural values. In other words, their demands with 
the Indigenous PSA is the establishment of a:  
“PSA that contemplates our relationship with the forests, with total 
adequacy to the indigenous culture. We do not manage the forests, that 
is an imported word, we lived from the forests. The law is to squared 
for us, it is meant for clearing the forests, it does not suit or needs, 
because what we can do is to support ourselves in the things we 
produce in the forests” (RIBCA Cabécar representative, interview, 
August 4th, 2014).  
Besides that, the proposal demands that FONAFIFO make the 
enrollment procedures more flexible, by reducing obligations related to 
payments to forest regents, that no sacred forests be object of the PSA 
contract, and that verification and monitoring mechanisms used for the 
PSA include active indigenous participation (Morales Pita, 2015). This is a 
demand developed in consideration of the high cost to entry that has 
historically characterized the PSA.  
Whereas some of these issues are not problematic from the 
perspective of FONAFIFO, the key demand is made by RIBCA regarding 
the integration of traditional uses and cultural values of the forest within 
the neoliberal mindset of the program. As stated before, FONAFIFO 
considered the feasibility of using a Forest Protection modality for the PSA 
in Talamanca due to the fact that is easier to bound the communal forests 
where some forms of conservation are already in place, than to engage 
with clan- or family-owned patches of land. Indeed, the notion of using 
the Reforestation or the Forest Management modalities – which would, in 
theory, be somewhat coherent with current agroforestry uses of the land 
–  is seen with some degree of inkling by FONAFIFO in view of the 
potential problems it would generate for proper accountability of abated 
carbon emissions. There is the preoccupation that by including different 
non-delimited familiar plots of land, or trabajaderos used by entire 
communities, that there would be considerable difficulties to control these 
many users and guaranteeing their compliance to a PSA program in order 
to guarantee additionality of the payment. As the Regional Manager from 
FONAFIFO in Limón argues:  
“Logistics can become a problem for using these types of modalities in 
the indigenous territories (Forest Management and Reforestation), 
because you have the ones that do it well, and there are the others that 
complain. Then, when I have to do the inspection, I can end up 
verifying that five plots are fine, but that the other five are not, and I 
cannot pay them like that. Then the five that did their job complain 
about the five that didn’t, because they have not internalized the idea 
of the program, and so nothing gets done and you can end up 
producing more conflict” (interview, August 19th, 2016).  
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Put in other terms, to allow the integration of PSA provisions for 
recognizing cultural uses of resources and the subsistence of the families 
on the indigenous forests, would counter the very logics of 
commodification, privatization and accountability upon which the very 
formation of the carbon emission abatement relies. While REDD+ has 
been a mechanism that has opened up new spaces for negotiating the 
conditions of indigenous incorporation to the conservation policy of the 
Costa Rican state, there is a limit to the potential of these spaces for 
guaranteeing indigenous political autonomy and self-determination, and 
such limits are determined by the fact that indigenous integration in Costa 
Rican society cannot possibly question the development and conservation 
agendas pushed forward by the state, entailing, in this case, the 
commodification of the very resources that indigenous peoples are trying 
to control.  
8.3. Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that the REDD+ readiness process has depended 
greatly on the decisions made by the most powerful actors of the Costa 
Rican forestry sector. It clearly is a reflection of the compromises between 
policy actors in favor of integrating market-based instruments for forest 
conservation and others oriented towards maintaining and reinforcing the 
existing command-and-control tools created since initial policy 
interventions in the 1970s. As a result, the degree of flexibility of REDD+ 
to accommodate to any other forestry narrative or perspective has been 
previously delineated between these policy positions, even before 
indigenous peoples were invited to the table. Well before their 
participation, the decision was made that REDD+ would be policy 
mechanism destined to finance already-existing command-and-control 
policies and expanded solely to cover new market-oriented instruments 
that entail a clear engagement with the private sector as its new focus of 
attention. Closed policy networks – composed from members of state 
conservation agencies, the private forestry industry and academic sectors 
– have molded REDD+ with very little external consultation.  
Of course, this does not mean that there have not been any spaces 
for indigenous peoples to take advantage of. There have been various 
elements that have led to indigenous inclusion in REDD+. National and 
international institutional requirements have forced policy elites in charge 
of decision-making to open the consultation process in order to attain 
effective validation vis-à-vis FCPF and other funding bodies. Moreover, 
there are political incentives in place to promote buy of indigenous, even 
despite the fact that the National REDD+ Strategy has been clearly defined 
as a tool to promote forest conservation in threatened Costa Rican private 
forests. In this context, REDD+ has provided a clear opportunity for the 
Talamancan indigenous peoples to negotiate the terms of their 
incorporation in the PSA program with the Costa Rican state, including 
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the implementation of a modality of PES that suits the political and 
cultural needs of these populations.  
However, these opportunities for participation have met a inflexible 
limits, thereby becoming an uneffective means to incorporate important 
policy changes fostering indigenous territorial autonomy. Indeed, there 
have been hindrances to the consolidation of the indigenous agenda 
through REDD+, represented in the fact that FONAFIFO has clarified that 
it will not get involved in processes related to reinforcing indigenous 
territorial control over their lands, nor adapting the PSA program in ways 
that could compromise existing conditionality, additionality, verification 
and monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, the readiness process has also 
failed as a means of effective participation by indigenous organizations, 
as shown by evidence of the negotiations happening around the SESA and 
SIS processes.  
In this way, the National REDD+ Strategy in Costa Rica reflects the 
very essence of neoliberal multiculturalism. While the discourse in favor 
of REDD+ presents this initiative as a means of combining market-based 
incentives to conservation with the defense of indigenous rights, in 
practice, here this outcome does not seem likely. Bribri and Cabécar 
organizations approached REDD+ readiness negotiations using their 
involvement in these new green economy initiative as a means of 
exercising some leverage to obtain long-standing territorial and cultural 
demands. Yet, governance structures have proven to be extremely rigid in 
allowing forms of livelihood different from what have been considered to 
be compatible with conservation here. Neoliberal multiculturalism entails 
the possibility of state structures to accommodate to some indigenous 
demands and viewpoints (at least, at a discursive level), but without 
compromising the central tenets of neoliberal governance. This is the case 
of the PSA and REDD+. In chapter 7, I showed how the PSA was modified 
for implementation in the Talamancan territories as a means of protecting 
livelihoods considered to be compatible to conservation, while promoting 
rationalities that are inconsistent with indigenous ways of life.  
In this chapter, REDD+ has become an effort by conservation to 
double down on this bet. While some room has been offered to modify the 
implementation of the PSA program, the actual possibility of changing the 
neoliberal core of the PSA program by integrating these cultural practices 
is unquestionably limited. Demands for an indigenous PSA have faced 
considerable opposition by FONAFIFO officials as these may counter 
critical logistical and accounting imperatives of the program. This is an 
expected reaction from this government agency, especially considering 
that in the post-REDD+ context, the PSA is bound to emphasize its 
orientation as a market-based tool designed to promote carbon abatement 
vis-à-vis the rest of the ecosystem services it is meant to guarantee. The 
negotiation behind the Costa Rican REDD+ Strategy captures the essence 
of neoliberal multiculturalism, as it is a process that has opened some 
room for indigenous leaders and state authorities to incorporate different 
 183 
policy imperatives akin to indigenous ideas and values, but only to a point 
in which neoliberal governance and conservation and development 
priorities are not actually questioned. In this sense, with REDD+, 
environmental conservation has drawn a very clear line defining how 
much of the local culture can be considered to be a support, and how much 
could be considered as a threat. Regretfully for the Bribri and Cabécar 
organizations, it appears to be clear that long-standing claims of territorial 
autonomy are perceived as countering environmental conservation, 
particularly as defined in a context of the neoliberal green economy. 
 
 
Notes 
1 REDD+ is an acronym that stands for two great agendas. The first one, 
previously dubbed as REDD means “reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation.” The plus (+) part stands for “the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
in developing countries”.  
2 Since the Thirteen Conference of the Parties (COP 13) of the UNFCCC, 
REDD+ has produced heated discussions in academic, conservation and 
development circles given the lack of clarity regarding the mechanisms that 
were going to be implemented in order to incitivize the reduction of carbon 
emissions. After COP 17, clarifications have been made regarding the usage 
of both market and non-market sources as a means of funding the initiative. 
A Green Climate Fund has been created in order to support REDD+ 
programs, while a market-based approach oriented to translating verifiable 
actions into carbon credits is also considered to be viable (von der Goltz, 2009) 
3 Growth of the fiscal deficit in Costa Rica has accelerated over the course of 
the past ten years. By 2015, the gap between public income and expenditure 
reached an amount equivalent to 5,9% of the gross domestic product of the 
country, the highest deficit in over three decades (PEN, 2016).  
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9 
 
Conclusions 
 
This dissertation is the result of a long and complex research process 
organized with the objective of understanding how some of the recent 
conservation and development interventions related to the operation of 
La Amistad Biosphere Reserve had affected the lives of the Bribri and 
Cabécar indigenous peoples living at state-mandated territories located 
around the Reserve, indigenous territories that are also conceived by the 
state as buffer zones for this major conservation endeavor. Overall, the 
thesis has shown that policy interventions have been diversified beyond 
the original imperatives of the Costa Rican conservation project. While the 
spirit of a socially-exclusive fortress conservation-minded approach 
towards La Amistad International Park remains, present and reflected 
upon the execution of restrictions to forest uses at the expense of 
indigenous livelihoods, there are newer instruments featuring different 
perspectives, including what I have dubbed here as the green economy.  
As I have shown in chapter 4, inspired by the tenets of a new 
outward-oriented development project for Costa Rica, the imperatives of 
conservation practice have changed, and today are oriented at 
emphasizing sustainable development and neoliberal policies through 
new and diversified practices hinged on the economic and environmental 
optimization of rural livelihoods, and espousing their integration to 
capitalist markets. All in all, these new trends in conservation policy-
making are meant to guarantee critical biopolitical objectives of the Costa 
Rican state such as guarding natural resource security, maintaining 
macroeconomic stability, and doing both things through the formation of 
new commodity and financial markets for resources put under 
conservation.  
In the previous chapters, I have offered a detailed look at two of 
these new and diversified forms of conservation at RBLA – mainly 
market-oriented agroforestry systems and payments of environmental 
services – thereby characterizing the particular ways in which both tools 
attempt to preserve certain traditions and livelihood practices of the Bribri 
and Cabécar indigenous peoples, while at the same time modifying others 
through the market-oriented essentialization of indigenous cultural 
practices (while totally omitting the equally important non-market 
features of said practices). This practice of intervention through the 
marketing of rural livelihoods and cultural practices for the capitalist 
system with little concern regarding potential drawbacks is reflective of 
conservation elites’ idealization of Costa Rica as a land of “no artificial 
ingredients”. But it is a practice that is also reflective of a wider history of 
interactions between environmental conservation and indigenous 
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peoples, as local culture is often considered to be both a supportive and 
threatening to former.  
Yet, as I have shown throughout the dissertation the actual 
territorialization of these new conservation imperatives has been 
contested by and modeled through Talamancan cultural, political and 
economic realities coming “from below”. Chapter 5 characterized the 
contestation against top-down forest conservation approaches and the 
eventual disposition of state authorities of including some degree of co-
management instruments to deal with key overlaps between La Amistad 
International Park and the two indigenous reserves. There I discussed 
how have stringent forest policies affected the livelihoods of indigenous 
peoples and how they often challenged these dispositions in order to 
extract resources needed from forests under state protection. Chapter 6 
explained how sustainable agricultural interventions had to organize 
around discursive imperatives based upon the protection of indigenous 
culture in order to justify its intervention around cacao trees and 
agroforestry. There I argued that interventions made by the state 
alongside a key academic institution have failed to account the realities of 
the indigenous territories, thereby leading to the program to be somewhat 
resisted and perceived with serious suspicion by the locals. Finally, in 
chapters 7 and 8, I explained the extent in which FONAFIFO has 
presented the PSA and REDD+ as tools for promoting social development 
and autonomous indigenous governance, while also attempting to fulfill 
institutional objectives of establishing a market for ecosystem services. 
This PES program has been forced to bend to the point of cracking in order 
to allow for other neoliberal rationalities and solutions to come in, running 
against the limits of its own reality, but without actually fulfilling the 
objectives of both the market-oriented technocratic sectors in charge of the 
program, nor those of the indigenous people, which serve as beneficiaries.  
All in all, these chapters have identified and characterized a number 
of institutional cracks produced by ongoing tensions between the 
neoliberal technocratic territorialization of market-friendly natural 
resource management and indigenous political activism centered on 
guaranteeing the territorial autonomy of the Reserves. In so doing, I 
questioned the self-idealization of conservation elites’ in Costa Rica as a 
land of “no artificial ingredients”, where conservation comes naturally for 
the most environmentally-aware sectors of society. These institutional 
cracks and ongoing tensions are at the core of this dissertation precisely 
because they are reflective of the interrogation of “territorial verticality”, 
that is, the manner in which a discrete segment of space is subjected to a 
variety of territorial power relations working at different scales. At a fairly 
empirical level of analysis, it is clear from the results of each of these 
political interventions that there has been a continuous misreading of the 
politico-environmental landscape, which is then reflected on cases of 
project mismanagement, misappropriation of resources and limited 
internalization of project goals as in the case of the Cacao Program, 
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incomplete incorporation of indigenous visions and territorial demands 
of autonomy into project planning and management as in the case of co-
management spaces for RBLA or outright political resistance due to 
complete contradiction of cultural and environmental values and 
livelihoods like it is currently happening with REDD+. Yet, at a more 
analytical level there is a lot more to say about the narrow-minded 
mentality of the Costa Rican conservation project and the tensions it 
produces at the level of local indigenous politics. This dissertation has 
manifested these continuous tensions between indigenous demands, state 
recognition of collective rights and the neoliberal technocracy behind new 
conservation policy-making, yet there are relevant comments to be made 
regarding how the resulting institutional cracks change not only the 
landscape of indigenous politics, but also the way in which the neoliberal 
green economy manifests in Costa Rica.   
9.1. Neoliberal conservation and the challenge of 
multiculturalism 
Since colonial times, the history of Talamanca has been determined by 
competing territorial claims between productive imperatives, state power 
and the indigenous peoples that have physically occupied this small 
geographical space. Over the course of the 20th Century, these competing 
claims began orbiting a single, but complicated, contradiction as the 
physical presence of indigenous peoples became a political tool for the 
state to claim sovereignty over the region with respect to perceived threats 
of encroachment from its neighboring states, while at the same time, the 
Bribri and the Cabécar became an obstacle for capital accumulation. The 
two main drivers of state formation in Costa Rica – reinforcing claims over 
a tenuously held territory and offering the means for the local economy to 
integrate with the world markets – entered into a complicated 
contradiction that was never fully resolved over the course of the past 
century. This, in turn, informed the current compromised position of the 
Talamancan indigenous peoples with regards to the Costa Rican state and 
its citizenship regime. In this context, neoliberal conservation has risen as 
a new alternative for solving the ongoing contradiction through the 
implementation of what I have characterized as the “passive frontier 
thesis”.  
Itself a concept originating from the 2008 PILA Management Plan, 
the passive frontier thesis encapsulates the dominant logic behind most 
state- and NGO-led conservation and development interventions to the 
Talamanca Valley. A discursive contradiction in itself, the passive frontier 
thesis, recognizes the agency of the Bribri and the Cabécar in provoking a 
fairly low degree of environmental degradation of the Talamancan region 
compared to the rest of the country, while at the same time arguing for the 
diminished agency of these very same groups to maintain the same degree 
of environmental protection of the landscape in the future. Politically, it is 
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a recognition of the common goals of addressing potentially deleterious 
processes of resource degradation between state- and NGO-led 
conservation agencies and indigenous activists, while prescribing that the 
former are the ones that should set the policy agenda for Talamanca, by 
implementing measures meant to guarantee sustainable development 
using market-related tools (such as the use of green seal certifications for 
agroforestry production, payments of environmental services, tourism, 
bioprospecting and others). Returning to the overarching discussion 
regarding the recognition of indigenous agency in the construction of their 
own environmental context that was presented along chapters 3 through 
5, the passive frontier thesis presents itself as a hybrid. On the one hand, 
it combines elements from colonial interpretations about the negligible 
impacts of traditional indigenous practices over the natural environment, 
while, on the other, indigenous agency to change or protect the 
environment is recognized, but only if directed by state-led forms of 
intervention. It is an extremely representative discursive 
conceptualization of the “sikwa” political viewpoint of the Talamancan 
peoples and their effects on the environment, as it implicitly remarks on 
the superiority of new conservation tools for attending the ongoing 
environmental problematique of the Talamanca Valley while at the same 
time diminishing the agency of the very people that have not only 
degraded parts of said environment, but protected it as well.  
This is best reflected when looking at the nature of the 
diversification of environmental policies implemented for promoting 
sustainable development and conservation at the Talamanca Valley. 
While most interviewees from state agencies and NGOs expressed an 
undeniable respect for the productive systems and cultural practices of 
the Bribri and the Cabécar, the fact of the matter is that the actual 
incorporation of these ideas and practices into new conservation 
endeavors explored in this document has been a limited and a contested 
struggle. There is a continuous tendency amongst the various project 
officials to essentialize the complex reality of the Bribri and the Cabécar 
enhancing the traditions and practices that are perceived to be compatible 
with conservation, while attempting to modify the ones that are 
considered to be incompatible. The BID-MAG project is a good example 
of these practices. The economic and environmental problematique of 
agricultural production of the Bribri and the Cabécar was consistently 
explored during the Namasol project leading to conclusions about the 
strong links between “sikwa” and traditional production. However, policy 
imperatives of CATIE and MAG have been designed based on the idea of 
treating these forms of cultivation as interchangeable and separable. As a 
result, cacao has been promoted in a way that reflects acceptable 
indigenous livelihoods, but failing to acknowledge the wider agricultural 
and livelihood context. The same can be said about the PSA and REDD+. 
In other words, while there seems to be a genuine disposition by state 
conservation agencies and NGOs towards promoting buy in to efforts at 
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protecting RBLA and the Sixaola Basin through the improvement of 
existing livelihoods, these efforts become hampered by the inability to 
think beyond the narrow neoliberal rationality of the green economy.    
9.2. Neoliberal state formation and indigenous peoples  
The forms of contestation and cooperation exhibited by the Bribri and the 
Cabécar in the different chapters of this dissertation need to be understood 
in the context of recent changes in state formation in Costa Rica. There are 
undeniable continuities reflected in the still unstable position that 
indigenous communities still occupy, being considered both part of the 
nation-state, yet also somewhat separate from the processes of capitalist 
integration that historically drove and continues to drive state formation 
in this country, and, particularly, in the Talamancan region. Indeed, the 
decision to carve out and maintain state-mandated zones for indigenous 
people early in the 20th Century was a territorial manifestation of this 
ongoing contradiction between state formation and capitalist 
development, as seen in chapter 3. This contradiction has accompanied 
the process of establishment of the indigenous reserves where the Bribri 
and Cabécar live today, and the same thing can be said of the choices of 
integrating the Reserves into the ongoing conservation programs studied 
here. For example, the very idea of including the reserves to the PSA 
program, while constituting Integrated Development Associations, and 
not the actual forest dwellers, the actual “beneficiaries” of it, reflects this 
contradiction, as I have shown in chapter 7.  
With that said, there have been some transformations along the 
way, leading to the resurgence of the Bribri and the Cabécar as political 
actors vis-à-vis the Costa Rican state, such as in the case of REDD+ and 
PA co-management. It is difficult to argue against the fact that there has 
been a process of democratization and that it has manifested in a new 
relationship between indigenous organizations – both state-mandated 
and the grassroots ones – and the Costa Rican state. Today, there is more 
political room for these peoples to address the state in a more open and 
direct fashion, an issue which was exemplified in chapter 7 with regards 
to the changes made to the implementation of the PSA program at 
indigenous territories. Moreover, the transnationalization and 
neoliberalization of the state and its functions has also offered an 
opportunity for these indigenous communities to achieve new 
opportunities of interaction with the state. Certainly, in the case of 
REDD+, the very fact that the FCPF and several environmental NGOs 
demanded increased participation of indigenous peoples and the 
peasantry, obliged FONAFIFO to slightly break with the political tradition 
of negotiating changes to the PSA exclusively with the industrial forestry 
sector and key forestry and conservation-related NGOs. In recent years, 
Costa Rica recognized its multicultural character in its Constitution, an 
important achievement within a process of gradual recognition of state 
obligations with international legislation on indigenous rights. This, in 
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turn, has legitimized some long-standing indigenous requests, such as 
pluricultural forms of education, recognition of their legal rights to 
autonomous forms of development and their collective ownership over 
the lands they inhabit. Yet, with all this said, there is an evident gap 
between acknowledging these rights and exercising them in practice. In 
the case of the Costa Rican state, some of these claims – territorial rights 
in particular – have been ignored consistently throughout the past four 
decades since the creation of the Indigenous Reserves.  
Over the course of chapters 5 to 8, I have consistently argued about 
the importance of neoliberal multiculturalism for understanding the 
interaction between indigenous peoples and the Costa Rican state in the 
context of implementation of new conservation practices. Following Van 
Cott (2006) and Hale (2005), neoliberal multiculturalism is a process by 
which the state – the Latin American states, in particular – engage with 
multiculturalism (mostly in response of the aforementioned international 
pressures to do so) leading to new possibilities of political recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ rights, while at the same time establishing new forms 
of political and disciplinary control over these populations and of the 
political demands of their representatives. Put simply, while it may 
establish new spaces for political participation and even empowerment, 
neoliberal multiculturalism is not the road for changing historical forms 
of political inequality faced by the Costa Rican indigenous peoples. 
Indeed, as the case of the PSA shows, while the ADIs may gain necessary 
financial resources to develop policies suitable for the cultural, political 
and economic reality of the Bribri and the Cabécar, it has to accept the 
commodification and financialization of its forest resources, relinquish 
political control over patches of the indigenous territory and submit to 
constant state conservation auditing in return. Neoliberal 
multiculturalism is undeniably a complicated subject: on the one hand, it 
seems to check the more deleterious consequences of neoliberal reform, 
but on the other, it intensifies the articulation of indigenous peoples with 
neoliberalism in new and potentially problematic ways.  
Overall, this dissertation has shown how the institutional cracks 
resulting from tension between indigenous activism and neoliberal 
technocratic conservation, result in a new politics of multiculturalism. The 
Costa Rican neoliberal state attempts to solve indigenous demands 
through different ways, but mainly through the means of guaranteeing 
their incorporation within the space of bureaucratic decision-making. 
However, this form of official recognition is limited from the start, leading 
to a small chance of actual reform of the power relations that have 
historically defined the relationship between the Talamancans and the 
Costa Rican state. In the end, it almost seems like if the possibility of a 
slight reform blunts the edge of actual political resistance, as the truly 
important issues for the Bribri and the Cabécar – territorial autonomy, 
self-development and access to stable forms of funding for their projects – 
remain largely untouched. Cultural differences regarding their approach 
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towards territorial politics are taken into account in the discourse of the 
managers, project officials and state political authorities interviewed for 
this dissertation, yet the translation of this recognition into political action 
is not always reflective of the hopes of the indigenous activists and 
politicians. The historical roots of the liminality of the Bribri and the 
Cabécar are never questioned, just acknowledged and then put aside. 
Moreover, neoliberal multiculturalism seems to privilege a form of 
indigenous political participation that is favorable to the wider neoliberal 
project. Indeed, if one thing can be extracted from the political justification 
given to the Cacao Program, the PSA and REDD+ is that there is a great 
deal of appropriation of indigenous culture and rights in order to offer a 
development agenda that is friendly to neoliberal tenets of market 
expansion, political decentralization and citizen responsibility. 
Within these institutional cracks, cultural difference may be 
welcomed by neoliberal multiculturalism, but it is not in the way in which 
it could be hoped by the various indigenous organizations and activists 
interviewed for this research, as there is no confrontation with the 
historical origins of the real problematiques behind their poverty and their 
liminal position as citizens of this country. Moreover, the most critical 
projects constantly addressed by these leaders – territorial autonomy and 
their right to self-determination – is rejected first hand by the Costa Rican 
state. In the end, it seems like if neoliberal multiculturalism would tend to 
favor a particular type of indigenous activism and identity formation 
while neglecting the rest, the reality of environmental policy-making in 
the context of RBLA is representative of the situation of indigenous 
politics in Costa Rica, whereby state policy does recognize ethnic 
pluralism though transformed in both content and reach under the rubric 
of neoliberal multiculturalism.  
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Appendix	1.	Interviews	
Respondent	 Type	of	interview	 Number	
Talamancan	BID-MAG	Cacao	Program	beneficiaries	
-	Amubre	(8)	
-	Sepecue	(7)	
-	Shiroles	(7)	
-	San	Miguel	(8)	
Semi-
structured	
30	
Talamancan	people	living	nearby	PILA	
-	Kachabri	(Group:	8)	
-	Amubre	(Group:	7)	
-	Kachabri	(4)	
-	Amubre	(3)	
Semi-
structured,	
individual	
and	group	
interview	
9	
Talamancan	beneficiaries	of	INBio	Tourism	Project	
-	Suretka	(Group:	4)	
-	Shiroles	(Group:	4)	
-	Suretka	(3)	
-	Shiroles	(3)	
Semi-
structured,	
Individual	
and	group	
interview	
8	
Talamancan	people	living	nearby	PSA	programs	
-	Amubre	(6)	
-	Gavilán	Canta	(5)	
Semi-
structured	
11	
Talamancan	Indigenous	Integral	Development	
Associations	
-	President,	ADITIBRI	
-	Vicepresident,	ADITIBRI	
-	Officer	in	Charge	of	Forests	and	Territorial	Affairs,	
ADITIBRI	
-	Officer	in	Charge	of	Indigenous	Education,	
ADITIBRI	
-	Accountant,	ADITIBRI	
-	Former	ADITIBRI	President	1	(x	2)	
-	Former	ADITIBRI	President	2	
-	Park	Ranger,	ADITIBRI	
-	President,	ADITICA		
-	Vicepresident	ADITICA	
-	Former	ADITICA	President	
-	Local	leaders	and	awapa,	Neighborhood	Councils	
(8)	
Semi-
structured	
20	
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Local	Talamancan	indigenous	organizations	
-	President,	APPTA	
-	President,	ACOMUITA	(x2)	
-	Local	Leader,	Talamancan	Authocthonous	Peoples	
Union	
-	President,	Koswak	Indigenous	Association	
-	Director,	RIBCA	
-	Political	Leader,	Talamanca	por	la	Vida	y	por	la	
Tierra	(x	3)	
-	President,	STRIBAWPA	
-	President,	CACTA	
-	President,	Association	of	Plantain	Producers	of	the	
Sixaola	River	
-	President,	COOPETISOLA	
-	President,	Bocatorean	Cacao	Cooperative	
(COCABO)	
-	President,	Association	of	Organic	Peasnt	Producers	
(ACAPRO)	
Semi-
structured	
15	
State	agricultural	and	environmental	agencies	in	
Costa	Rica	
-	PILA	Administrator,	ACLAC-SINAC	(x	2)	
-	RBLA	Heritage	Site	Promotor,	ACLAC-SINAC	
-	PILA	Park	Ranger	1,	ACLAC-SINAC	
-	PILA	Park	Ranger	2,	ACLAC-SINAC	
-	Regional	Director,	ACLAC-SINAC	
-	Regional	Manager	for	Limón	Office,	FONAFIFO	
-	Monitoring	and	Verification	Director,	FONAFIFO	
-	REDD+	Executive	Secretary,	FONAFIFO	
-	REDD+	Public	Relations	Officer,	FONAFIFO	
-	R-PP	Consultant,	FONAFIFO	
-	SESA	Consultant,	FONAFIFO	
-	Climate	Change	Unit	Director,	MINAE	
-	Director,	Binational	Project	of	the	Sixaola	River	
Basin	(BID-FEM)	
-	BID-MAG	National	Coordinator,	MAG	
-	NCP	Director,	MAG	
-	NCP	Officer,	MAG	
-	Regional	Sixaola	Director,	MAG	
-	Evaluating	Consultant,	BID-MAG	Project,	MAG	
Semi-
structured	
19	
Other	state	institutions	in	Costa	Rica	
-	Executive	Secretary	of	the	Frontier	Development	
Cooperation	Agreement,	MIDEPLAN	
-	President,	CONAI	
-	Mayor,	Municipality	of	Talamanca	
Semi-
structured	
3	
State	environmental	agencies	in	Panama	
-	Changuinola	Regional	Director,	ANAM	
Semi-
structured	
7	
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-	National	Director,	Mesoamerican	Biological	
Corridor	for	the	Panamanian	Atlantic	Seaboard	
(CBMAP)	
-	PILA	Administrator,	ANAM	
-	Climate	Change	Unit	Director,	ANAM	
-	Environmental	Quality	Director,	ANAM	
-	Hydrological	Resources	Director,	ANAM	
-	Evaluating	Consultant,	BID-GEF	
Other	state	institutions	in	Panama	
-	General	Director,	General	Direction	of	Indigenous	
Peoples,	Ministry	of	Government	(MINGOB)	
-	Coordinator	of	the	Frontier	Development	
Cooperation	Agreement,	Ministry	of	Economy	and	
Finances	(MEF)	
Semi-
structured	
2	
Local	Talamancan	non-indigenous	NGOs	and	CSOs	
-	Director,	Talamanca-Caribe	Biological	Corridor	
-	Officer	in	Charge	of	PES,	Talamanca-Caribe	
Biological	Corridor	
-	President,	ANAI	
-	President,	Talamancan	Tourism	Association	(ATEC)	
Semi-
structured	
4	
National	and	international	NGOs	and	CSOs	based	in	
Costa	Rica	
-	Officer	in	Charge	of	Climate	Change	Adaptation	
Project,	IUCN	
-	Officer	in	Charge	of	the	Environmental	Economics	
Project,	IUCN	
-	Director,	Foundation	for	the	Development	of	the	
Central	Mountain	Range	(FUNDECOR)	
-	Director,	National	Indigenous	Roundtable	(MNI)	
-	Director,	Oilwatch	Central	America	
-	President,	Forestry	Business	Chamber	(CCF)	
-	Coordinator,	National	Forestry	Union	(UNAFOR)	
-	Tourism	Program	Coordinator,	National	
Biodiversity	Institute	(INBio)	
Semi-
structured	
8	
National	and	international	NGOs	and	CSOs	based	in	
Panama	
-	Director,	Panamanian	Centre	for	Social	Action	
Studies	(CEASPA)	
-	Director,	Center	for	Environmental	Incidence	
(CIAM)	
-	Director,	Panamanian	Ecological	Consultants	
(CEPSA)	
-	Director,	Fundación	PANAMA	
-	National	Director,	National	Coordinating	Body	of	
Indigenous	Peoples	in	Panama	(COONAPIP)		
Semi-
structured	
5	
 194 
Academic	institutions	in	Costa	Rica	and	Panama	
-	Climate	Change	Researcher,	EARTH	
-	Officer	in	Charge	of	Cacao	Project,	CATIE	
-	Environmental	Economics	Professor,	Technological	
Institute	of	Costa	Rica	(ITCR)	
-	Indigenous	People	Researcher,	Development	
Observatory,	UCR	
-	Kioskos	Ambientales	Program,	UCR	(x	3)	
-	Talamanca-Sixaola	Researcher,	School	of	
Sociology,	UCR	
-	Indigenous	People	Researcher,	University	of	
Panama	
Semi-
structured	
10	
Total	 	 151	
In	order	to	safeguard	the	anonymity	of	the	respondents,	this	table	does	not	use	their	
actual	names	and	identifies	them	using	their	town	of	residence	or	the	institution	to	
which	they	were	affiliated	at	the	time	of	the	interview.		
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